FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-96-115
Thursday
13 June 1996

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FBIS-SOV-96-115 *13 June 1996*

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Russia: Yeltsin Addresses Independence Day Rally 12 Jun

LD1206164696 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1525 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Address by Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the Independence Day rally and concert on Vasilevskiy Spusk, near Moscow's Red Square attended by Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Compatriots! Dear Muscovites! We used to meet here, by the Kremlin walls, during the most crucial times for Russia. Each time you offered me your support. Thank you very much for this. I thank you for your faith in me, for your love and hope. I, too, have faith in you. I pin my hopes on you. Dear citizens of Russia, dear Muscovites! Today we are marking the newest holiday in the history of our country. We are marking the Day of Russia. [loud cheers] This is the day of our freedom, the freedom to say what we think and to do what we say, the freedom to choose our future. Statehood has been returned to Russia along with its history, culture and faith. We have assumed responsibility for our own future.

The new Russia is still young but we have overcome any difficulties and obstacles. That's how it has been and how it will be. [Cheers]

I would like today to express words of gratitude to Moscow and Muscovites for your courage, for your understanding, for your support. We chose freedom and human dignity but there are many people who oppose this choice. They wanted to intimidate us once again by the blast in the metro yesterday. Scoundrels are even willing to resort to something like this: wrecking the elections. But the country will not forgive them for this. We will not forgive this. [Loud cheers.] They have no future. There are more and more people in Russia who have begun to believe in themselves and their potential. Time is working in our favor and we must not waste that time. Then every one of us, every citizen of Russia; all of us will live decently like human beings. I am sure that we will pass on to our children a free and prosperous country, a great Russia. [loud cheers]

Three days are left to the election. I will ensure you freedom of choice but the choice is up to you. I am confident of our victory. I believe in myself. I believe in you, Moscow. I believe in you, I believe in young people, I believe in our people of Russia. Thank you. We will win. [Loud cheers and chanting of "Yeltsin! Yeltsin!"]

Russia: Police Say 500,000 Rallied for Yeltsin 12 Jun

LD1306102396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1001 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — Roughly 500,000 people took part in rallies in support of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov Wednesday, police spokesman Vladimir Vershkov told Interfax Thursday.

The earlier figure of 125,000 reported to Interfax referred to the number of people who marched after the rock concert/meeting on Red Square.

There were over 200,000 people at the concert/meeting at the Kremlin, he said.

Russia: Yeltsin 'Way Ahead' in Nationwide Straw Poll

MM1206120496 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jun 96 p 6

[Report on results of polls carried out at the address No. 2, Pushkin Street in various Russian cities and villages by Rustam Arifdzhanov, Boris Bronshteyn, Nikolay Gritchin, Sergey Zhdakayev, Aleksandr Zilbert, Aleksandr Kalinin, Valeriy Konovalov, Boris Reznik, Kirill Svetitskiy, and Boris Sinyavskiy; date of polls not given: "Who Gets the Votes of No. 2, Pushkin Street, From Khabarovsk to Ryazan"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Khabarovsk: Brisk Start for the President

In Khabarovsk, this apartment block [No. 2, Pushkin Street] is a prestige building. At one time it was only the command personnel of the Far East Military District who lived in its — "Stalin-plan" — apartments. Even now there are a good many retired men here wearing epaulets with large stars. But all kinds of different citizens have moved into some of the apartments on an exchange basis.

In the first apartment our correspondent was greeted by a slender elderly lady in a tracksuit, the wife of a military pensioner, who reported that husband and wife will go and vote without fail, but won't say who for. However, in Apartment No. 2 a tall gray-haired man with a military bearing declared that he will vote for Zyuganov for sure. He voted for Yeltsin before, but now he thinks that if Yeltsin stays president "the country will inevitably be ruined and plundered." He is a military pensioner and hopes for the restoration of Russia's own economy. The residents in Apartment No. 4, a husband and wife who work for an insurance

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company and are just 40, will vote for Yeltsin, whom they also voted for before; they are afraid of social upheavals. In Apartment 9 a woman who was formerly an engineer and is now unemployed wanted to vote for Yeltsin until only recently, "but the campaigning is so dumb it makes you really want to do the opposite," so she is still thinking about it. She hopes that Yeltsin, if he is elected, "will get smart and get rid of his terrible entourage, who you can't look at without tears of revulsion."

But in Apartment 10 it is the other way round. A pensioner and grandmother with a little grandson stated on behalf of the whole family that they voted for Yavlinskiy before, but will now vote for Yeltsin. "We have a hard life, but we've lost the fear. Some people have forgotten what it's like when they coerce you.... And life goes on." The children are working, but have not received their wages for some months. The grandmother's pension is 346,000 rubles [R].

And in Apartment 18 a pensioner, formerly director of the central food store, intends to vote for Lebed "so that he imposes order."

After the first stop, the incumbent president has seized the lead in our elections. At building No. 2 on Pushkin Street in Khabarovsk, five people intend to vote for Yeltsin, one each for Zyuganov and Lebed, three don't know, and two wouldn't say. So the president has the majority, but it is less than half of those polled. Let us move further west.

Kemerovo: Against Everyone

An elderly woman invited us in. Over the threshold we were greeted by...Lenin. A bust of the leader was displayed prominently at the very top of a dresser of crockery. Ilich gazed silently and sternly out from behind a heap of books protecting him from the world. The mistress of the house, the 67-year-old Yekaterina Petrovna Kharchishina, proved much more welcoming and talkative. She used to work at the "Karbolit" plant until she retired; her husband, a driver at the nitrogenous fertilizers plant, died five years ago. The daughters live separately with their families, here in Kemerovo. Yekaterina Petrovna has five grandchildren. At one time she used to get a pension of R116, and with what her husband got it came to about R300 a month — a decent amount, in those days. And her husband, as a war invalid, had concessions and was on the list at a special store. Now she has 200,000 a month, plus a local Kuzbass pension of 97,000. The pension arrives late, you can never tell when the mailman will knock. At the moment Yekaterina Petrovna has yet to receive her pension for May. True, there are some concessions: She pays half price for coal. She thinks it was the reforms that brought her down: She sold her car to her son-in-law and put R9,000 into her savings book and thought she was well provided for, but now it's all evaporated....

A 100-percent vote for Comrade Zyuganov, you would think. But no.

"What was so good about life under the Communists? My man was in the party. When he retired, they used to visit him: They came once a month for the party dues. But now, I wait and wait, but nobody comes. I met one of them and I asked him: Why don't you come for the dues? We don't pay any more, he said, even the ones who work at the plant don't pay. So they've stopped calling. They don't want the people, just the dues. That's the kind of party it is. And everything we bought in our lives, it all meant humiliation, waiting in line, lists: the refrigerator, the furniture.... What kind of a life is that?"

Yekaterina Petrovna will definitely turn out for the elections, but she does not yet really know who to vote for. "It's time Yeltsin took it easy, he's not a very healthy man, you can see that straight away. Or Fedorov — what does he want with the presidency at his age? He's the same age as me!"

So our "elections" in Kemerovo did not change the situation. Here the voter at No. 2, Pushkin has not yet made up her mind about her sympathies, although she will turn out. Yeltsin is still in front with five, followed by Zyuganov and Lebed with one each, but now there are four don't knows. But it has become clear that elderly Russians are certainly not the loyal combat detachment of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]. And although the veterans we polled, living in eight cities and population centers, mainly support Zyuganov (34 percent, with 17 percent for Yeltsin), more than 44 percent of them are people like Yekaterina Petrovna, who have not yet decided who to vote for. So it is still possible, and important, to fight for the old people's votes. But the Volga region is before us.

Kazan: Fedorov and Zhirinovskiy Make an Appearance

Conducting polls here is convenient. You stand in the communal corridor between the crate of potatoes and the stepladder, and in 15 minutes or so you get to see all the residents. One, carrying a saucepan, collides with you, another bumps into you with a bowl. And you ask him a very relevant question: "What do you think about Martin Shakkum, at this ungodly hour?"

Within range of the dictaphone, the apartment block displayed a high level of activeness. Of 23 residents

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covered by the poll, only two do not want to turn out for the elections. "I don't trust anyone!" said a woman called Alfiya, who experienced an upsurge of optimism for the last time when Academician Sakharov appeared on the platforms. "My husband is at the 'Tochmash' plant and he hasn't received his wages since November, he's gone down from engineer to worker — it's all the same, still no wages."

Eight people will vote but do not yet know who for. The other 13 votes have been distributed beforehand. Zyuganov can count on two of the residents. On his side are Gulya the bookkeeper, a former Communist; and a young nurse, who has no political unity in her family: Ma Irina is for Yeltsin, and Pa Khamziabdul Gamidovich, a refrigerator mechanic, is still considering.

Fedorov and Zhirinovskiy could get one vote each in this block. Also in a politically divided family. Where the father, the crane operator Vladimir Ivanovich, prefers Yeltsin. The mother, Alevtina Ilinichna, a former actress, respects Fedorov for giving his people work and wages. It proved impossible to find out why her son respects Zhirinovskiy, and the young falcon himself refused to talk.

But those voting for Yeltsin provided arguments in support of their position. Gulnara the music teacher reported that her husband Igor, a builder and decorator, now has the opportunity to conclude advantageous contracts, but if the Communists come, they will insist on Marxist-Leninist foundations even for the building of offices and will not let people earn money. Yekaterina Mikhaylovna and Konstantin Igorevich had received no news for three months from their son Sasha, who is fighting in Chechnya. But now a letter has just come. Now the mother and father cannot wait for peace. Metrologists by profession, they have carefully calculated their choice and came to the conclusion that nobody will handle that war more successfully than Yeltsin.

So where are we after Kazan? A dramatic surge forward for Yeltsin, which is only to be expected. After all, the republic with the highest level of sovereignty values its exceptional status and its guarantor. So, nine for Yeltsin, two for Zyuganov, one each for Fedorov and Zhirinovskiy, eight don't knows, and two who will not turn out. Again Yeltsin has a majority, but less than half those polled. In all, there are 14 for Yeltsin, three for Zyuganov, one each for Lebed, Fedorov, and Zhirinovskiy, 12 don't knows, and two will not turn out.

What is the mood in the south?

Stavropol: Zyuganov Begins To Catch Up

Thirty-eight people answered our correspondent's questions. All of them intend to take part in the elections. Sympathies were distributed among only four candidates — Yeltsin, Zhirinovskiy, Zyuganov, and Yavlinskiy. Lebed's and Fedorov's names were mentioned as attractive leaders, but people here are not going to vote for them. Some because it would mean taking votes away from the main contenders, and nobody believes Lebed or Fedorov can win. Others because they would find it more appropriate to see Lebed as defense minister and Fedorov as one of the government leaders. The name of Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Nemtsov was also mentioned — the 74-year-old Valentina Sidorovna Bekhtereva intends to vote for him in the presidential elections in the year 2001.

Two people intend to vote for Zhirinovskiy, but they are younger than the others — under 40. Three Yavlinskiy supporters are close to pension age. And these voters are prepared to go over to Yeltsin in the second round.

Zyuganov has eight supporters, with an average age of 73. The pensioners in this apartment block believe that life has become materially worse under the present authorities. Yeltsin got most votes of all here, the average age of his 13 voters is 49, they voted for him before, but now they are cooler toward their chosen one. "He's the least of the evils today," doctor Margarita Zvolibovskaya says. The main criticism of the president is the war in Chechnya.

In percentage terms, Yeltsin lost ground in the Caucasus. He has 34 percent, while Zyuganov is gaining on him with 21 percent, Yavlinskiy has 8 percent, and Zhirinovskiy 5 percent. Again, more people are postponing their decision until the last moment. They now account for 32 percent. What next?

Shuya, Ivanovo Oblast: Surge for Zhirinovskiy, Not Counting the "Tom Cats"

In the ancient Russian city that once gave its name to a whole princely clan, at No. 2 in the first Pushkin Street Aleksandr Dyman, elder of the Church of Seventh-Day Adventists, is patiently awaiting the second coming of Christ. He was sent here from the Caucasus, he bought this house, he adapted half of it for services and lives in the other half with his wife and two small daughters. Aleksandr the elder will definitely vote, because you should render unto God that which is God's, but render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's, and he has determined his political sympathies, but he refused to give the name of this choice — it is, so to speak, a personal matter. Especially since all this

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is vanity in comparison with the end of the world, for which the elder is preparing himself and his flock.

There are six streets in Shuya that bear Pushkin's name. True, the great poet never walked along them, because they grew up in the twenties of our own century and were all successively named after Ryzhovskaya — in honor of the landowner who once owned these lands. But 1937, the year of the shootings, arrived, that name became unpopular with the authorities, and it happened to be the centennial of Pushkin's death, so all the streets became Pushkin Street overnight. This whole sector consists of private houses.

In the second Pushkin Street retired warrant officer Yerofeyev reported with army bluntness that he will vote for Yeltsin. "In 27 years of service and 30 years of CPSU membership I got sick of standing to attention before political workers of every rank, in fear of losing my epaulets along with my party card."

Grandma Masha Belova, in the third Pushkin Street, has not yet made up her mind, though she will definitely vote. "I was thinking about Yeltsin, but my pension hasn't arrived." And the pension is the only form of campaigning for her. Campaigners do not trouble Shuya. They drop a leaflet in the mailbox, stick a picture on the fence — and that's it. The pictures are of Yeltsin, Zhirinovskiy, and occasionally Yavlinskiy. Zhirinovskiy is the winner. He is different everywhere — sometimes in the uniform of a defender of the Fatherland, sometimes in the role of defender of the suffering, and, on the road leading to the church, with a priest.

On the fourth Pushkin Street, No. 2 burned down. The owners got drunk and failed to take proper care. Where fate is leading them now and who they will vote for, God only knows.

On the fifth Pushkin Street former teacher Marya Vasilyevna, who is 93, remembers life under the emperor, under Kerenskiy, and under the Bolsheviks. She cannot walk any more, but if they bring the ballot box to her house the old teacher will vote for Zyuganov. The best part of her life was under the Communists, it is dear to her heart, whereas Marya Vasilyevna cannot think of any word for Yeltsin except "plague."

At No. 2 on the sixth Pushkin Street lives Gennadiy Tikhonovich Seredkin, whose sympathies incline toward Zhirinovskiy. True, he is afraid that Zhirinovskiy might start a war, but he badly wants order. At the vegetable oil plant where Gennadiy Tikhonovich words, they have not been paid their wages for five months now.

There are also several additional inhabitants who are nicknamed the "tom cats" — people who have come out of jail and have lost their homes and their jobs. No doubt they will vote too. But since the "tom cats" live a mainly nocturnal life, it was not possible to identify their political sympathies.

Uncertainty reached a peak in Shuya. Of those who intend to take part in the elections, 38 percent do not know how they will vote in the end, and Yeltsin is again ahead of everyone, on 31 percent. The main rival here is Zhirinovskiy; 15 percent is his best result. Naturally, that is among those who live on Pushkin Streets.

Yasnogorsk, Tula Oblast: A Yavlinskiy Revival

This street, in a small town, confirms the once popular theory about the erosion of the boundaries between city and countryside. Anatoliy Chesnokov, who lives at No. 2, Pushkin Street, works as a machine operator on a neighboring farm and every morning erases that boundary with the wheels of his motorcycle. His own street, by which he goes to work, turns smoothly into a forest road. The boletus mushrooms are already appearing in the verges, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich says.

He is about 40, he has two children, a son of 13 and a daughter of 16. His wife, Nina Ivanovna, works as a cashier. Their wages are modest. Chesnokov, working 14 hours a day in the sowing and reaping seasons, earns as much as a million. The rest of the time it is about 400,000. His wife gets approximately the same. Housing is the main problem. The four of them live in 16 meters.

In the first round the husband and wife intend to vote for Yavlinskiy, but in the second round they will see. But grandma is a Yeltsin supporter.

"Yes, I'm for Borka [Boris]," Nina's mother Yevdokiya Nikolayevna Kolotvinova confirmed. "He's my friend. I like him a lot. And my husband Ivan Borisovich likes him too. Why are we for him? Because we've seen life."

Yevdokiya Nikolayevna was at the front as a signals operator and an antiaircraft gunner, she went on reconnaissance, and after demobilization she worked on a kolkhoz. "For a day's work they gave you 200 grams of grain and 2 kopeks in money. Nowadays, if you're willing to work, you can live."

Apart from the Chesnokovs and the Kolotvinovs, there are two more families in the building. They all have identical apartments: a 16-meter room, a kitchen with a gas stove, a shed, and a bit of land. But they all vote differently. The lathe operator Yuriy Gutov has firmly decided to support Yeltsin: "We can't change him now, let him finish the job." In the Galushko family the daughter intends to vote for Zhirinovskiy, while the father and mother have not made up their minds.

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In percentage terms it turns out that Yavlinskiy has improved matters somewhat, with 24 percent, while Yeltsin is in the lead here too — 37 percent. Next comes the countryside.

Vladimir Oblast, Settlement of Sobinka: President in Front

Chasing off her dog, Lyudmila Pavlovna Lebedeva, an ordinary countrywoman of 57 wearing valenki [traditional felt boots], opened the gate to us. In the living part of her peasant hut she sat us at a table on which a piece of paper inviting her to visit the polling place on 16 June lay in conspicuous isolation.

That is the extent of the campaign literature. Nevertheless Lyudmila Pavlovna and her son and daughter-in-law know who they are going to vote for — Yeltsin. But her husband is undecided.

"When he's been drinking he starts running around the house looking for his gun," Lebedeva tells us. "I'll blast those democrats to hell, he shouts. At times like that he likes Zhirinovskiy... But when he's sober he's calm."

Ldyumila Pavlovna is part of the rural intelligentsia; she works as a nurse at a psychoneurological hospital.

The family do not like the Communists.

"What's there to like about them?" Lyudmila Pavlovna asks. "There's a patient at the psychiatric hospital who is in love with Brezhnev. From the time of Malaya Zemlya we were more than just soulmates, she says. I have a son by Leonid Ilich, she says; he now lives in Israel, our historical homeland. She's also written poetry dedicated to Brezhnev. A quiet old lady, and then a letter arrives for her from Jerusalem with a photograph of her son and grandchildren; and the son is the spiting image of Brezhnev."

[IZVESTIYA] So might this poor woman have been subjected to psychiatric repression for this connection?

"What do you mean?" Lebedeva says. "She has ordinary senile dementia."

As we picked our way along Pushkin Street to the main road we questioned other village inhabitants. Many of them are against Yeltsin but they also fear Zyuganov. The only thing you can definitely say today is that the people love Pushkin. But he's not going to sort out who they should vote for, either. The poet is dead.

The way one house containing one family votes could be disregarded. But how many such Sobinkas there are in Russia and how many such families! So we will record it. Seventy-five percent for Yeltsin, 25 percent for Zhirinovskiy. No abstentions.

Ryazan: Vlasov Here, and Gorbachev Too

Natalya Sergeyevna from apartment 10 and Olga Ivanovna from apartment 11 were having an argument on the landing. They are both now pensioners. They've seen a lot in their lifetime. Natalya Sergeyevna Smirnova was a nurse before she retired. She's going to vote for someone who will raise pensions. Yeltsin or Yavlinskiy.

"Just you wait and see the kind of raise they'll give you!" Olga Ivanovna Lapshina told her. She voted for the Communists in both the State Duma and the City Soviet elections. They won both times.

"Never in my life will I vote for your Communists. I remember how my father and we lived in the village of Kanishchevo and worked on the kolkhoz for tally-sticks and labor-days. Under the Communists we lived like animals, without passports, hungry and cold!"

In apartment 26 father-in-law and son-in-law were not arguing. They were fixing a toilet. "I went to the housing office and they told me: 'If you flood your neighbors, then we'll come.' Call that authority? No, I'll unequivocally go for Zyuganov."

Father-in-law and son-in-law are in agreement. Apart from Zyuganov, the former is also prepared to support Vlasov. And is not afraid to say so. "Write it down: My name is Gavryushin. I was in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] all my life."

"And my name...," interrupted Volodya.

"They don't need your name, Volodya. I'm a pensioner, a Category II invalid. But you're still young and have to work. They'll print it in the paper, and when there's a new regime they'll remember...."

There are many pensioners but few young people in "our" Ryazan apartment block. But the pensioners are by no means as unanimous in supporting the old order as it sometimes seen. For example, former teacher Galina Alekseyevna Pavlovskaya from apartment 54 is most likely going to vote for Lebed and, in the second round, for Yeltsin. Her husband, Nikolay Fedorovich, a retired major, also favors Yeltsin, but will vote for Gorbachev in the first round. In his view, the reforms should be continued by the person who started them in practice.

Olga Nikolayevna Yakovleva, a pensioner from apartment 46 and a veteran of the war, says: "I was and will be for the Communists! May Zyuganov win!" But Aleksandra Petrovna Yermachkova, a pensioner from No. 59 and a former doctor, states with equal confidence: "Yeltsin is my president! My kin — I love him like a son!"

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According to our poll, in Ryazan Zyuganov has caught up with Yeltsin. Here, in the apartment block at 2 Pushkin Street, they each scored 30 percent. But some other contenders also appeared on the list. Lebed has 15 percent and Yavlinskiy 7 percent. The newcomers to our poll — Vlasov and Gorbachev — scored 5 percent each. Eight percent of the residents will make up their minds later.

Let us sum up. Only let us repeat once again: Our poll does not lay claim to unalloyed sociological purity. We were by no means trying to show how people intend to vote in Kazan and Ryazan, Khabarovsk, and other cities and villages. Our data reflect a poll of only the residents of 2 Pushkin Street. Specific residents from specific apartments. It is this, we believe, that makes our study interesting.

Summing Up

Despite the notion that the provinces are pro-Communist Yeltsin scored 35 percent with us and is way ahead of his nearest rival — Zyuganov. Only 12 percent favor Gennadiy Andreyevich, and most of those polled by us were people of pension age, apparently the most communist section of the electorate. Because Pushkin Street most often turned out to be in an old part of town. No. 2 is also an old building. Thirty years old in some places and a full 60 in others. But even the elderly people, while on the whole preferring Zyuganov — 34 percent — were not one- sided in their choice, as you can see. So the Communist 12 percent — if that is what happens on 16 June — is an entitlement to go into the second right.

Vladimir Volfovich will be somewhat distressed. According to our calculations he came third. As in the last presidential elections. He scored 11 percent. Just behind the Communists.

Next comes Yavlinskiy with 6 percent. Lebed scored 3. The closest to them scored less than 1 percent: Fedorov with 0.8 and Gorbachev and Vlasov with 0.6 percent each. The other three contenders did not even get that. The residents of 2 Pushkin Street mentioned Tuleyev but realized that he was bluffing and so nobody intended to vote for him, although he was spoken of in respectful terms. Nobody mentioned Bryntsalov and Shakkum.

Naturally Moscow, Petersburg, and Nizhniy Novgorod would bring in different results. But this was the way we found it in the provinces, on Pushkin Street.

One more adjustment should possibly also be made. When a person with a dictaphone comes from Moscow some people might be keen to tell him about his loyalty to the authorities. And again, when a person from IZVESTIYA comes, our canny citizen knows that he has to be answered in a different way to a person from PRAVDA. But here too, we think, the adjustment should be slight. The people today realize that the press and the authorities are not the same thing. And if people do not refuse to answer but, on the contrary, do so enthusiastically, they most likely do it candidly.

Another point about the figures. Most servicemen are for Yeltsin. At any rate that's what they say out loud. Among young voters 6 percent are Yeltsinites. Zhirinovskiy and Yavlinskiy shared 20 percent each. One-fifth of young people, although they intend to vote, have not decided who for.

Yeltsin has no rivals among people whose jobs involve mental work — almost three-fourths of voters here back him. Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy score somewhere around 7 percent each. Yavlinskiy and Fedorov score 4 percent each. But among those who do physical jobs Yeltsin, according to our polls, scored less than half the votes. And the person named most frequently as second to him by workers and peasants was by no means the Communist Zyuganov but the anticommunist Zhirinovskiy.

And last, the final figures. The election turnout promises to be high. At least at 2 Pushkin Street. The overwhelming majority of those polled intend to vote. Admittedly 31 percent of them had still not decided who for. But there was still a week left to persuade them.

Russia: Yeltsin Heads Opinion Center's Final Poll

MM1206150996 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Final Poll by All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The poll was conducted 5-11 June using a sample representing the adult (aged 18 and above) rural and urban population of Russia. In all 1,600 people were polled in 58 population centers.

The poll was conducted by the interview method. The statistical error margin is 3.8 percent.

Some 80 percent of those polled intend to take part in the first round of the elections. Here is the breakdown of their answers to the question:

For which of the Russian presidential candidates will you vote? (The question was commissioned by the NTV television company's "Itogi" program).

B. Yeltsin — 36 percent.
G. Zyuganov — 24 percent.
A. Lebed — 10 percent.

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G. Yavlinskiy — 8 percent.
V. Zhirinovskiy — 6 percent.
S. Fedorov — 3 percent.
A. Tuleyev — 1 percent.

The other candidates received less than 1 percent of the votes.

Some 2 percent intend to vote against them all.

About 9 percent of those who intend to take part in the 16 June vote found it hard to say.

Some 73 percent of those polled intend to take part in the second round.

Here is how their votes break down (the question was commissioned by the NTV television company's "Itogi" program):

For Yeltsin — 53 percent.
For Zyuganov — 36 percent.
Against both — 5 percent.
Don't know — 6 percent.

The voters' actual behavior may differ slightly from what they say in polls. On the basis of the results of the first round vote the main contenders could receive 2-3 percent more or less than the results of polls have shown.

Russia: Analyst: Yeltsin To Win in Center, Zyuganov in Provinces

LD1306114596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1116 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian electorate is divided not only into those who back the current government and those who support the so-called national-patriotic alliance, but also into the urban and rural categories.

The parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1995 revealed that the rural voters opted mostly for the communists or Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, while the voters in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other major industrial centres cast their ballots in favour of the "party of power."

With this in mind, it is of interest to take a closer look at Leonid Smirnyagin's prediction of how the voters will behave in the June 16 presidential elections, depending on where they live. Smirnyagin is an expert of the President's analytical department.

According to him, around 10 percent of Russia's electorate live in Moscow and St. Petersburg, another 20 percent are inhabitants of the capitals of the republics, territories and regions. Some 30 percent of the voters reside in district-level towns. It means that some 60 percent of the country's electorate are urban dwellers.

Another 30 percent of the voters live in "mixed areas," and the remaining 10 percent are "purely rural" inhabitants. Of these latter 40 percent, 26 are "100-percent rural folk", judging by the country's 1989 census.

Interestingly, the rural inhabitants usually are among the most active voters, and political scientists believe that they are also among the "easiest to control," as they easily yield to pressure from their superiors on the collective and state farms and campaigners for the Communist party and the Mikhail Lapshin Agrarian party.

Moreover, the supporters of Boris Yeltsin who have done their best to win the voters, particularly young ones, in the major urban areas, have hardly been seen or heard in the country's rural areas.

Itar-Tass correspondents report from the Russian provinces that the inhabitants and the local press are clearly motivated in their electoral behaviour by the social, economic and political situation in each concrete republic, territory or region.

In Tatarstan, where the monthly minimal wage is the highest in Russia at 110,000 roubles, the voters actively backed the "party of power" — the Our Home Russia movement — in last year's parliamentary elections. The political situation in the Vologda region has been normalised after Governor Nikolay Podgornov was relieved of his duties for a number of gross violations of law. The voters in the Arkhangelsk, Voronezh and Orel regions are now much better disposed since the payment of wages and pensions was normalised.

At the same time, the failure to restore the situation to normalcy has resulted in mass actions of protest in Smolensk, Ryazan and the Kostroma region where people blocked road traffic, and in Bashkiria where the teachers have called an indefinite strike and the builders are ready to begin industrial action at any time.

It is no secret that some labour unions sympathise with the communists and are doing their best to "fan passions" in work collectives.

It is likely therefore that the results of the presidential elections will confirm the fact that the economic reforms encouraged "from above" have already yielded positive fruit in the life of the capitals and major cities but have been slow to produce tangible changes in the life of the subsidised regions and remote rural areas.

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Russia: VTsIOM's Last Poll Before 16 Jun Election Reported

MK1306111196 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 1

[SEGODNYA report: "Yeltsin's and Zyuganov's Voters: 36 to 24"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the law "On the Main Guarantees of Citizens' Election Rights," and a corresponding instruction from the Central Electoral Commission, today is the last day when the newspapers can make the results of polls public. Thus, the materials of VTsIOM [All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion] staffers Oleg Savelyev and Lev Gudkov, carried on page three, wind up a series of "forecast" articles ahead of the upcoming presidential elections on Sunday.

The vast majority of Russian sociological institutes and services point to an advantage for the sitting president in the first round of voting, and to a considerable edge on his main rival Gennadiy Zyuganov as early as the first round.

The latest results of a public poll conducted between 5 and 12 June by the VTsIOM, the most authoritative institute in this country, give reason to assume that Boris Yeltsin will lead Gennadiy Zyuganov by 12 percent on Sunday. Thirty-six percent of VTsIOM respondents stated their firm intention to vote for the president in the first round and twenty-four percent, for the communist leader. After Gennadiy Zyuganov the sociologists place Aleksandr Lebed next, with 10 percent of the vote, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy with 8 percent, and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy with 6 percent.

According to the same poll, 52 percent of those who are going to the polls in the second round, in the event of having to choose between Yeltsin and Zyuganov, would prefer the current head of state, and 36 percent would back the left-wing opposition leader.

At the same time SEGODNYA editors think it necessary to underline, echoing the sociologists, that data from such public opinion polls cannot be taken for a forecast of voting results. One can only speak of the tendencies discerned by the sociologists — and one should bear in mind that the actual voting can spring any kind of surprise.

Russia: Final NTV Polls Show Yeltsin With Big Lead Over Zyuganov

LD1206204296 Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Jun 96

[From the "Segodnya" program]

[FBIS Summary] Two opinion polls commissioned by Moscow NTV Television and shown on 12 June give Boris Yeltsin a big lead over Gennadiy Zyuganov in the presidential election on 16 June. The polls, the "Segodnya" presenter said, were the last permitted under electoral law.

The first poll was taken by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center [VTsIOM] polling organization between 5 and 11 June among 1,600 people in 58 urban and rural areas of Russia. Asked for which candidate they would vote, they replied: Yeltsin — 36 percent, Zyuganov — 24, Aleksandr Lebed — 10, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy — 8, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy — 6, Svyatoslav Fedorov — 3, Aman-geldy Tuleyev — 1, Vladimir Bryntsalov, Yuriy Vlasov, Mikhail Gorbachev and Martin Shakkum — each 0.0 percent. Nine percent of those polled were undecided.

According to the Russian Public Opinion and Market Research (ROMIR) poll taken between the 8 and 10 June among 1,500 people in 160 urban and rural areas in 39 component parts of Russia, voters expressed the following preferences: Yeltsin — 34 percent, Zyuganov — 23, Aleksandr Lebed — 8, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy — 7, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy — 5, Svyatoslav Fedorov — 2, Aman-geldy Tuleyev, Yuriy Vlasov, Mikhail Gorbachev and Martin Shakkum — 1 percent each and Vladimir Bryntsalov — 0.0 percent. Eighteen percent of those polled were undecided. Of the undecided, however, "about 50 percent" will probably vote for Zyuganov, ROMIR said.

As for the projected second round of the election, ROMIR predicted that Yeltsin will win 46 and Zyuganov 30 percent while VTsIOM predicted 53 percent for Yeltsin and 36 percent for Zyuganov.

ROMIR also predicted results for a second round in which Zyuganov is opposed by a candidate other than Yeltsin. Thus Lebed would win 35 to Zyuganov's 29 percent and Yavlinskiy would win 34 to Zyuganov's 31 percent.

Russia: Pollsters Predict 40% for Yeltsin, 30% for Zyuganov

LD1206124996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1218 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By Tamara Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 12 (Itar-Tass) — Leading Russian sociologists announced the latest forecast of election results at a news conference on Wednesday. The latest date of "voicing" these data is June 13 at 15:00. Following this, pollsters must keep mum.

Nugzar Betaneli, director of the sociology of parliamentarism institute, forecasts that Boris Yeltsin will collect

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40 percent of votes, Gennadiy Zyuganov — 31 percent. He allocates only 11 percent to Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Aleksandr Lebed — nine percent, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy — five percent and Svyatoslav Fedorov —three percent.

Other hopefuls will not win even one percent of votes, in which Betaneli is also echoed by other sociologists. The permissible error of the forecast amounts "plus-minus" three percent.

Results of Yuriy Levada, director of the All-Russian institute of public opinion, virtually coincide with Betaneli's data concerning the main candidates. A possible low level for Yeltsin's result is 36 percent and the top — over 40 percent.

However, Levada placed Lebed third with 7-10 percent. In Levada's opinion, Yavlinskiy and Zhirinovskiy will collect 6-7 percent each while Fedorov — three percent.

Head of the Vox Populi service Boris Grushin announced the so-called "expert forecast" which was compiled according to poll results of prominent politicians, heads of power structures, legislators and media editor-in-chiefs.

According to these data, Yeltsin and Zyuganov can collect approximately an equal number of votes between 25 and 35 percent. Zhirinovskiy and Yavlinskiy can be in the 5-15 percent bracket.

Lebed will possibly win 5-7 percent, Fedorov — three percent and Gorbachev — 1.5 percent.

The top executives of the three leading Russian poll centres concurred in the opinion that the second round of elections is inevitable. According to Betaneli, "tough struggle and surprising combinations of coalitions" will develop in the interval between the first and the second round of elections.

Russia: Tyumen Predicts 70.3% Voter Turnout, 38.6% for Yeltsin

MM1306111596 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (DOM I OTECHESTVO Supplement) in Russian 13-21 Jun 96 p II

[Report by Vladimir Yefimov from the "Political Thermometer" feature: "Tyumen: According to Vladimir Ulyanov's Predictions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perhaps for the first time the topic of the upcoming presidential elections has pushed into the background the Siberians' concerns for the heroes of "soap operas." This is confirmed by the results of sociological studies carried out this week by the Tyumen Oblast Center for Regional Development Strategy.

"The people of Tyumen really do regard the presidential elections as a matter of supreme importance," the center's leader Vladimir Ulyanov says. "According to our predictions 70.3 percent of our fellow countrymen will turn out for the elections, and the majority of them — 38.6 percent — will vote for Boris Nikolayevich. Only 12.3 percent will vote for Zyuganov, 7.6 percent for Yavlinskiy, 5.5 percent for Zhirinovskiy, 6 percent for Fedorov, 4.8 percent for Lebed, 1.1 percent for Gorbachev, and less than 1 percent for the others."

They say that Vladimir Ilich, who enjoys the reputation of a skilled lawyer and political scientist among his fellow countrymen, has never yet been wrong in his estimates. However, for Leonid Roketskiy, head of Tyumen Oblast Administration, who is a radical supporter of the incumbent president, these predictions are no grounds for complacency. Addressing students at higher educational establishments, the governor exhorted them like a father:

"Kids, the time has come for us to chose our own life. But no doubt some of you, after sitting the examinations, will decide that you can relax and forget everything that is happening around you. Go to the elections, unless you want your grandmas and grandpas to decide for you what kind of life you should have."

And as a former commander of student detachments, he added sternly: "I declare a general alert!" Knowing that the governor does not waste words, the students, perhaps for the first time, started thinking seriously to themselves about things that had formerly seemed so remote and incomprehensible.

They must make the important decision — important not only for themselves, but for their future — in three days' time. Only three days! Don't make a mistake, kids. In the 21st century it will be a bit late to shake your heads at the "mistakes of youth"....

Russia: Mock Election in Volgograd Gives Yeltsin 48 Percent

MM1306110396 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 5

[Report by Valeriy Kornev: "Zyuganov Lost to Yeltsin on Heroes' Alley by 25 Percent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Volgograd — A presidential election was held in Volgograd 0900 through 1700 hours 11 June. Ballot boxes were set up in one of the busiest parts of the city, the intersection between Tsentralnyy Prospekt and Alleya Geroyev [Heroes' Alley], which leads from the main square down to the Volga.

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No, no one had any intention of violating the Law on Elections. The Volgograd Association of Student Trade Unions in conjunction with City Hall's Information and Analysis Department used this unique method to conduct a sociological poll, to which everyone was alerted right away. But unlike ordinary sociological polls, in which a person could reply just out of politeness or be insincere if he were reluctant to be candid with strangers, that was ruled out here.

The "voters" themselves, if they so desired, took "ballot papers" and then dropped them in the ballot boxes themselves. Admittedly, in this case for convenience's sake there was no blank ballot. "Ballot papers" bearing the names of the presidential candidates lay in separate piles in "individual" blocks.

The results of the trial ballot proved impressive. The "polling place" was visited by 1,916 people in all; this may be considered an extremely broad range of respondents by any sociological poll yardsticks. Of them 48.2 percent quite definitely favored Yeltsin and dropped papers bearing his name into the ballot boxes. Moreover, the gap between him and Zyuganov proved pretty substantial, at over 25 percent. Whereas previously the Communist Party of the Russian Federation leader has polled over 30 percent in Volgograd, this time only 441 out of almost 2,000 people, 23 percent, dropped "ballot papers" bearing his name into the boxes.

The "live" vote brought to light some curious changes in other presidential candidates' ratings. Lebed overtook Yavlinskiy, polling 11.6 percent whereas the Yabloko leader polled 10.1 percent. Zhirinovskiy ended up in fifth place. He received 134 votes, or 6.9 percent of the total.

You can see why Volgograders made a particular choice from a dispute that arose at the "polling place." A Zyuganov supporter explained that the Communists would "restore the life that we had before." "Aha, we have had that and we are still trying to sort ourselves out," a man of over 60 said ironically. He added jokingly as he dropped his "ballot paper" into the box: "Russia is big and so is Yeltsin; they are made for one another." Incidentally, the place where the "polling place" was located on this occasion was where the Communists usually gather with their election paraphernalia.

Russia: Kazan Voters Interviewed; Poll Gives Yeltsin 26 Percent

MM1306103496 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (DOM I OTECHESTVO Supplement) in Russian 13-21 Jun 96 p II

[Report by Dmitriy Mikhaylin from the "Political Thermometer" feature: "Kazan: The Spasskiy Tower Is Visible From the Kazan Kremlin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to all the public opinion polls, the incumbent president is in the lead in Tatarstan: 26 percent of voters are prepared to vote for him. But sociological reports are one thing, and real life is another. So your correspondent took a dictaphone and set off for the city's main street — Bauman Street. And here are the views I heard from the people of Kazan.

Talgat Garafutdinov, policeman:

"I'm for Boris Nikolayevich. What has he achieved? If you don't work, you don't eat, for sure!"

Lidiya Ageyeva, home worker:

"I don't rely on anyone. I earn my own money and I look after myself. I don't think our life depends so much on Moscow now as on the republic authorities...."

Nail Gazizov, unemployed:

"I'm for Zyuganov! He will impose order. At least so that the people's property is not squandered."

Lyaysan Vafina, university graduate:

"What do I want with these elections? But okay, I'll vote for Yavlinskiy. Though I like Svyatoslav Fedorov too. Lebed?... I don't know, maybe I won't vote at all...."

Nikolay Larionov, driver:

"I saw Gorbachev's speech on the local TV. A good man. But why does he want to be president again? He's already left his mark on history. Mind, I don't agree with Yeltsin on everything, either. Prices are high, a lot of people have no work.... But the Communists are even worse. I'll soon be 48. I haven't forgotten waiting in line for your sausage ration. And before that, my father was dispossessed as a kulak — they said he was rich. Yet the commies themselves did nothing but steal, they lived the same as under capitalism...."

Russia: Yeltsin Has 'Significant' Lead of 35 Percent in Sverdlovsk

MM1306101696 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (DOM I OTECHESTVO Supplement) in Russian 13-21 Jun 96 p II

[Report by Aleksey Vladykin from the "Political Thermometer" feature: "Yekaterinburg: In the Urals, They Will Cheer Their Fellow Countryman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the president's home region they are trying not to let down their illustrious fellow countryman and to ensure his election victory.

"We have no doubt at all that Yeltsin will secure victory in Sverdlovsk Oblast. He has a significant lead here," the president's plenipotentiary representative in Sverdlovsk Oblast, Vitaliy Mashkov, says. "And our task is to try to use the election results to compensate for votes in

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anti-Yeltsin regions. On the other hand, the possible provocations by Communists, aimed at overturning the results of the elections, cannot but cause concern. After all, the 'last battle' really is approaching for orthodox Communists."

As sociological analyses show, on the basis of figures for early June, some 35 percent of Sverdlovsk people will vote for Yeltsin. And as the elections approach the trend toward an increase in votes in Yeltsin's favor is outstripping the corresponding indicators for all the other contenders. About 13 percent are prepared to vote for G. Zyuganov, 8 percent for A. Lebed, about 7 percent for G. Yavlinskiy, and approximately 5 percent for V. Zhirinovskiy. Naturally, these figures are very approximate, especially in view of the fact that B. Yeltsin plans to come to Yekaterinburg and meet with his fellow countrymen on 14 June. It cannot be ruled out that after this the 12 percent or so who are hesitating and have not made up their minds will finally make their choice.

Considerable campaigning work for B. Yeltsin is being done by political movements and blocs of a democratic orientation: "Transformation of the Urals," "Our City Is Our Home," "Forward, Russia!" Today they are united as never before and are working very harmoniously. Though naturally without absolving the incumbent president of responsibility for the errors and miscalculations made.

Russia: Memo on Options for Yeltsin First-Round Win Published

MK1306072396 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "The President Is Going To Win in the First Round"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The report "On the New Strategy and Tactics of the Communist Struggle for Power...," published in the previous issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, has attracted such close attention that, according to Boris Yeltsin himself in an interview with Yevgeniy Kiselev, the Russian Federation general prosecutor and the president have discussed it on the phone. The report — assuming that the facts presented in it are true — points to the opposition's specific preparations for an unfavorable outcome of the election. The opposing side, however, was not born yesterday either, and therefore is also providing for fallback options against the eventuality of failure. As an optimistic Boris Yeltsin noted in his interview with Yevgeniy Kiselev (NTV "Itogi" program of 9 June 1996), he intends to score an outright victory in the first round. Furthermore, the president did not rule out that he could use a "secret weapon."

The report published below gives an idea of one such "secret option." NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA does not know whether this report is already a rejected proposition or whether it is still considered as a possible guidance for action. Even so, it might not be totally useless in drawing a full picture.

Presidential Election. Possible Scenarios for the Final Stage

According to current surveys and expert appraisals, the president is sure to make it into the second round. Yet there is a great danger of defeat in the runoff against Zyuganov.

Thus, the main task at the final stage of the campaign can be formulated as B. N. Yeltsin's outright victory in the first round.

Clearly, B. N. Yeltsin's first-round victory can be ensured only through special measures.

These include measures to ensure [favorable] voting results at the level of:

— district electoral commissions (as things are standing now, this is practically impossible);

— territorial electoral commissions (with great influence by administration chiefs, who need to be subjected to additional impact); and

— the Central Electoral Commission, that defines the final election results.

In taking special measures, it is important to bear in mind the danger of destabilizing the situation in the country.

The probability of spontaneous action by the population (popular destabilization), according to various appraisals, is insignificant.

With respect to the entities capable of provoking organized action across the country or destabilizing the situation by some other method, the following should be noted:

Political opposition (selection basis: the presence of organized capabilities at the regional level). Among the political opposition, the following groups can be singled out:

— the moderates. Represented for the most part in the State Duma. Zyuganov and Seleznev are among the leaders. At the regional level, the capabilities of deputies' aides are being used;

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— nomenklatura "old-timers." Lukyanov and Kuptsov could be mentioned among the leading authorities. They are instrumental in forming district committees, oblast committees, and so forth;

— the intransigents. One notable representative is Anpilov. At the regional level, own structures are organized based on "political madmen." Thus far regional structures have not reached the village level and are confined to the oblast level;

— the Zhirinovskiyites. A very specific and rather developed structure, governed from the center; and

— regional elites. Administration chiefs being subject to election, there is a high likelihood that with a potentially unstable situation at the federal level, regional elites will use every possibility to distance themselves from the center, which can lead to unpredictable consequences for Russia.

To avert the possible negative consequences, the following set of measures is proposed:

1. To enhance the role of regional elites in running the country at the federal level.

The main task is to win over regional elites as "associates," linking their prospects for the future with the incumbent president.

2. To involve the political opposition in the process of administering the country and to "buy" opposition leaders.

To this end the president should in the very near future indicate his intention to introduce the post of vice president, which should be held by the Federation Council chairman on an ex officio basis.

After this the president makes a decision about the dismissal of the government chairman and assumes control of the government.

In announcing this decision at a Federation Council session, the president appeals to Stroyev to take part in leading the government.

The president and Stroyev open consultations with opposition leaders on the question of forming a "government of national trust."

The president scores a victory in the first round. The moderate opposition is engaged in the process of forming the government while the regional elites have good prospects for impacting on the federal executive branch. The nomenklatura opposition, deprived of the support of regional elites, has to join either the moderate or the intransigent opposition.

The main destabilizing factor in this event will be the intransigent opposition. It is vital to come to terms with V. V. Zhirinovskiy about measures, at the local level, to neutralize any insurgent action on the part of the intransigents.

Here the position of the Internal Affairs Ministry (!) is crucial. It appears expedient to involve Kulikov, from the very start, in working out and implementing this scenario. In ensuring the president's victory in the first round, the position of the Central Electoral Commission is the most critical factor.

There is a likelihood that the Central Electoral Commission will not be able (or will not want) to play the role assigned to it.

In view of this it appears advisable to consider two additional scenarios and make the requisite preparations to ensure their implementation.

1. The first round has taken place. The president has not received 50 percent plus one vote.

In this event provisions should be made for broadcasting instances of widespread violations in the election process, compelling the Central Electoral Commission to invalidate the vote and call a new election. If the Central Electoral Commission ignores the numerous statements, then appeals from outraged citizens will force the president and the Federation Council to postpone the election and reorganize the Central Electoral Commission. To realize this scenario, it is necessary, in addition to the aforementioned measures — with the assistance of the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Federal Security Service, and the Presidential Security Service — to ensure there are abundant complaints alleging violations of the voting procedure.

2. Should it transpire in the very near future that the Central Electoral Commission is unlikely to fulfill the role entrusted to it, an expedient course of action might be to delay the election altogether. To this end, within the framework of the first scenario, before the formation of a coalition government, the Federation Council comes out with the initiative to extend the transition period and to delay the election for two years. (A possible mechanism is described in the appendix: "Negotiations with the Opposition on the Conditions of Preserving the Presidential Powers of B.N. Yeltsin: Legislative and Practical Aspects.")

Negotiations With the Opposition on the Conditions of B.N. Yeltsin's Retaining His Presidential Powers

(Legislative and Practical Aspects) A major condition for stability in the country — in the event of a successful outcome of negotiations with the opposition on B.N.

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Yeltsin's retaining his presidential powers — is the formalization, including legislative, of the achieved accords. This can apparently proceed in two different ways:

1. The most effective way is the introduction of amendments into Paragraph 3, Section 2 of the Russian Federation Constitution. The changes should concern the tenure of the incumbent president of the Russian Federation and can be linked to a specific date. For instance: "Paragraph 3. The president of the Russian Federation, elected in conformity with the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Federation, shall exercise his powers, established by this Constitution from the time of its entering into force, until the inauguration of the next president of the Russian Federation the day of whose election may not be set before 1998."

Should corresponding agreement be reached, this paragraph could include a provision saying that the incumbent president of the Russian Federation may not serve another term as president, which would be a substantial guarantee for the opposition.

Chapter 9 of the Russian Federation Constitution does not define the order or procedure for making amendments to Section 2 of the Russian Federation Constitution, and therefore this can be legalized by a corresponding act of the Federal Assembly (for example, a joint resolution by the State Duma and the Federation Council), which looks feasible if an agreement is reached with the opposition.

In this case the Federation Council rescinds its resolution on setting the election for 16 June 1996 because of the amendment of Section 2 of the Russian Federation Constitution. The advantage of this option is that everything proceeds within the framework of the existing Constitution and laws and, besides, does not require much time. What is very important, a realistic mechanism of guarantees for all the sides is put in place.

At the moment, the amendment of Section 1 of the Russian Federation Constitution (redistribution of powers and the introduction of new subjects of power) appears problematic, because complex procedures are called for in this case, that require considerable time, which is impossible in the present situation.

2. Another way of formalizing the agreements reached at the negotiations in the framework of the current legislation could be the decision by the opposition candidate to pull out of the race in exchange for the legislatively executed appointment of opposition representatives to some state positions, and the adoption of statutory acts bearing on particular lines of foreign and internal policy. This path appears more complex because, first, it requires greater concessions from the opposition in the eyes of public opinion and, second, the system of guarantees in this case is rather uncertain for both sides, because the changes suiting the opposition can be guaranteed only by corresponding amendments in Section 1 of the Constitution, while there is no time for adopting them.

Russia: Duma Opens Anti-Yeltsin Exhibition on Oct 1993 Events

LD1306115196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1134 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — An exhibition of photos devoted to the tragic events of September-October 1993, which is of a clearly defined anti-presidential nature, opened in the building of the State Duma Thursday.

For example, a photo of President Boris Yeltsin signed "perjurer and usurper" is displayed under the title "State coup: acting persons and executors," our parliamentary correspondent reports. Photos of prominent politicians, Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, candidates to the Russian presidency Aleksandr Lebed and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, and members of Yeltsin's closest circles are located nearby under the sign: "They supported the shooting of the constitution and parliament."

Epithets addressed to Yegor Gaydar, Valeriya Novodvorskaya, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and ex-Interior Minister Viktor Yerin are not impartial either.

"Outrage of the Interior Ministry and spetznaz [special forces]" and "hirelings" are the slogans on immense billboards hanging in the hall of the State Duma.

The photos show Muscovites killed in the streets, the burning House of Soviets, and armored personnel carriers in the streets. One of the titles accompanying the photos reads: "Mass murder of unarmed people in the House of Soviets." Another, next to photos of hosts of the RTR news programs Svetlana Sorokina and Nikolay Svanidze, reads: "Lie about assault broadcast live on air." A third says, "Major conspirators — usurper Yeltsin's closest comrades-in-arms."

A separate billboard is devoted to "the victims of the shooting of the Russian parliament" which exhibits photos of young people killed during the riots in Moscow October 3-4, 1993. The exhibition was prepared on the results of parliamentary hearings "Moral, Legal and Economic Estimate of Events of October 1993." It was recommended to restore the Duma commission investigating the circumstances of the October tragedy in line with the results of the hearings.

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Duma deputy Konstantin Borovoy tried to say that "what is going on in the State Duma hall is disgraceful," however, State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev interrupted his speech during an expanded State Duma session Thursday.

Russia: Zyuganov Rejects Live TV Debate Due to Yeltsin Absence

LD1306090096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0839 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — Leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] Gennadiy Zyuganov turned down Public Russian Television (ORT)'s invitation to join a live TV debate slated for June 13.

A copy of Zyuganov's letter to ORT was transmitted Thursday to Interfax. Zyuganov refused to join the TV debate because another presidential hopeful, Boris Yeltsin, had decided to ignore it.

"Live TV debates are turning into a correspondence course of communication with Boris Yeltsin," which makes them meaningless, Zyuganov said. Citizens must be able "to compare the leading hopefuls' positions in an open dialog, in an honest exchange of views of the national headaches," he also said in the letter to ORT.

According to CPRF press chief Vladimir Perfiliyev, Communist leaders are taking a close look at the electoral manifesto of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. Yavlinskiy also invited Zyuganov to hold a live TV debate and Zyuganov will soon give an official answer to that invitation, Perfiliyev said.

Russia: Zyuganov Holds Local News Conferences

964F2436A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 1

[R. Aliyev report: "Zyuganov in Novosibirsk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The visit to Novosibirsk of presidential candidate Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov, leader of the CPRF, began in businesslike fashion. The first mini-news conference took place at Tolmachevo Airport.

"We are very much afraid and we feel for you, Gennadiy Andreyevich," sighed an elderly woman in the front row of people clustering round the small table at which, aside from Zyuganov, V. Karpov and V. Kuznetsov sat. Zyuganov gave her a grateful weary smile.

"Gennadiy Andreyevich, how do you view the polls?"

Zyuganov smiled:

"With interest. I study them."

It was by no means journalists who put the questions. Zyuganov was laconic in his replies: "I have met with Fedorov and Zhirinovskiy—we reached agreement on fair elections." "Sobchak's defeat was entirely natural. The patented democrats are leaving." "Only the power party supports Yeltsin. The main political forces are in no hurry to side with him."

The next meeting was in Akademgorodok's House of Scientists.

...People had packed two halls and were standing in a tight crowd in the lobby. In the lobby Zyuganov's voice came through over the loudspeakers, in the small hall of the House of Scientists the meeting was shown on a television screen. I was lucky, I managed to get into the large hall. Above the stage, a curtain depicting Lenin. An ovation heralded Zyuganov's arrival. In addition to him, Academician V. Koptyug, State Duma Deputies L. Shvets, G. Berdov, and N. Kharitonov, Yu. Sukhanov, chief of the oblast administration Office for Relations With Public Organizations, and others took part in the meeting. Zyuganov's speech and then his answers were interrupted repeatedly by applause.

"A fearful slump has occurred in our country's national economy: 10 percent in mechanical engineering, 82 percent in light industry, 92-94 percent in the military-industrial complex. People ask, where will we get the money to raise the country up? First, Russia's foreign debt is $130 billion, we are owed $150 billion, second, there is a shortfall in the collection of tax in the country of $8 billion—we will lower taxes (it is simply not to people's advantage to pay them in full) and we will increase the liability for their nonpayment. This is what is done in many countries. We will take action to protect the domestic market—earlier light industry produced goods amounting to 26 percent of the total share of national production, now, 2 percent. We will protect our market, having bought up modern technology.

"The Communists are being accused of bloodthirstiness. And this by people who killed hundreds of people in October 1993 in Moscow and who unleashed the war in Chechnya. I am the most peaceful man. Never have I or my relatives been on trial. I promise—there will be no punitive measures!"

...The six-car motorcade moved to the city center. A news conference in the oblast administration and Zyuganov's meeting with Yu.A. Nesterov, chief of the Main Planning-Economic Department, lay ahead.

...Then a meeting with young people at the Construction Academy. The young people listened closely and read with interest the leaflets that had been distributed to them, but they do not support Zyuganov. Someone

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turned on deafeningly loud music in a window of the next-door hostel. And there carried above the crowd: "And I did the eight years that were due me, and I am still disgorging prison soup!" There was a quite active search for autographs at all the meetings.

...A public meeting at the State Public Scientific and Technical Library. It is estimated that there were 8,000 people there. The presidential candidate was greeted with stormy applause.

"Why do you support Zyuganov," I asked an elderly woman, but people answered from all sides:

"There's no one else to vote for. We have not been paid in months. These pensions are simply beggarly, what am I supposed to do, collect bottles from the garbage heaps? You leave a plant where there's no pay—you can't find work anywhere. Under the Communists people were more sincere, now its every man for himself."

This is what the participants in the meeting in Novosibirsk said.

Russia: Zyuganov on Need To Save Fatherland, Establish Strong State

LD1306094796 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0456 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Election broadcast by Russian presidential candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation — live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian people, people of Russia, my countrymen: You are facing a crucial choice. Gorbachev's five years ended with the destruction on a thousand-year-old state and with the unprecedented humiliation of humanitarian aid. Yeltsin's five years — with the collapse of the entire economy and the destruction of agriculture, with unprecedented corruption and banditry. Much depends on your choice, because it is no longer a matter of jobs or your savings, but of [the future of] our fatherland. We have built it over many centuries, and if the old policy, whereby a half-sick country is handed down from one infirm physician to another, is allowed to continue, then we will lose our fatherland.

The fatherland is the country, the state, and the people. For the first time we have now become a divided people. Only 25 million Russians are left beyond the sovereign borders [as heard]. The fatherland is the language, the culture, and the traditions. Look at the country's main street, Tverskaya-Gorkiy Street [in Moscow] — it is full of foreign signs, and even the torch-bearer of our culture, the Russian poet [Aleksandr] Pushkin, is lost among them. The fatherland is a link between generations, continued reproduction — but today the woman cannot afford to give birth because it has become too onerous, and our numbers are dwindling by a million every year.

So, when you make your choice today, you must know the following figures, dry but all too sad: there are one million homeless children in the country, two million school-age children who are not studying anywhere, six million refugees, and nearly 20 million people who are totally or partly unemployed. You are being told that there are no queues in the country today — but there are queues we have never thought possible. If all the cheated depositors form a file, it will stretch from Moscow to the Baykal. If all those who have now lost all confidence and hope form a queue in front of a till from which wages are paid, you will see many millions there — and even they get no satisfaction [as heard].

Our program centers on the human being. Without a strong state there cannot be a strong Russia. But the state has to create conditions for good business, normal education, and medical care for its fellow-countrymen and ensure their personal, family, and public safety. Therefore we have set ourselves a task of strengthening state power that would be honest before its citizens and report back to them on a regular basis. To achieve this, powers have to be redivided in favor of a strong coalition government and a proper legislature, which is to be elected regularly at all levels, and local self-government has to be strengthened. The balance between the center and local self-government based on our best national and cultural traditions is the ideal we are aiming for.

We have set ourselves a task of creating an economy combining all forms of ownership and management, an economy in which everyone gets support and pays proper taxes, and which at the same time opens wide horizons for creative work, be it for a student, a schoolchild, a worker, a teacher, or a modern businessman.

We have set ourselves a task of ensuring that law should prevail, that all matters are solved on the basis of the law, first and foremost the matters of fighting crime and banditry.

Our task is to retain democratic institutions and a multiparty system. With this in view we have formed our bloc of people's patriotic forces, which even today comprises over 200 parties, movements and organizations, and which has offered its services to save the country against sliding further into the abyss and against civil strife.

I am addressing the Christians. Open the Bible. St. John the Divine prophesied: "If any man worship the beast and his image, and receive his mark on his forehead,

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or in his hand, The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God." [Rev 14:9,10]

Look carefully and you will see. Our slogans are simple and clear. We are calling with us all those who are for peace and against civil war, for honest work and against scroungers, for people's power and against the power of the mafia, for the honor and dignity of the Russian state. Our slogan is: Russia, Motherland, and the People. We believe in the wisdom and justice of people's choice. All the best to you. Good bye. [video shows Zyuganov sitting at a desk with a map of the world and a painting depicting a Russian landscape on the wall behind him]

Russia: Zyuganov Seeks Orthodox Believers' Support

MM1306084496 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Jun 96 p 3

[Appeal to Orthodox Believers by Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov, Candidate for the People's Patriotic Coalition]

[FBIS Translated Text] Orthodox Believers, Friends,

At such a difficult and crucial time for Russia's future I wish to remind you that all of us Russians — ethnic and nonethnic — are linked by an indissoluble bond which has stood the test of millennia.

Dire upheavals have fallen to our people's lot in this waning century of ours. These include the far from simple and often tragic relations between the Church and the state authorities. State authorities, a number of whose representatives, while hiding their own antipathy to our history, culture, and the people behind high-flown words about Party-mindedness and a bright future, besmirched themselves with persecution of the Church and the clergy which was senseless and destructive to the country and people's souls. And today, in remembering the mistakes of the past we wonder whether St. John the Baptist was not speaking of them when he said: "They went out from us, but they were not of us...."

The current rulers of Russia, the ravagers of the country, having profaned its people, have likewise never understood its essence or its calling. Moreover, they are afraid that the Russian people will inevitably emerge from today's trials — as has always been the case — merely more pure of spirit, clear of mind, and stronger.

Incidentally, we do not condemn those representatives of the powers-that-be who try to disguise their worthlessness and spiritual emptiness by means of purely formal attachment to Orthodox rites. Let God be their judge.

Who knows whether grace will touch them contrary to their own will or whether their souls now wandering in the darkness of unbelief will see the light.

For the moment, however, I want to say to you that we, unlike they, do believe. We believe in Russia as the embodiment of a world-cleansing steadfastness and devotion to the highest abiding values of goodness, devotion to the Motherland and the interests and traditions of our people. Orthodoxy is for us a symbol of patriotic service to the Fatherland.

Life has convincingly demonstrated to those of us who have experienced the arduous, agonizing search for self and undergone inner, nonostentatious repentance and spiritual self-cleansing that we are all children of the Russian soil. And we are all duty bound to stand together in our constructive endeavors, labor, political activity, and the struggle to revive and secure the happiness of our Fatherland.

Social justice, goodness, truth, beauty, and the fraternity of people — these are the ideals today, at a time when cupidity, arrogance, and disunity are attempting to call the tune in our society, which cannot fail to unite us.

St. Paul 's appeal that we create a human community in which everyone would be equal, of good will, and just — "Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, Barbarian, Scythian, bondman nor freeman...." — retains profound significance for us all. An honest life untainted by any avarice, malice, or lies is the Orthodox and our people's patriotic ideal. We will do everything we can to ensure that this ideal triumphs in our life and that peace and calm are preserved in our society.

The liars are trying to frighten our people now by claiming that with the people's patriotic forces' victory our opponents will start to be persecuted and prosecuted. No! For us, as for everyone who is concerned for the good of the Fatherland, the appeal of Patriarch Tikhon remains significant:

"All Orthodox Russian people, all Christians, when the many sufferings, insults, and afflictions have started to instill a thirst for revenge in you and press a sword in your hand, Orthodox Russia, to mete out bloody punishment to those who regard you as their enemy, cast it far away so that neither during the time of your greatest trials and tribulations nor the time of your triumph should your hand ever stretch out to that sword or be able or wish to wield it."

Yes, we believe in Russia and appeal to you, our true — in terms of your spiritual essence — brothers: Let us pool our will and strength to secure that most important thing — the revival of Russia. We will not allow it to be turned into a spiritual scrap heap, a field for the

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dark forces of the world, the false prophets, and the false teachers to play their games, an object of malicious experiments designed to stupefy and brainwash people and set them against one another.

Russia is still far from having said all it has to say to the world or played its historically preordained role of defender and repository of the highest values of humanity and justice.

So let us by uniting in our Russian world — ethnic and otherwise — prevent Russia being enticed, diverted, or pushed away from this great path.

We, the people's patriotic forces of Russia, are aware of this preordained role because we have experienced a whole era of self-cleansing and repentance.

And today we know what must not be done in any circumstance and what first and foremost it is essential be done for the good of the Fatherland. We know and advance toward the 16 June elections with this hard-won knowledge, hoping that you, our Orthodox fellow-citizens, brothers, and sisters, will lend us your support.

Russia: Differences in Zyuganov, Yeltsin Election Platforms Viewed

LD1206222696 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1910 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Last time I spoke about the economic platform published by the leader of the Communist Party, Gennadiy Zyuganov. Although experts here believe it is a mere compendium of what many a presidential candidate here is promising in these preelection days, there is something in it that has aroused immediate controversy.

At a recent news conference the director of the Economic Forecast Institute, Andrey Illarionov, pointed out lots of factual blunders and downright lies in the Communist election platform. A liberal economist, Illarionov seems to have made quite an impression on many people here, who are now making up their minds on whom to vote for. He said there are good reasons for the widespread fears of a deterioration in the economic situation, should the Communist economic program be adopted, and that despite what Communist supporters thought, their situation would get worse, not better.

Now one of the myths the Zyuganov platform offers its readers is a comparison of things happening in this country now, and developments during the slump in the United States in the early 1930s. It is easy for anyone to figure out that, whereas the United States of America was going through a cyclic crisis within one and the same system of capitalism, this country is changing its main course, its economic orientation, refusing to go on producing things that no one needs.

Another myth deals with stopping the circulation of the dollar in Russia. Illarionov argues that there is not enough money in the Russian economy to do that, due to the austere financial policies pursued by the current government. With money in supply since the beginning of the year growing not more than 6 percent a month — and that's faster than inflation — the communist platform suggests that the dollar be ousted by nothing less than printing more rubles, something bound to stir up inflation.

As for Russia becoming a raw materials appendage of the West, as the Communists say, Illarionov points to 1991 when gas and oil made up 52 percent of our total exports, compared with 41 percent last year.

Meanwhile, President Yeltsin, too, has presented his election platform during his visit to the South Urals, to the city of Perm. The main part of the platform, the section dealing with continued effort to create market economy mechanisms, is being discussed by many an expert here, too. What makes Yeltsin's platform different from Zyuganov's is that it stands four years, not 16, as the Communist's program does. First of all, staying in office that long would violate our constitution, according to which one and the same person may not stay in office longer than two terms.

Yeltsin's program, by the way, is entitled Russia — the human being, the family, the society, and the state. For one thing, it plans to bring down inflation to 5 percent a year by the year 2000, the ruble becoming a hard currency. National production is to grow at over 4 percent a year. But front burner issues for Yeltsin are to reform our taxes so that the total level of taxes is reduced as well as their number. There are also going to be fewer exemptions from taxation.

As for the basic question of funding the reform process, here to the two candidates differ. Gennadiy Zyuganov says he is ready to support foreign investment, quoting the law on nationalization as his guarantee of this. And it's a paradox. For Boris Yeltsin, investments are the brunt of his program for this country's development. This country is to achieve economic growth on the path of greater investment, his platform says.

Russia: Zhirinovskiy Interviewed on Premiership Suggestion

MM1306083696 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: If Zyuganov Wins I Am Ready To Head the Government To Neutralize the Communists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at a news conference Tuesday [11 June], LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy said that if Gennadiy Zyuganov wins the presidential election, he is ready to take the premiership or at least a vice premiership in a Communist government. The statement

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caused a sensation since hitherto the LDPR leader has not been noted for his sympathies for the Communists.

"My attitude to the Communists has not changed," Vladimir Zhirinovskiy said during an interview with IZVESTIYA. "But Russia does not need a bloodbath; compromise is what is needed between the main political forces. I am still convinced that the Communists should not be in power. But if Zyuganov wins I am ready to head the government in order to balance the influence of a Communist president. The Communists have no future. They can only preserve themselves for politics if they rally to the LDPR's standard.

"We agreed to meet with Zyuganov 18 June to discuss the first round results and formulate a plan for further joint action. We will most likely put our proposals to Yeltsin. And if he agrees to join us at the negotiating table, a political compromise could be reached. Right now the president's aides Ilyushin, Baturin, and Satarov are preventing my meeting with him.... But it would be more beneficial for Yeltsin to meet with Zyuganov and I after the first round rather than with the power ministers to discuss when to open fire...."

Russia: Fedorov Accuses Media of Unbalanced Election Coverage

LD1306105896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0958 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — Renowned Russian eye surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov, a candidate to the Russian presidency, refused to participate in a press conference scheduled for Thursday in Moscow.

"It is inexpedient in the situation of an unjust and unequal pre-election struggle," Vitaliy Tarlavskiy, a member of the executive commission of the council of the Workers' Self-government Party led by Fedorov, cited Fedorov as saying to participants of a gathering in the information center Elections-96.

Fedorov asserts in his statement that the mass media "are silent" concerning his pre-election program and "tear out separate phrases and statements from his addresses." Fedorov said only two contenders "constantly appear on the TV screen," namely current President Boris Yeltsin and leader of the Communist Party Gennadiy Zyuganov. Fedorov also favors "an urgent referendum on the status of the Chechen republic."

"If the Chechen people choose independence then it would be necessary to withdraw the federal forces from the republic's territory, it is senseless to do this now," he said in the document.

Russia: Border Troops in Kazakhstan To Vote Before 16 Jun

LD1206171996 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1202 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Akimov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty, 12 Jun (Itar-Tass) — Early elections of the president of the Russian Federation began in Kazakhstan today. Russian officers and members of their families who are stationed at remote border posts are taking part in voting ahead of the main Russian election in line with a bilateral agreement in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States on joint protection of the external borders. A helicopter especially assigned to carry members of the local electoral commission and observers on this mission will visit all remote and not easily accessible posts on the Kazakh-Chinese border within the next two or three days.

After each stage of this field voting, ballot boxes will be immediately sealed and placed under guard to prevent their opening. The counting of votes will be done by the Electoral Commission only after 2200 on 16 June, as required by the instruction on the elections of the president of the Russian Federation.

Representatives of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in Kazakhstan in accordance with bilateral agreements on the intergovernmental level will vote on 16 June. All necessary conditions have been created for them on site.

Civilians can take part in the elections only locally. The majority of Russian citizens in Kazakhstan are residents of Almaty, Aktyubinsk, Karaganda, and Kustanay, where polling stations are operating.

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CIS: CIS Countries Pledge To Work Out Vital Documents Together

LD1206184596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1603 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By Larisa Klyuchnikova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, June 12 (Itar-Tass) — The CIS Executive Secretariat and the Integration Committee of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed a protocol of cooperation in Minsk on Wednesday.

Under the protocol, the parties will jointly work out documents concerning the activity of the CIS and the operation of the Treaty of the Four (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia), provide organisational and legal support for the preparation of such documents and exchange documents adopted by the councils of CIS heads of state and government and the Interstate Council of the States which are parties to the Treaty of the Four.

The protocol also calls for a joint examination of draft documents to be submitted to the CIS supreme bodies and the Interstate Council.

Speaking at a meeting with the chairman of the Integration Committee, Nigmatzhan Isingarin, after the signing ceremony, Belarusian parliament speaker Semyon Sharetskiy said it would be a mistake to artificially accelerate integration processes to achieve political goals.

As an example of wise and consistent integration, Sharetskiy cited the European Union countries which, "while seeking closer integration among each other, do not lose their own sovereignty."

He believes it is too late to try to build a federation or confederation of the CIS countries. "We have lost time and the most reasonable thing to do under these circumstances is to consider a union of independent states," he added.

CIS: Results of 13 May Energy Conference Summarized

MM1306091996 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 8

[Article by Vladimir Kucherenko: "Energy Security: CIS-Wide Anguish" — from the 'Economic Union' section]

[FBIS Translated Text] A consultative conference of CIS countries, devoted to energy security problems, was held in Moscow 13 May. It was admitted for the first time at such a high level: The former USSR states are on the brink of an energy crisis.

We All Are in the Same Energy Boat

Energy security is one of the most important elements of ensuring each country's viability. Stability, predictability of output volumes and prices, and the existence of several complementary sources of energy resources and their reserves — these are the cornerstones of energy security. We can place the reliability and uninterrupted operation of power stations, pipelines, and power grid lines in the same category.

Following the USSR's disintegration, the energy security of the new states was dealt a crushing blow. For several years the artificially split single power and gas supply system of the USSR was utilized irrationally. Investment famine and nonpayments complete the picture of advancing ruin. The energy crisis has already affected many people.

The declining production of energy resources in the CIS is already threatening life in the new states. Some two-thirds of fixed production assets in the CIS fuel and energy complex are obsolete and are not being modernized. Oil and gas reserves are being "eaten into" and their raw materials base is not being renewed. This is especially true for the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine (as regards gas). The 1994 level of investment, compared with 1990, dropped to 35 percent in oil extraction and to 20 percent in gas extraction.

Russia has elaborated its energy strategy through 2001. There is also a draft national energy security doctrine. In all probability, however, it will have to be revised.

On 13 May representatives of the governments of the 12 CIS countries accepted several fundamental theses formulated in the speeches by O. Lobov, secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, and Yu. Shafranik, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy.

They include the elaboration of 10-15 year forecasts for satisfying the CIS members' requirements for energy resources involving the planning of interstate flow of supplies, including across the territory of third countries. This should provide the basis for concluding multilateral and bilateral treaties between exporters and importers of resources, setting prices, jointly opening up promising deposits, and building major fuel and energy complex facilities.

The CIS delegates agreed that it is necessary to resolve the questions of payments, encourage the creation of transnational fuel and energy complex companies, and pursue a coordinated pricing policy, forming in this process a common market for energy resources

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and technologies and taking a common stance in international energy organizations so as not to squeeze one another out of the world oil and gas markets and not to lose valuable revenue.

But how is this coordinated policy to be ensured? Premier V. Chernomyrdin presented an algorithmic model. Bringing in line the national laws of CIS countries in the sphere of the fuel and energy complex and the economy as a whole. Enhancing the efficiency of operations by existing structures — the Council of CIS Heads of Government, the International Economic Committee, the CIS Electricity Council, the Intergovernmental Oil and Gas Council, and the Interstate Coal and Steel Association.

The International Economic Committee was instructed to elaborate the question of creating a single code of behavior by CIS countries which would ensure their mutually advantageous cooperation in the fuel and energy complex and would prevent the adoption of decisions which might be detrimental to the energy security of Commonwealth members.

Let us add to this the holding of regular consultative conferences by sectors — coal industry, oil and gas industry, nuclear power generation, hydroelectric power generation, transportation of fuel and energy resources, and so on.

Given such an infrastructure for coordination and the reaching of agreements, the premier believes, it may be possible to apply the practice of concluding multilateral and bilateral agreements.

The most important achievement was the formation of the CIS Energy Community with its own special structure — the Energy Agency — which should bring together the experience of similar structures of fuel and energy resource importing countries in the West European International Energy Agency and of exporter countries associations like OPEC.

V. Bushuyev, secretary of state at the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy, believes that the CIS Energy Agency may emerge as early as next year. At the first stage of its work it will be a structure founded on mutual trust and general recognition of the need to pursue a coordinated energy policy.

Ways To Solve Old Problems

It could be seen as a good sign that the 13 May conference mapped out the way to solve several problems which have hitherto prevented the integration not only of the energy sectors but also of the economies of CIS countries as a whole.

Take for example the question of reciprocal nonpayments. Russia is still playing the role of energy donor for the CIS. Declarations about pooled efforts remain only declarations and, unless the debts owed to the Russian fuel and energy complex are repaid, matters will not progress.

O. Lobov cited the amount owed by CIS countries to Russia — $3 billion. The Ministry for Cooperation with Member States of the CIS amplifies: 14.8 trillion [rubles] as of 1 May (82 percent for gas and 16 percent for electricity). This was also discussed at the conference.

The methods for settlements have been known for a long time. For example, conversion of the debt into securities, bonds, or property or into debtors' participation in investment projects. Moldova, for example, will take part in building the twin-pipe section of the "Yamal-Europe" pipeline across Belarus as repayment of its "energy debts" to Russia. The Ministry for Cooperation with Member States of the CIS believes that the repayment of CIS debts could take the form of jointly owned power grid and pipeline systems on Commonwealth territory. This "stone" may be used to kill another "bird": To ensure the safety and reliability of their operation in our country's interests.

What do the Russian Federation's main debtors think of this? Ukraine's premier did not attend the meeting, having sent just his report and his deputy. But O. Lobov is satisfied that our Ukrainian neighbors have offered to transfer a proportion of shares in their oil refineries so as to ensure a fuller workload for them, like the Lisichansk refinery, for example. Let us hope that the recent resignation of Ukraine's head of government will not divert the emerging trend.

Belarus is for now setting an example of successfully solving the problem of using property to settle debts. The Slavneft Joint Company has been set up on the basis of the Novopolotsk refinery. Joint ventures set up by Russia's Lukoil, Yukos, and Naftan with [the Belarusian] Belnefteprodukt. Gazprom is working with Beltransgaz. But alas, their Russian-Ukrainian counterpart — Gaztranzit — still remains only on paper.

A common approach is also emerging as regards investment strategy. Moldova suggested a great idea: Everybody should invest their funds in the most effective projects. But which ones?

Russian Federation Premier V. Chernomyrdin named the gas deposits of the Timano-Pechorskiy Field, the Barents Sea shelf, and Yamala. Inviting the others to invest their funds in opening them up, he offered three

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possible options: Guaranteed deliveries of energy resources at acceptable prices in exchange for investments, transfer of shares in Russian fuel and energy enterprises to CIS countries, and formation of transnational financial-industrial groups.

Russia has its own interests in fuel and energy complex politics. Primarily as regards retaining its markets for fuel and energy resources across the former USSR, and therefore it is unwilling to yield any positions to the Near East's OPEC group. This is quite difficult to achieve: There is a surplus production of oil in the world and competition is tough. But the Russian Federation, just like all CIS countries, is interested in providing workload for its industry and investing in it.

For example, the conference heard a statement of the Russian Federation's desire to participate in the opening up of deposits across the CIS territory, building communications and terminals within the Commonwealth and in East and Central Europe, and in building pipelines from Siberia and Central Asia both southwards and eastwards. O. Lobov believes: In order to protect the Russian Federation's energy security, it is necessary to safeguard its strategic and geopolitical interests in the CIS, Europe, the Far East, and Central, South, and Southeast Asia.

The Russian Federation Ministry for Cooperation with Member States of the CIS spoke of the main integration efforts in rebuilding the power generation industry and modernizing pipelines along strategic avenues. Like, for example, the "Central Asia-Russia's Heartland" multipipe system, investments in which are beyond the capacities of just the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. It is apparently necessary to involve Belarus, Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus in it. In the time of the USSR, this system used to pump 68 billion cubic meters of gas each year. The current task is to restore its operations to the level of at least 35-40 billion cubic meters. There was confirmation of Russia's desire to "commit" the delivery of a sizable proportion of Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani oil to the modernized port at Novorossiysk.

Projects for pipeline systems of interstate importance, associated with the opening up of deposits in the Barents Sea, the Timano-Pechorsk Province, and East Siberia, are also under consideration.

But it is impossible to overlook the aspirations of other CIS countries. Like, for example, Turkmenistan's wish to build a new oil pipeline system and its desire to stretch the "gas track" directly to China, or the Ukrainian-Baltic plans to build the Black Sea-Baltic Sea collector to supply these states from countries outside the CIS. All this will radically change the current flows of oil and gas.

V. Bushuyev, secretary of state at the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy, believes: The desire of CIS neighbors not to be completely dependent on Russian energy sources alone is perfectly understandable. But it is necessary to arrive at a sensible correlation of exports. Ensuring, for example, that Russia has 70 percent of the market on mutually advantageous conditions.

A solution to the "Caspian question" to everyone's advantage is also emerging in outline. It was emphasized yet again: The Caspian Sea cannot be divided into national sectors and must remain a zone to be exploited jointly by all littoral countries. Several options were proposed. For example, creating a financial-industrial group which could be transformed into an interstate group, and adopting a comprehensive federal program for exploiting the inland sea's potential. There are also the proposals by the Russian Academy of Sciences Europe Institute — to have the Caspian littoral states set up and international joint-stock company to extract oil and gas from the entire sea. Shareholding in the joint-stock company would depend on the length of coastline owned by each stockholder state.

What can be really expected from the results of the 13 May conference? According to V. Bushuyev, the Commonwealth states have already put their energy-saving laws on the table with a view to coordination.

O. Lobov announced that the conference decisions will be submitted to the next session of CIS heads of state and will be reflected in the work of the International Economic Committee so as to be backed up by acts of the Commonwealth countries' supreme executive authorities.

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Russia: Grachev To Attend Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers

LD1306093396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0900 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Alexander Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRUSSELS Jun 13 (Itar-Tass) — A regular biannual meeting of Defence Ministers of NATO countries opened in Brussels today. For the first time it is held under a new formula reflecting France's return to the "renewed" military orgnisation of the alliance.

The first two hours are assigned for the meeting of the "old" bodies — the Military Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning group, in whose work France does not participate.

Then all the 16 NATO defence ministers, including Charles Million of France, will discuss in the framework of the new forum, the NATO Council at the level of defence ministers, the course of the operations in Bosnia and implementation of the decisions on the beginning of NATO's reforming, passed recently in Berlin.

Russia's Defence Minister Pavel Grachev is expected to arrive in Brussels in the evening. He will participate on Friday in the meeting of NATO's defence ministers and of member-countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in a meeting with NATO colleagues on "16 plus one" formula and will also conduct negotiations with U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry.

Russia: NATO Expansion, Evolution Issues Examined

MM1206160496 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 96 p 3

["Observer's Comments" article by Aleksandr Golts: "NATO Evolution: Illusions and Reality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Thanks to the achievements of civilization Darwin's theory of natural selection no longer extends to the human race. However, in politics its laws are inexorable: International institutions, unions, and even states that are unable to adapt to new conditions are doomed to disappear.

This was what happened in its day to the Warsaw Pact, which failed to find a niche for itself in the postconfrontational world. Subsequently Moscow has often rebuked the NATO countries, asking why they have not followed this example. But the Atlanticists were reluctant to dissolve their bloc and virtually straightaway, back in 1990, set themselves the goal of radically transforming NATO. In effect this transformation has taken two main directions. First, internal reorganization, the purpose of which is to considerably reinforce the European component of the North Atlantic alliance. Second, the bloc's eastward expansion. The recent NATO Council session in Berlin gave a fairly clear impression of how successfully these two processes are going.

"Divisible but Indivisible"

This phrase, which does not translate overly smoothly into Russian, appeared more often than others in the final communique of the NATO Council's Berlin session. The alliance's military structures — staffs, military combined units, and command and control, support, transport, and intelligence systems — are to become "divisible but indivisible" after the transformation. This phrase conceals the extremely difficult compromise which marked this NATO Council session.

The point is that over the last few years extremely intensive work has been under way on the role of the Western European Union [WEU], the military-political organization, which mainly unites European NATO countries. The WEU, set up a year before NATO, existed in a state of permanent lethargy after the emergence of the North Atlantic bloc, only awakening in order to provide insurance for the "main" alliance at times of radical change.

This happened in the mid-fifties for instance when the WEU became the instrument that ensured Italy's and Germany's integration within NATO. And the same is happening now. The WEU found itself at the fore as soon as it became clear that the process of West European unification was noticeably gaining momentum. Following the Maastricht Agreements the question arose of the structure that would implement EU [European Union] defense policy. In the process it had become clear that West Europe's interests when it comes to ensuring security are by no means always in line with U.S. interests.

For its part, Washington found itself faced with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, with the end of global confrontation a number of influential U.S. politicians advocated reducing the U.S. presence abroad, including its military presence. The disputes in the United States ahead of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia showed that the isolationists are extremely strong. On the other hand, the emergence in these conditions of military structures independent of NATO would seriously challenge the U.S. claim to the role of world leader.

A solution was found in compromise. It is intended to lend the WEU a more autonomous role, it will even be able to carry out its own military operations. For which it will have WEU-oriented staff and command

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structures and large Army formations. But within a NATO framework. Hence the idea of "divisible but indivisible" NATO potential. Potential that can be broken up in order to carry out what are purely WEU operations.

Meanwhile Washington retains its right of supervision. Admittedly, another problem has appeared. NATO structures were developed with the United States playing the dominant role and it is extremely difficult to single out the European component in intelligence, communications, and transport. Washington (contrary to initial newspaper reports) by no means has a burning desire to give its units to the WEU. That was why the Berlin communique went no further than a general declaration regarding the creation of joint multinational tactical forces subordinate to the WEU. In effect the question has been left for the future.

But even if such forces are created shortly, WEU autonomy will be extremely relative. NATO members stated that its sphere of responsibility only encompasses those cases that go beyond the framework of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That is, situations which have no connection with the NATO countries' collective self-defense. Namely peacekeeping operations and operations for the settlement of crises.

The WEU seems to have been galvanized in case another crisis like that in Yugoslavia arises in Europe. It is not, after all, impossible that influential forces in the United States will block direct U.S. participation, since this does not square with collective self-defense. However, experience shows that it is necessary to act rapidly and decisively in such situations without wasting time on lengthy coordination. Be that as it may, Russia does in theory benefit from the fact that the European states are receiving or may receive greater influence over ensuring security on the continent. It obtains fresh room to maneuver, albeit fairly limited.

Unconfirmed Theory

At the same time it is unlikely that the galvanization of the WEU can really affect the resolution of the most important problem for Russia — NATO's eastward expansion. Although certain Moscow analysts saw the expansion of the WEU's function as a chance that this union, which did not serve as an instrument of confrontation, could integrate the East European states, which are so keen to join the "Western defense club." Especially since the WEU now has a four-tier structure: 10 permanent member countries, which are at the same time members of NATO and the EU; then associate members — NATO countries, which are not EU members; observers — EU countries; and, lastly, associate partners — nine countries from East and Central Europe.

You would have thought that the WEU, which is already cooperating with the countries of East Europe within the framework of the Yugoslav operation, would be a defense structure capable of integrating all European states. It was the WEU that looked like a compromise that might suit all parties to the debate on NATO eastward expansion, which everyone is pretty sick of.

I am afraid however that people in Moscow have somewhat overestimated their Brussels partners' subtlety. WEU Secretary General Jose Cutileiro, who visited Moscow straight after the Berlin session, insistently reiterated that there are no far-reaching designs behind the WEU's decisions, there are no plans to expand this union in the short term. At least if such plans do exist, nothing is being said about them. It seems that the problem of NATO expansion will be decided without the WEU's participation. But some elements of a solution did nonetheless appear in Berlin.

Ambitions or Security

The report put out by U.S. delegation circles that Yevgeniy Primakov had allegedly said that Russia agrees to NATO expansion on certain terms caused plenty of hullabaloo. If you consider that the Russian minister was talking about Moscow's readiness to cooperate with the transformed NATO, this leak seems plausible. But an extremely brusque denial was not long in coming. Primakov said that any form in which the NATO military infrastructure is brought closer to Russia's borders is absolutely unacceptable to us.

It is not impossible that this leak aimed to gloss over the changes taking place in various NATO countries' position regarding the bloc's expansion. First and foremost, more and more people realize that the military-political benefit derived from expansion is absolutely incomparable to the consequences of a deterioration in relations with Russia. Two extremely high-ranking diplomats from NATO countries told me, without prior arrangement, that it would be best to gradually "drop" the idea of the bloc's expansion. Moreover, even the most rabid supporters of expansion cannot fail to take account of how much this will cost. According to the U.S. Congress Budget Commission, at least $60 billion will have to be spent to bring the countries of East Europe up to NATO standards. And all they will receive in exchange will be that their own ambitions will be assuaged.

NATO members, which recently simply repeated that Russia does not have the right of veto, are now expressing willingness to conduct serious talks with Moscow. This process began in Berlin. In my view,

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serious prospects are now opening up here, if you consider the results of the Vienna conference on the implementation of the CFE Treaty. It did not only relax considerably the flank restrictions for Russia. Debate will start in the near future regarding the move away from bloc to national approaches to arms limitation. Thus, provision can be made for the whole necessary spectrum of security guarantees for all European states without the need to join a military-political bloc.

It is hard to anticipate the results of NATO evolution. After all even a sincere desire to adapt to the demands of the times does not guarantee success. Dinosaurs did after all develop successfully: Their teeth became sharper, their reactions faster, and their skin thicker. But all this proved to no avail when there was simply a change of climate on the planet....

Russia: Primakov on U.S. Ties, NATO, Mideast, CIS

BR1206111096 Rome LIMES in Italian Jun-Sep 96 pp 53-56

[Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov by Stanislav Kondrasev; place, date not given: "We Are the Locomotive of Eurasia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kondrasev] Is Russia able, and does it want, to prevent the enlargement of NATO to take in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?

[Primakov] We have to have good relations with the countries of central and Eastern Europe, which were our partners in the Warsaw Pact and COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] until a short while ago. Neither of those organizations exists any longer, so far be it from Russia to claim a right of veto on the admittance of this or that country to NATO. But Russia has an absolute right to defend its own interests. We are all agreed on that score: the foreign minister, the parliamentary groups, and public opinion.

[Kondrasev] On what arguments is this conviction based?

[Primakov] The enlargement of NATO would worsen our situation. It is against our interests from the military point of view, because it would mean the infrastructures of a powerful military bloc advancing toward our borders, and, psychologically, we find that difficult to accept. We are not primitive enough to think that an enlarged NATO will immediately be used to strike out at Russia. Of course it will not be, but in the event of tactical missiles fitted with nuclear warheads being installed in the territories of the new NATO members, they will have the same strike time as the Pershing- 2's, the medium-range missiles that were once eliminated under an East-West agreement, and it is a problem of which we have to take into account. Our military commanders will call for additional allocations, and we will be forced to grant them, and that is difficult for us at the moment, very difficult.

Yes, I know they are telling us that NATO is not directed against us. Fine. Some time ago, President Clinton said that the Russian missiles were no longer aimed against the United States and that that was one of the major gains for his country in recent times. And it is true: Our missiles are not aimed against anyone. But would the West now welcome an increase in our unaimed missile stockpile? Of course not. So why do they take a different line when they talk to us, saying that we must accept the enlargement of NATO because it is not directed against Russia?

[Kondrasev] There seems to be a very strong psychological element in the Russian reaction. Russia feels tricked and betrayed because it has decided against embarking on a collision course with the West, and, for its pains, it is in danger of finding the Atlantic military bloc on its very doorstep...

[Primakov] Of course. Perhaps our Western counterparts misinterpreted the signals that Moscow was sending out at a given time. I am not referring to the president, as he has consistently been against the enlargement of NATO. When I was still head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, we published an open paper expressing our opposition to enlargement in no uncertain terms. The paper came out when a number of ministers held vague views on the subject. I have to say that all the ideas contained in the report were approved at the time by President Yeltsin.

[Kondrasev] How is Russian foreign policy toward the West changing?

[Primakov] We regard our relations with our one-time enemies from the days of the Cold War as fundamental. We have done our utmost to set these relations on an equal footing, but I would quote Chairman Mao here: "When you want to stand up straight, you first have to bend over." We seem to have bent over too far. However, I do not think that it will come to forming a strategic alliance with our former Cold War enemies. Quite the contrary. We have to talk in terms of a civil partnership, and of a preferential partnership with some countries. But in any case, relations must be placed on an equal footing. There must not be one partner who leads and another who is led, copying the actions of the leader all the while. I have discussed this openly with all my Western counterparts, and in confidence with Christopher. Generally speaking, we have agreed on the equal partnership concept. Consultations must be held

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instead of presenting the other side with a fait accompli. If one side has a step that might affect the other side's interests in mind, it must state its intentions in advance.

To sum up: The approach adopted in Russian foreign policy now consists in safeguarding our interests more actively and more effectively, while at the same time not drifting toward clashes and another Cold War. Our foreign policy is that of a major country, so, first and foremost, we want to create conditions that will be conducive to maintaining Russia's integrity: This is one of our current priorities. Moreover, we have to pursue a diversified, active foreign policy at all latitudes, wherever Russia has interests. This is no sop to our vanity. It is simply a vital necessity in the creation of better conditions for more dynamic domestic development.

[Kondrasev] You have often talked about geopolitical pluralism. What do you mean by the term?

[Primakov] We are going through a transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world, a process in which Russia must act as a counterweight to the negative trends emerging in international affairs. The transition has still not seen the formation of all the centers of power that make for multipolarity. In this situation, there are those who aspire to dominate the rest. Russia has a major role to perform in the multipolar world. This is apparent, for example, in the Middle East as well: Even the countries in the area that assign a preferential role to the United States have an interest in active Russian participation in the peace process. It is not that they are harking back to the old days; they want to redress the balance in a situation where the dominant role played by a single power in the peace process might be to their disadvantage.

[Kondrasev] There are 25 million Russians living beyond the federation's frontiers, in the countries making up the Community of Independent States (CIS), within which integrationist tendencies are emerging. Can integration still be pursued?

[Primakov] Relations with the CIS countries are of prime importance to Russia, as they restore Russia's status as a major power. I would add that all the integration processes taking place in the CIS, and those that will take place in the future, indirectly affect Russia's relations with other countries, and the United States in particular. These integration projects are of an objective nature, something that is not universally understood. They are not directed toward the rebirth of the Soviet Union, which is not feasible under present conditions, since the sovereignty that the former republics of the Soviet Union have acquired cannot be revoked.

As I see it, the specific nature of our brand of integration may lie in an integrative process at various levels. A few states might form a pioneering group, thrusting far ahead along the path to integration, economic unification, and the constitution of supranational structures to which part of their sovereignty will be delegated. It is being done in Western Europe as well, the individual states maintaining their sovereignty. We are making faster headway in integration with Belarus, which will perhaps be followed by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

[Kondrasev] Many people in the West are interpreting this integration process as a neoimperialist throwback, a return to Russian imperialism.

[Primakov] I think that they are repeating, and aggravating, our past errors and weaknesses. I recall our totally negative attitude to the integration process in Western Europe back in the sixties and seventies. At the time, we thought that integration could have no objective foundation under capitalism, and that the United States was actually creating an imperialist base under NATO control. This approach is now being mirrored, no less, even in the terminology used by the West. Voices are again being heard claiming that integration within the CIS is an imperialist ambition on Moscow's part. People are not realizing that the thrust toward integration is coming from all the parties concerned, not only, and maybe not even mainly, from Moscow. Indeed, many of our Muscovite finance ministers think it would be better to implement economic reforms solely on Russian territory, to keep the cost down. Russia's future, particularly in the wake of industrial development (which is imminent), will lie in the conquest of the CIS markets.

[Kondrasev] Russia has joined the Council of Europe, accepting its legal standards. Can a Council of Eurasia, in which Russia would have a fundamental role, be envisaged?

[Primakov] As of now, I would not bother my head with the name that such a council or union or whatever would go by, but I am thinking along those lines. Russia can act as the locomotive for the integration of the CIS countries situated in Asia.

Russia: U.S. House Decision To Cut Aid to Russia Noted

MM1306092896 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Yevgeniy Bay: "U.S. Conservatives Start Economizing on Russia Even Before the Election..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. Congress House of Representatives has approved a $12-billion package of U.S. aid to foreign states for next year. It has been cut

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by $458 million compared to the previous budget and is exactly $1 billion less than the amount which President Clinton requested from the Congress.

Russia and the other CIS states are on the list of countries whose aid has been cut: They will have a total "shortfall" of $51 million out of a package of $590 million.

U.S. legislators generally cut aid to foreign states in a straightforward manner, without any fanfare. For instance, it was announced that aid to Turkey would be cut in the new year because it is still blocking humanitarian aid shipments to Armenia and has so far failed to express regret officially for the mass slaughter of Armenians in 1915.

As for the cut in aid to Russia, U.S. legislators did not deem it necessary to explain the reasons for their toughness. By cutting the Russian aid package they hardly intended to demonstrate their rejection of Yeltsin's policy on the eve of the election, never mind support his opponent. But, no matter what their intentions, they did not choose the best time to bring in their verdict.

However, the U.S. lower house does have its own election timetable. What is more, as in the Russian State Duma, those with the strongest vocal chords and those who are numerically strongest often win the day. As in previous years Israel got the most — $3 billion. Along with Egypt it receives around 40 percent of all aid.

Right now it is not clear whether President Clinton will sign the new bill. Members of his team have already voiced regret in connection with the cuts in appropriations, saying that these measures "will undermine the President's opportunity to ensure the U.S. people's security and prosperity in the international arena."

Russia: Kissinger's NEWSWEEK Strictures on Russia Policy Cited

MM1306101496 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Nadein: "U.S. Conservatives Even Tougher in Criticizing White House's Moscow Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington — U.S. conservatives are in a hurry. The last week before the Russian election is the best time to attack Clinton's foreign policy. As the Communist Party of the Russian Federation emerged from the ruins of the [CPSU] Central Committee, pushing the democrats out of the enraged provinces to the shelter of the Kremlin walls, Clinton's pro-Yeltsin policy has brought him even more trouble. The Republicans' attacks have become harsher, and they are not the only ones. There have been demands from within the administration itself "not to disgrace ourselves" by links with a regime festering with corruption and disgraced by the war in Chechnya. Washington rumor has it that there have been insistent recommendations of this kind from several secretaries, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

An article by well-known historian and diplomat Henry Kissinger, published in the latest issue of NEWSWEEK, provides a full and systematic range of all the well-known accusations against Russia and Clinton's Russia policy. The author does not go to the trouble of considering the options "under Zyuganov." He believes that the whole Zyuganov situation is clear. The White House will not carry on sitting on the fence then. An "urgent reappraisal is inevitable" then. "But a Yeltsin victory, too, would impose a new approach. For even under Yeltsin Russia is pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, which already opposes American notions of world order in many parts of the world," Kissinger claims.

According to him, the Clinton administration has placed too much reliance on Yeltsin. Otherwise the endorsement of the military assault on the parliament, the dismissal of the Constitutional Court, the justification of the pressure on the newly independent states, and the comparisons between the American Civil War and the campaign in Chechnya would have been impossible.

Obsessed with participating in Russian domestic politics, Clinton and his people have missed the external threat emanating from Russia. "Yet it is precisely the external actions of Russia that present the greatest challenge to international stability. And, paradoxically, the very domestic drama of which we have made ourselves too much a party provides some of the incentive for Russian adventurism."

In particular, much of the lamentation regarding the "great and glorious past" is being exploited by Russia's politicians simply because economic reforms have been conducted badly. The protestations regarding an external threat are groundless. A country of that size ought not to suffer from claustrophobia, Kissinger writes, reminding his readers that "St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, which is in turn closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow."

The main conclusion is that, despite mounting evidence in the daily conduct of Russian diplomacy, Washington treats Yeltsin as if he were some tender shoot incapable of withstanding the gusts of a realistic foreign policy.

What Washington moves does Kissinger consider essential in the immediate future? Ukraine must be given attention commensurate with its political and strategic

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importance. Washington must abandon its regrets regarding human rights concerns in the new Central Asian states in view of the geopolitical importance of that region. And Russia's diplomatic "medieval imperialism" in the Caucasus must be opposed.

But these recommendations are almost secondary. The main thing is NATO. "NATO expansion requires a decision, not a study...," Kissinger states categorically.

As for Russia, the author is agreeable to "giving it an important role in the creation of the new international system," but on the essential condition of "Russian readiness to stay within its borders." Although things will be more complex with the election of Gennadiy Zyuganov, Kissinger asks the U.S. leadership even after a Yeltsin victory "to assemble a proper balance of incentives and penalties" and make it obvious to the Kremlin that "strategic domination of its neighbors can be achieved (by Russia) only at the cost of permanent tensions with the United States and the West."

Long articles about Strobe Talbott, who is now the number two at the U.S. State Department and a personal friend of President Clinton, have recently appeared in several U.S. publications. Talbott is considered the main man behind the White House's Russia policy. These articles are insistently driving the deputy secretary of state into the corner where scapegoats are slaughtered.

This slaughter will become inevitable in the event of a Zyuganov victory.

Russia: Moscow Denies Giving PRC Nuclear Computer Technology

LD1306104396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1024 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 13 (Itar-Tass) — Russia does not have a fleet of computer equipment sufficient for staging simultaneously a series of nuclear explosions, Itar-Tass was told at the Russian Ministry for the Nuclear Industry on Thursday. A spokesman for the information and public relations agency of the ministry, commenting on reports in the Japanese Press that Russia supplies Beijing "with a special computer technology enabling the simultaneous staging of several nuclear explosions and creating missiles with several warheads", said this: "Nuclear scientists see no connection between such tests and missile production."

The spokesman says Russia does not produce high-yield rapid action servers. So to assert that Russia supplies computer technologies to China means deliberately to mislead the world public, the spokesman said.

Russia: Belarus Refusal To Send Back Missiles Viewed

MM1206160196 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Lukashenka Hangs on to Russian Topols"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new furor has flared up between the Belarusian Ministry of Defense and the Russian military department. Contrary to the accords signed by the two ministers 9 December last year, the Belarusian leadership is not allowing Russia to withdraw to its own territory two strategic missile regiments armed with 18 RS-12M Topol mobile systems or, as they are also called in the West, SS-25's. The schedule for the withdrawal of these missiles in 1996 has virtually been wrecked once again.

This happened for the first time in April last year. The last trains carrying missile hardware bound for Russia were stopped then by Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka personally. At the time he called the withdrawal of Russia's missile troops from the republic's territory a major political mistake by the republic's former leadership, and since the two countries are coming closer together on all counts, the Russian missiles must be left where they are now. That is, near Lida and near Mozyr.

It took a lot of diplomatic and political effort at the highest level to convince president Lukashenka that the withdrawal of nuclear missile weapons from Belarus to Russia is not someone's whim or thoughtlessness but [the result of] international pledges assumed both by Ukraine and Kazakhstan and by Belarus and Russia. They have been sealed by the signatures of not only the presidents of these four countries but also the U.S. President, by the Lisbon Protocol, and by other juridical documents and must be fulfilled unconditionally. Minsk seemed to realize this.

After visiting Alyaksandr Lukashenka's office, the two countries' ministers of defense — General Grachev and General Maltsaw — at last managed to sign a new schedule for the withdrawal of combined units and units of the Russian Armed Forces from the territory of Belarus, including the directorates of the 49th and 33d Missile Divisions and the two aforementioned Topol regiments. All nuclear warheads were to have been removed to Russia from the territory of Belarus by the end of May. But all the deadlines approved by the ministers expired, and there was and still is no permission to let Russian military trains cross the border. Minsk did not respond to requests from Moscow. It did not even respond to a note sent by the

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leader of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Belarusian minister of foreign affairs.

Moreover, when two strategic missiles were affected in October 1995 by defects which could be eliminated only under plant conditions, and the question of the missile system's nuclear safety arose, even then the Belarusian authorities did not allow those missiles to be removed to Russia. They did not believe or for some reason did not want to believe the Muscovites' claim that the Topols are nonetheless in need of immediate repairs. It took repeated appeals from Boris Lagutin, the general designer of the RS-12M, to Viktar Sheyman, state secretary of the Belarusian National Security Council, before the faulty missiles could get to plant specialists only in March (!) of this year.

Why is all this happening?

Experts familiar with this problem maintain that the Belarusian president is using the Russian missile regiments in a political game with the West, which has adopted a decision to expand NATO eastward. The idea is extremely simple: If you bring your troops closer to our borders, he says, you will be in the sights of these strategic missiles.

There is another version too. The 18 Russian nuclear missile systems remain on Belarusian territory as a counterweight to the 500 U.S. nuclear bombs which the United States does not intend to remove from Europe, as President Bill Clinton declared at the April summit in Moscow. My interlocutors believe that here, too, there is an intrigue which resembles the previous one in terms of its intent: If it does not suit President Yeltsin to rattle nuclear missile weapons, President Lukashenka might take on the role of "trouble maker" in the common interest.

But, as specialists believe, these two ideas have nothing in common either with international policy in general or with common sense in particular. If NATO troops suddenly start approaching the borders of Belarus, it would be utterly foolish to keep strategic missile launchers there, whose position areas are just 30 km from the borders of the Baltic countries and Poland. For many reasons. But particularly from the military viewpoint: Even cannon artillery would be able to cover them at any moment.

The situation with the U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe and the situation with our missiles in Belarus are totally different. The Americans have not assumed any international pledges to withdraw them, whereas we have. What is Russia's word worth now?

But maybe the results of the presidential election in Moscow are being awaited in Belarus?!

Russia is also insisting on the withdrawal of its missile regiments from Belarus for other reasons, you might say purely economic ones. It costs Russia 10 billion rubles a month to maintain them outside the country's borders.

The leadership of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, which I asked to shed light on the situation with the "Belarusian" regiments, endeavored to avoid a direct answer. "This is not a question for Russia," I was told. "As for us, we strictly adhere to the provisions of the bilateral intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal of strategic nuclear forces from the territory of Belarus." An acquaintance who is a general said that only President Yeltsin can resolve this problem today. But the election has evidently pushed it into the background for the time being.

Russia: Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Talks To Resume in Moscow 14 Jun

LD1206184996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1611 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, June 12 (Interfax) — Negotiations on a peace settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh will resume in Moscow on June 14.

The Armenian Foreign Ministry's press-center has said the talks by delegates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia and Finland will be mediated by the OSCE Minsk group.

A map of a neutral zone, likely borders and areas where flights by military aircraft would be banned will be discussed. The Moscow round of talks will last one week. The talks will continue in Stockholm as of July 1.

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Political Issues

Russia: Internal Affairs Denies Arrest of Metro Bombing Suspects

LD1206220396 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2035 GMT 12 Jun 96

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Shvedov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 June (Itar-Tass) — The duty officer at Moscow's main internal affairs directorate told ITAR-TASS today that he had no information confirming reports on this evening in some of the mass media about the arrest of two persons who had allegedly anonymously telephoned the law-enforcement bodies over the Moscow metro explosion on Tuesday.

The duty officer at the Federal Security Service's Moscow and Moscow Region directorate also informed ITAR-TASS that he had no information of any arrests in the course of the continuing investigation into the circumstances of the terrorist act.

Russia: Sources Confirm Arrest of Two Men After Telephone Warning

LD1306071396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0654 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Olga Semenova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 13 (Itar-Tass) — Two men, both coming from the Caucasus, were arrested in Moscow on Wednesday. They called the Moscow police service and said that "the explosion at the Moscow underground on June 11 was not the last one," Tass learned from reliable sources at the Moscow law enforcement agencies. The location of the two men calling from the street was established at once, and they were arrested right in the telephone booth. According to the same source, however, the connection between the detainees and the explosion at the Moscow underground was not found.

Russia: Moscow Police Receive 12 Bomb Threat Calls 12 Jun

LD1306094996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0930 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — Moscow sapper teams received 12 anonymous bomb threat calls Wednesday. Five callers said bombs had been planted at subway stations.

On all twelve occasions, specially trained dogs searched the suggested bomb plant sites for explosive devices, the Metropolitan Police Administration told Interfax.

They searched for bombs at the Kolomenskaya, Krasnoselskaya, Tverskaya, Teatralnaya and Paveletskaya subway stations, as well as in the square in front of the Bolshoy Theater.

The June 11 explosion between the Tulskaya and Nagatinskaya stations on the Moscow subway system claimed four lives. Twelve persons received injuries.

The police receive ten to fifteen anonymous calls a day. Ninety-five percent of the calls are made by high school and college students, police spokesmen said.

Russia: Zyuganov: Subway Blast Part of Political 'Free-For-All'

LD1206142996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 12 (Interfax) — Russian Communist party leader, presidential candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov has described the explosion in the Moscow subway on June 11 as another manifestation of "several years of a free-for-all in politics," just as the war in Chechnya. The blast claimed four lives. As he addressed youth and students at Moscow's film house Progress, Zyuganov recalled that the war in Chechnya had left 60,000 killed and 100,000 injured.

Zyuganov disagreed with Moscow's Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who claimed the subway blast was "an attempt by reactionary forces to upset the election in the capital."

Zyuganov said that such statements could be made only after a thorough investigation of the attack.

The Communist leader demanded that the authorities should take timely and effective security measures and consistently fight against those who commit such atrocities.

He confirmed his appeal to the potential leaders of what may become a Third Force political alliance — Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Aleksandr Lebed and Svyatoslav Fedorov — to agree to join a coalition government. However, Zyuganov said that he would make specific proposals only after the first round of voting, which would make clear the real influence of each movement and politician. Zyuganov said that in the current cabinet there were "decent people who may well be invited into a "popular confidence government."

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Russia: Security Agencies Link Moscow Subway Bombing to Elections

LD1206151696 Moscow INFORMATSIONNOYE AGENTSTVO EKHO MOSKVY in Russian 1422 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [no dateline as received] — Aleksandr Zdanovich, acting (?chief) of the Russian Federal Security Service's [FSB] Public Relations Center, told Ekho Moskvy radio station that Russian Chief Prosecutor Yuriy Skuratov, Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov, and FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov issued a joint statement on 12 June about the series of terrorist attacks committed on the eve of the election of the president of the Russian Federation.

The statement of the three security agencies notes the appearance, both in statements by individuals and the mass media as a whole, of information on proposed infringements of Russia's constitutional structure, possible violations of election legislation, falsification of voting returns, and nonrecognition of the results. In this connection, the heads of the Interior Ministry, the Federal Security Service, and the General Prosecutors Office deem it necessary to state the following:

"The law enforcement bodies insist that the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the existing legislation of the Russian Federation must be strictly observed, and that the rights of Russian citizens to freely express their will must be unconditionally guaranteed.

The bodies of the General Prosecutor's Office, the Interior Ministry, and the Federal Security Service will take the measures provided for by the law to prevent and avert any violations of legality during the elections. Any encroachments upon state and public security, and any actions aimed at violating the normal work of the electoral commissions and at bringing pressure to bear upon the members of the commissions and the electorate, will be resolutely stopped."

Russia: Moscow Subway Blast Details, Reactions Reported

MM1306080896 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 96 p 2

[Report prepared by Tatyana Bateneva, Viktor Belikov, Mikhail Belkin, Svetlana Galkina, Aleksandr Dzyublo, Grigoriy Punanov, Natalya Timashova, Yuriy Senatorov, and Yuriy Snegirev: "Terrorist Act in Moscow Subway"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpts]

How It Happened

The ill-fated train had traveled barely 600 meters from Tulskaya subway station in the direction of Nagatinskaya station when the fifth passenger car was rocked by a home-made explosive device equivalent to approximately 500 grams of TNT which had been detonated. According to the specialists, it had been placed in the front section of the passenger car under a padded seat designed for three people. A plausible version that is being strenuously investigated is that the delayed-action "bomb" with a timer mechanism was hidden under the seat when the train was in a siding at the terminus. [passage omitted]

The Mayor's View: The Terrorists Must Be Destroyed

"An attempt by reactionary forces to disrupt the elections in the capital" was how city mayor Yuriy Luzhkov described the explosion at an emergency press conference Wednesday. He expressed the conviction that "the attempt on the life of candidate deputy mayor Valeriy Shantsev 7 June, the explosion in the subway, and other incidents which have been recorded by the law enforcement organs are links in the same chain."

At the same time, according to INTERFAX, the mayor announced that "we will not allow the elections to be disrupted." Yu. Luzhkov said that "the cancellation of the elections is the aim of those political forces whose euphoria has given way to alarm and apathy."

"There were more telephone threats this morning. The callers said that this terrorist act will not be the last. They have been ringing 02 and trying to intimidate the government. They do not frighten us," Yuriy Luzhkov stated. This was the mayor's reply to our correspondent's question about the details of the operation to clean up the aftermath of the explosion in the capital's subway. "They are animals, not people, they must be hunted down and destroyed," Yuriy Mikhaylovich added.

By an irony of fate these words were also voiced at the Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters where the Moscow mayor was awarded the medal "Participant in Humanitarian Emergency Operations" on the morning of 12 June, Russian Independence Day. [passage omitted]

The Rescue Workers Were Equal to the Task

Sergey Shoygu, minister for affairs of civil defense, emergency situations, and elimination of natural disasters, received a report on the explosion while in his car

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returning home from the ministry. The car changed direction and Shoygu went to the scene of the incident. Sergey Shoygu told an IZVESTIYA correspondent that organizing the work was not particularly difficult because the special teams of subway rescue workers were already at work. The equipment was already deployed at the scene and specialists from the Moscow Center for Disaster Medicine were ready to receive the injured. The firefighters turned up next. A team of rescue workers from the Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters' Special Purpose Center took part not only in evacuating people but also in dismantling the passenger car. In all around 600 people worked to clean up the aftermath of the blast including 90 rescue workers and 260 police and fire fighters. Sergey Shoygu stressed that it took 1 hour 20 minutes to evacuate all the passengers.

The Moscow mayor stressed that all the services worked well together and explained that after the passengers were evacuated, the prosecutor's office and investigators worked until 0200 hours at the scene of the blast and that it took until 4 a.m. to cut away the sections of the car and clear the track. All obstacles to trains were cleared away in the two hours remaining before the subway reopened.

The Moscow health department refused to give us the names of those who have been hospitalized and would only report (at the time this edition was signed to press) that seven casualties were in hospital.

However, from a confidential source we managed to obtain the names of 12 casualties. [passage omitted]

This Is Political, Not Criminal

While calling the event an "impotent terrorist action," Yuriy Luzhkov nevertheless did not rule out a repetition. Moscow, with its overcrowded transport system and large crowds of people on the streets and public squares, is extremely vulnerable to terrorists.

Sergey Bogdanov, leader of the Federal Security Service [FSB] Moscow Press Service, told your IZVESTIYA reporter that in this instance "it may be said with a higher degree of certainty than usual that this was a terrorist act." At the very least, the Moscow Transport Prosecutor's Office has instituted criminal proceedings under the Russian Federation Criminal Code's article 213-H — "terrorism." So far no one has claimed responsibility for this explosion, although the law enforcement organs tend increasingly to the view that the incident has political motives. But, Bogdanov stated, the possibility that "a schizophrenic" might appear "demanding $10 million from the authorities and threatening another explosion" cannot be ruled out.

Or Is It Gang Warfare?

According to another likely version that is being considered by the Moscow law enforcement organs, the explosion in the subway train on the evening of 11 June could be an extension of the "bombing war" that is being waged in the capital's South Administrative Okrug (V. Shantsev is head of the okrug). The coincidence of a number of recent dramatic events points to such a possibility, our correspondent reports.

First of all there is the attempt on the life of Valeriy Shantsev, prefect of South Okrug and a contender for deputy mayor, which took place in similar circumstances. Prior to this, three crime bosses vying for control of some extremely lucrative areas of economic activity in the prefecture had been killed in the same okrug and by exactly the same method — the detonation of concealed home-made bombs. These areas of economic activity included the automobile trade (the automobile center at the intersection of Varshavskoye Avenue and the Moscow Beltway), the "unofficial" market near Tsaritsyno station, and finally there is the alcohol trade — at the beginning of April V. Shantsev banned the sale of alcohol in the okrug after 2200 hours.

The latest terrorist act — the explosion in the subway — also took place in South Okrug, which stretches from the central districts of the Zamoskvorechye area to the outlying residential districts of Biryulevo and Orekhovo-Borisovo. The Serpukhovskiy subway line, which includes Nagatinskaya and Tulskaya stations, is one of the okrug's main transport arteries. [Passage omitted]

Since the morning of 12 June the protection of the Moscow subway has been stepped up. At Novogireyevo, the final station on the Kalininskiy Line, our reporter saw the passengers leave the train after which police staffers went into each car and searched them thoroughly, among other things lifting up the seats and searching for suspicious objects. When asked how trains are being searched on the Circle Line a lieutenant replied: "It is more difficult there but people are at work on it."

Anyone who might have information about the explosion near Tulskaya subway station 11 June is requested to telephone the FSB's Moscow Directorate on 925-28-19 or the Internal Affairs Main Administration on 200-82-82.

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Russia: Magazine Interviews Duma Chairman Seleznev

LD1306111496 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No. 24, Jun 96 (Signed to press 10 Jun 96) p 3

[Interview with State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev by an unidentified correspondent "last week" at the newspaper office: "Gennadiy Seleznev: We have Our Path"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Many different famous people have been the guests of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY during the past year — both major politicians and businessmen and high ranking officials. The idea of the meetings is to understand what kind of people make up the current elite and what their intellectual and moral potential is.

The chairman of the Russian State Duma, Gennadiy Seleznev, visited our office last week.

[passage omitted]

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] We all know that the Communist Party has not repented its sins. Has the current Communist Party drawn any lessons from its difficult legacy?

[Seleznev] Yes and very serious ones. We now have four communist parties: Under Nina Andreyeva, Viktor Kryuchkov, Viktor Anpilov, and Gennadiy Zyuganov. There is an opportunity to choose and so there are no grounds for creating a new platform within the party. The main lesson is that there cannot be one party within the state which forces its will and aspirations on the entire nation. The second lesson: There cannot be a party elite; people came into the party before to gain good posts. The third lesson: There must not be a party administration; the CPSU as a party was one thing, the CPSU administration was another. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is now learning to operate without an administration. They have got the money together and taken people on for a year, for the election campaign, for example. If there is no money, there are no wages and this means we do not have the personnel. Many of the restored party regional and city committees do not even have offices. So the approach where one was "automatically" given everything as a member of the elite — a car, telephone, office, and the rest — does not exist now either. [passage omitted]

[ARGUMENTY] Will there be reelections to a new Duma if Zyuganov wins?

[Seleznev] If the president's rights are restricted (which Zyuganov supports because he understands that the president should not be an autocrat in Russia), a new constitution will need to be adopted. And this will mean that there will also be new elections to the State Duma.

Perhaps they will become soviets again. And it will essentially be as it was in the USSR — the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Federation. Although many lawyers are now recommending a one chamber parliament.

[ARGUMENTY] You are suggesting changing everything yet again in just five years: Having soviets instead of the Duma, a general secretary instead of the president. This is practically a new revolution, isn't it!

[Seleznev] Twenty-five percent voted for Yeltsin's constitution. Yes, his constitution provides for amendments but the procedure for adopting them is so finely drawn up that its impossible to change a single amendment! You cannot just stop the powers of the Duma: They are all fixed, four years have been set if, of course, the Duma is not dissolved. And in order for it not to be dissolved, one needs to have a good knowledge of the Constitution and not to give any grounds for the Duma to be dissolved.

[ARGUMENTY] Are you planning to change the Constitution via a referendum or a party congress?

[Seleznev] Via a referendum. There is not a single party these days that could say at its congress: "We are doing this in the name of the entire people." [passage omitted]

[ARGUMENTY] The Communists do not yet have a clear program in either the economic or ideological sphere. Just obscurity and generalities. Zyuganov is rushing about, promising everything to everyone.

[Seleznev] He will never cause everything to be turned back. He will neither be able to, nor will he want to, nor will he know how to. It's all very well to write a program when you are in power but, when you are not in power, on whose authority can you write a program?

Everyone asks me: What guarantees does your party give? I reply: What guarantees can a party that has not won yet give? It can say in general terms that it guarantees freedom of speech, for example, and freedom of the press.

[ARGUMENTY] But we already have that now.

[Seleznev] All the same, if you want there to be a guarantee for the mass media, when I have left the Duma, if I become minister of information, I will not allow anyone to encroach upon the mass media. [passage omitted]

But we do not have the right to foist new models on anyone. I would not like us, for example, to live like

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the Americans or the Germans. Let them live their lives if it suits them and they like it.

We have our path. They say: "Young people choose 'Pepsi.'" But the young people of Russia should not choose 'Pepsi.' Let them choose kvas [a low strength alcoholic drink traditional in Russia]. Then we would have kvas patriotism.

[ARGUMENTY] By the way, would you like to live in North Korea?

[Seleznev] No. And I think most people wouldn't want to live there either. Everyone should have their motherland.

[ARGUMENTY] Do you retain communism as an idea?

[Seleznev] It's a beautiful idea. It should be a guiding star.

[ARGUMENTY] Several people in the Communist Party think you are exceptional. Are you not afraid that you might be destroyed tomorrow?

[Seleznev] I could be destroyed today. Is anyone insured against that? But there are a lot of people supporting us. It has become clear to us that a government of civil accord is the only government possible in such a strongly multipolar society. Forces in society need to be calmed down. Gennadiy Zyuganov was the first to make this proposal.

[ARGUMENTY] Let's take the nonradical part of society — that is the majority of the population. They are bitter about the current authorities and about the recent communist past. And if you win the elections and reproduce our recent but forgotten past, then in fewer than six months people will begin to feel dreadful disappointment.

[Seleznev] We are not at all euphoric. On the contrary, we have a constant feeling of danger. It will not go away because the president is unpredictable. Any Shakhray [Sergey Shakhray, former deputy prime minister] could bring him some decree tomorrow and think up grounds to break up and ban the party. What then?

[ARGUMENTY] What do you think of the president in extreme conditions?

[Seleznev] He is terrible in these conditions.

[ARGUMENTY] He sees that only the older generation supports Zyuganov's party. Nature itself, by taking away the old leaders, caused the collapse of the CPSU and regulated this process itself.

[Seleznev] But can you not see the new people who were fervent democrats yesterday, supporters of this system, but who today are deserting democracy? Its true that they're not all going to the CPRF. Its worse if they go to Barkashev or Bryntsalov.... Today the older generation is grateful that we have not renamed the Communist Party. It gives them peace of mind. But where will those guys go who are now disappointed with everything under the sun?

Russia: Livshits Cited on Yeltsin's Budget Message

MK1306072696 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 11 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Boris Boyko: "A Glimpse Into the Near Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every year in June the Russian president forwards to the government a budget message for the following year. This practice was introduced last year. On Saturday [8 June] Yeltsin signed his budget message for 1997 — his second. The main parameters set for the would-be budget — a monthly inflation rate at 0.7 percent of GDP and deficit at a level of 3 percent of GDP — are rigorous. This enabled Aleksandr Livshits, an aide to the president on economic matters, to say at a briefing yesterday that "the economic strategy remains unchanged." That notwithstanding, the message clearly indicates that economic policy will be adjusted.

Having decided to avoid any questions of a political kind, Aleksandr Livshits immediately characterized the new budget message as "the first serious decision to promote the electoral program of the president.... I would even like to say more than that," the aide to the president said. "Before the election the president has started to implement his electoral program." The message sets the following three main tasks for the government: to fulfill state financial obligations unconditionally, to their full extent, and in a timely way; to ensure full-bodied funding in the social sphere; and to promote investments and enliven business activity. To this end, the message says that in 1997 it is expected that the decline in industrial production will be stopped and that the financial sphere is going to be stabilized. To all appearances, the economic course is largely going to be adjusted by orienting budgetary policy "toward the investment of budgetary funds into areas that are capable of upgrading the structure of the Russian economy and of strengthening domestic capital, while, at the same time, pursuing an active social policy." Quite remarkably, the 1997 budget should be oriented, as it was last year, toward the conduct of a consistent monetary policy, aimed not only at a decrease in the inflation rate, "but also toward the creation of conditions to satisfy economic needs in credit resources on the basis of market mechanisms, as well as at a strengthening of the banking system."

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Measures proposed in the message for the strengthening of the revenue part of the budget provided the grounds for Livshits to state that "the president proposed that 1997 be made the year of tax reform." Indeed, problems of tax reform are given great significance in the message. On one hand, it points to the need to streamline the tax system and the budget process, to create the legislative basis for the strengthening of the revenue base, and to work out mechanisms to monitor the efficiency of the use of state funds. To this end, it is proposed that the Tax Code and federal laws "On the Fundamentals of the Budget Structure and the Budget Process," "On the Treasury System of Budget Execution," and "On the State Financial Control" be adopted. On the other hand, emphasis is made on an improvement in tax collection. Moreover, the message specifies directly the relevant targets: The tax bite should be raised from this year's 9-10 percent of GDP to a 12-13 percent level in 1997. The government is being tasked with specific targets, ranging from a reduction in arrears by rendering the procedure for granting the deferment of payments to the budget harsher, and by establishing a rigid oversight of the proceeds of major enterprises through greater administrative control as well as through extending criminal responsibility of officials for violations of the tax legislation. The message also specifies the total revenues to the budget expected as a result of these measures, which amount to not less than 70 trillion rubles.

In the popular interpretation of the presidential aide all of these measures look very simple. After the election, "there will be a total revision of tax exemptions, deferments, and nonmonetary forms of tax payments." Forestalling any signs of discontent on the part of those who are affected by these measures, Livshits noted cryptically: "This is the answer the president has made to the demands of business circles, industrialists, and bankers, suggesting that, being fully aware of the fiscal role of taxation, this, above all, has to do with the promotion of production and investments."

As for the expense part of the future budget it has, in Livshits' words, the following two main components: the social sphere and investments. The president, according to his aide, "demanded that in 1997 the government continue to pay compensation for people's [lost] savings." Moreover, this concerns not only the deposits with Sberbank that were devalued in 1992, but also 1992 [state] bonds, special deposits, and special checks. On the whole, it is expected that not only the system of state expenditures will be rationalized, but also additional measures will be taken to ensure a stricter monitoring of the use of budget funds. To do this, it is proposed that the federal executive branch — including power agencies — be switched over to the treasury system of budget execution.

As this year, the means to offset the budget deficit will continue to be of a kind that do not envision the printing of money, but, as the message says, "will be accompanied by a consistent reduction in the volume of external borrowings from state and interstate sources." This enabled the presidential aide to note that "there will be much novelty as regards state securities." Specifically, the message talks about the need to reduce interest rates on state securities in accordance with the rate of inflation and about the boosting of the distribution of Russian state securities among private foreign investors. Livshits put a special emphasis on the fact that "this is a most effective form of borrowing." In the West, "there is more money, therefore it is cheaper there." On the whole, the president set out the task of shifting the focus of budget borrowings away from the banking sector by attracting the funds of individuals, enterprises, and organizations. Moreover, the message placed special emphasis on the fact that all obligations will be 100-percent fulfilled.

The last section of the message discusses relations with international financial organizations. In Livshits' words, the task in this area is "to maintain payments at 1 percent of GDP and to reduce the amounts of tied credits." In principle this task is quite feasible — under the condition, of course, that all the questions related to the fulfillment of earlier agreements with international creditor clubs get resolved. There is no doubt that if Boris Yeltsin wins, this will be implemented in full.

A more detailed comment on the presidential budget message in the context of the financial policy that has been conducted in the first six months of this year will be given in the next issue of KOMMERSANT-DAILY.

Russia: Livshits Denies Central Bank Boosting Inflation

LD1306093996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0914 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jun 13 (Interfax) — Russian presidential economics adviser Aleksandr Livshits denied on Thursday that the Central Bank's recent transfer of part of its profits to regional treasuries would boost inflation.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin would do nothing that would either give an impulse to inflation or restrict the Central Bank's independence, Livshits told Interfax.

The transfer of 5 trillion rubles, ordered by a law endorsed by Yeltsin, is "a one-time measure, which does not at all mean that the [present] course has been

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changed for a pro-inflationary one," Livshits said. "The measure will have no continuation" and financiers "need not make a tragedy" of it.

The transfer is a "seasonal" measure necessitated by "pressure on the budget."

The bulk of the money has been used to pay holiday allowances to school teachers and meet the defense industry's needs, the aide said.

Commenting on the opinions of Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov, who supported the transfer, and Central Bank Chairman Sergey Dubinin, who opposed it, Livshits said: "If I were in Panskov's place I would act as Panskov has done, and if I held Dubinin's post I would take the same attitude as Dubinin does.... This is what makes the situation tragic, and yet it has been impossible to make any other decision."

Russia: Yeltsin Orders Help for Small-Scale Food Producers

MM1306111896 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jun 96 p 3

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict 819 "On State Support for Horticulturists, Truck Farmers, and Owners of Personal Subsidiary Plots," signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin in Moscow, the Kremlin, on 7 June 1996: "The Truck Garden Bed Is an Aid to the Table and to Health" — from the 'Documents' section]

[FBIS Translated Text] In recent years, as a result of implementing the land reform, the number of citizens with plots of land for horticulture, truck farming, and the maintenance of personal subsidiary plots has increased significantly. There has been a corresponding increase in production of agricultural produce. Mindful of the increasing role of these plots of land in filling the Russian food market and of their great social significance in creating conditions for a healthy way of life, and also taking into account the inadequate state support for horticulturists, truck farmers, and citizens who maintain personal subsidiary plots, I decree that:

1. All possible support for horticulturists, truck farmers, and owners of personal subsidiary plots is deemed a priority task for federal executive bodies, executive bodies in the Russian Federation components, and local self-government bodies.

The state support measures envisaged in Russian Federation legislation for agricultural commodity producers are to apply to the said category of citizens.

2. Mindful of proposals by the Union of Landowners of Russia, the Russian Zemstvo Movement, and other interested organizations, the Russian Federation Government is to:

submit to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma in 1996 drafts federal laws "On the Personal Subsidiary Plot" and "On Collective Horticulture and Truck Farming," making provision for a reduction in taxes on horticulturists, truck farmers, and owners of personal subsidiary plots and for their exemption from paying dues into nonbudgetary funds, with subsequent amendments and additions to Russian Federation tax legislation, and the development of the necessary infrastructure (transport, trade, communications, etc.) in places where horticultural and truck farming associations are concentrated;

ensure an expansion of services to horticulturists, truck farmers, and owners of personal subsidiary plots through the system of state pedigree, veterinary, and agricultural animal husbandry services, as well as supplying young livestock and poultry, high-grade vegetable and potato seed, planting stock for fruit and berry crops, and organic fertilizers for the needs of this category of citizens. It is to provide for the creation of a network of machine-technical stations and centers for the hire of equipment for the cultivation of citizens' plots of land;

create the necessary conditions for selling surplus stock-raising and arable products produced by horticulturists, truck farmers, and owners of personal subsidiary plots;

provide for the allocation, starting in 1997, of funds from the federal budget for the preferential provision of credit for the construction of outhouses and premises for keeping livestock and for the development of garden plots for a period of 15-25 years;

allocate 100 billion rubles from the state leasing fund in 1996 for horticulturists, truck farmers, and owners of personal subsidiary plots to acquire pedigree and working livestock, agricultural equipment, implements, and gear. It is to make provision for funds for these purposes in subsequent years as a separate line in the federal budget.

3. Executive bodies in the Russian Federation components are to:

ensure the full satisfaction of the population's requirement for pastures and hayfields for private livestock;

make provision, starting in 1996, for an annual seasonal reduction during the May-October period in the charges for conveying passengers on all forms of transport in public use for suburban services.

4. This edict comes into force on the day it is published.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

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[Dated] 7 June 1996

Military Issues

Russia: Yeltsin Declares Benefits for Military With Chechen Record

LD1206141496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1358 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 12 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed a decree on fringe benefits for officers and men with a combat record in Chechnya.

The presidential press-service said that one month of service in Chechnya would be equivalent to three months of routine service.

Chechen veterans will have the right of admission in the military educational establishment they choose without entrance exams.

The decree says that Chechen veterans and their families will enjoy priority in receiving vouchers to government-run health resorts.

This decree applies to the staff of the Russian Interior Ministry agencies and their families, too.

The Russian government was instructed to find sources of financing the decree and present its proposals to the State Duma (lower house of parliament) for approval.

Federal Assembly

Russia: State Duma Moves To Extend Citizenship Law

LD1306094296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0922 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — The lower house of the Russian legislature, the State Duma, endorsed in the first reading amendments to the Citizenship Law. The amended bill was presented by Duma Deputy Chairman Sergey Baburin of the Popular Rule faction and was supported by 361 deputies.

In keeping with the amended legislation, all citizens of the defunct Soviet Union and their descendants shall be considered citizens of the Russian Federation if they were born in an area recognized as Russian territory at the moment of their birth; have not expressed, of their own free will, the intention to stop being citizens of Russia; have left Russia for permanent residence elsewhere on former Soviet territory; have not become citizens of another country; or have returned for permanent residence to the Russian Federation.

The breakup of the Soviet Union turned many of its citizens into displaced persons, Baburin said, but the amended legislation will enable Moscow to fulfill its duty to protect the interests of Russians who live abroad.

Practically all of the Duma's factions and groups favored the amendments to the Citizenship Law.

Russia: Opinion: Duma's Resolution on Foreign Debt Lamented

MK1306110996 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 11 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Konstantin Levin: "The Deputies Decided That Paris Is Not Worth a Mass"]

[FBIS Translated Text] State foreign debts give governments a headache. This is an axiom. On the other hand, these debts can be turned into a profitable business undertaking or a source of political dividends. In any event, in Russia, the debt issue has long been more than a purely academic one. The parliamentarians have not stayed out of the way of it either. The State Duma adopted a resolution "On the External Loans of the Russian Federation and the External Debts to the Russian Federation by Foreign States," in effect asking the government not to hurry to join the Paris Creditors Club, but to wait for the final results of an Auditing Chamber probe into the activity of those state agencies related to foreign loans.

As 16 June draws near, political rivals are under increasing time pressure. In the election context, the Duma's latest resolution on Russia's foreign debts appears extremely antigovernmental. The document was drafted by the State Duma Geopolitics Committee, with contributions being made not only by representatives of the LDPR faction, but also by the agrarians who, in effect, initiated the idea of reviewing Russia's international credit agreements. The Duma cannot issue direct orders to the government. Yet its recommendation to "refrain from acceding to international financial agreements on matters of interstate debt obligations" until the Auditing Chamber completes its examination can substantially complicate Russia's admission to the Paris Club, planned for late June. The parliament's decision could also call into question the long-term restructuring of Russia's debts to the London and Paris Clubs. The fact is that technical agreements on final debt rescheduling mechanisms are to be discussed at the level of authorized banks precisely in late June, at the G-7 meeting in Lyons.

The Duma resolution of foreign debts was prepared in haste and it abounds in numerous mistakes, including a purely arithmetical one. For instance, the parliamentarians failed to property perform the addition operation, as a result of which the overall sum of credits extended to

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Russia in 1994-1996 exceeds the annual indicators they themselves cited — and by a whole $10 billion. Yet the main distinguishing feature of the deputies' resolution was its anticlub tenor. A share of admonition was also meted out to the Finance Ministry, whose activity, the resolution authors maintain, will soon lose Russia the possibility of recovering its debts from developing countries. If Russia joins the Paris Club as a creditor, the deputies believe, a real catastrophe will occur: First, all the debts under special deliveries ("military debts), which constitute 80 percent of the developing countries' aggregate debt, will have to be forgiven. True, it is always better to get something than to firmly, but hopelessly, insist on getting everything. Second, under the Paris rules, Moscow will have to grant the debtor nations a 15-20 year deferment. The deputies are also afraid that the debts will now be repaid at an unfavorable exchange rate. The conclusion is unambiguous: The Auditing Chamber should look into the Finance Ministry's performance while Russia's accession to the Paris Club should put on hold.

The impression is that in trying to wrest the initiative in the foreign debt sphere from the government, the deputies were obviously overwhelmed by anticorruption and anti-Western emotions (the authors are especially discontented with the IMF). In effect, by pressing their demands that Russia intensify the "squeezing" of debts, the parliamentarians are trying to force an open door. The governmental Commission on Russia's State Foreign Debts and Financial Assets has long been trying to implement various schemes to ensure the repayment of debts to Russia. For instance, the Ministry of External Economic Affairs coordinated with Managua a scheme for the repayment of Nicaragua's debts that can be seen as a major concession on the part of Moscow to its debtors. The gist of the scheme is that the repayment is effected in hard currency, not in commodity deliveries. Moreover, Managua's debt is recalculated into dollars according to the USSR State Bank exchange rate (0.63 rubles per $1). True, it is planned to write off the bulk of the debt. Yesterday Aleksandr Livshits said that in 1997 the volume of loans granted under government guarantees will be substantially cut. As for advantages from Russia's accession to creditor organizations, it is enough to recall that Ukraine did not begin paying on Russia's accounts until the IMF stepped in.

The Duma resolution essentially demonstrates how the opposition intends to build its relations with the world financial community should the leftist candidate win the elections. This will bring Russia no good at all.

Russia: Legislative, Regulatory Documents 2-8 Jun

96P50092

[FBIS Report] The following is a listing of Russian legislation recently published in the press of the Russian Federation compiled by FBIS.

Numbers within parens indicate approximate wordage.

Entries followed by the notation "Text" have been translated into English and are available in FBIS publications.

SECTION I:

ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (EXPORT-IMPORT, BANKING, PRIVATIZATION, AUCTIONS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

Government 15 April Directive No. 605 Permitting Finance Ministry To Set Up Government Guarantee For Repayment Of Loans Granted By Commercial Banks For Acguisition Of Textbooks.

(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 6) (80)

Government 15 April Directive No. 613 On Establishing Annual Fund For Remuneration Of Workers Of Russian Federation Territorial Organs For Preservation Of Cultural Assets In Sum Of R844.1 Million.

(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 6) (40)

Government 23 April Directive No. 676 Allocating Money To Repair Stadium In Vladikavkaz.

(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 6) (50)

Government 14 May Decree No. 579 On State Support For Yelabuga Plant Producing Small Cars.

(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 6) (1300)

Government 17 May Decree No. 611 On Finance Ministry Auditing Of Accounts Between Federal Support Fund, Regions Benefitting.

(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 6) (200)

Government 17 May Directive No. 776 Ordering Finance Ministry To Pay Off Wage Arrears Of Abolished Economy Ministry Institute.

(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 7) (100)

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Government 17 May Directives Nos. 778 And 795 Allocating Disaster Aid To Buryatia, Kurgan Region.

(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 1) (100/100)

Chernomyrdin 17 May Directive No. 797 Allocating R154.5 Million To Emergencies Ministry For Humanitarian Aid To Ethnic Russian Pensioners Living In South Ossetia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 9) (300)

Government 17 May Directive No. 798 Relocating State Pension Supplements To 'Social Policy' Heading Of State Budget. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 7) (100)

Government 17 May Directive No. 799 On Submitting Income Tax Law Amendments Bill To Duma, Appointing Deputy Finance Minister Shatalov To Shepherd It Through. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 7) (100)

Yeltsin 20 May Edict No. 743 Revoking Earlier Edicts On Labor Relations. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 3) (300)

Yeltsin 23 May Edict No. 768 Confirming Proposed Comprehensive Program For Creation And Preservation Of Jobs In 1996-2000 Plus Text Of Program. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 5) (550/4500)

Government 25 May Directive No. 835 On Submitting Bill To Duma On Compensation For Chechnya War Casualties. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 3) (120) (Text)

Federal Law No. 56 Of 27 May On Amendments, Addenda To RSFSR Code On Administrative Offenses. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 4) (6000)

Government 28 May Decree No. 465 On Measures To Implement 22 April Presidential Edict On Procedure For Allocating Finance To Restore Chechnya Economy, Social Sphere. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 6) (800) (Text)

Government 29 May Directive No. 856 Ordering Saving Banks To Implement Yeltsin Edict No. 733 On Uprating Inflation-Hit Balances. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 3) (100)

Yeltsin 31 May Edict No. 795 On Measures To Stabilize Provision Of Goods And Services For Rural Population. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 6) (350)

Yeltsin 3 June Edict No. 799 On Granting Investment Tax Credit To Electronics Industry Enterprises In Zelenograd City. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 6) (250)

Yeltsin 5 June Edict No. 809 On Additional Measures To Ensure Timely Payment Of Salaries For Workers In General Educational Institutions, Using Money Collected As Fines For Breaches Of Labor Legislation. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 1) (250)

Yeltsin-Signed Federal Law No. 62 Of 5 June On Transfer Of Central Bank Profit Into Federal Budget. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 1) (400) (Text)

SECTION II: POLITICAL (INTERNATIONAL AND CIS AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS, CRIME, POLLUTION)

Chernomyrdin 6 March Decree No. 236 On Concluding Agreement Between Russian And Kyrgyz Governments On Cooperation In The Sphere Of Air Defense (Approves Draft Submitted By Defense And Foreign Ministries; Authorizes Defense Ministry To Make Minor Changes To Agreement In Course Of Negotiations). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 9) (150)

Federal Law No. 54 On Museum Fund, Museums, Adopted 24 April And Signed By Yeltsin 26 April. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 4) (5000)

Government 1 May Decree No. 547 Approving 'Concept For State Nationalities Policy' Plus Text Of 'Concept,' Asserting Equality, Freedom For All Ethnic Groups. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 5) (100/5800)

Government 1 May Directive No. 701 Accepting Ministry Plans For Talks With Syria, Mexico, Cyprus On Sporting, Cultural Exchanges. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 6) (200)

Government 7 May Directive No. 721 Accepting Proposal For Talks With IBRD In May Concerning $500 Million Loan For Restructuring Coal Industry, Plus List Of Negotiating Team, Negotiating Premises, Plus Commentary By Rosugol General Director Yu. Malyshev. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 6) (300/600/500)

Government 8 May Decree No. 569 Amending Details Of Earlier Decisions On Support For Kurils, Far North, Polar Expeditions Etc. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 6) (700)

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Government 8 May Decree No. 571 On Forming Federal 'Dendrological Park' Near Lipetsk. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 6) (250)

Government 8 May Directive No. 723 Approving French Credit For Modernizing Moscow Garbage Incinerator. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 1) (250)

Federation Council Decree No. 159 Of 15 May Approving Federal Law 'On Ratifying Agreement Between Russian And Belarus Governments On Procedure For Completing The Construction Of, Using, And Maintaining The Baranovichi Node Of The Missile Early Warning System, Which Is On Belarusian Territory. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 9) (250)

Federation Council Decree No. 161 'On Ratifying Agreement Between Russian And Moldovan Governments On Social Guarantees And Pensions For Former Servicemen And Members Of Their Families.' (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 9) (200)

Government 16 May Decree No. 585 On Ratification Of Federal Program For Preserving And Developing Historic Center Of St. Petersburg. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 6) (400)

Government 17 May Decree No. 595 Amending Consumer Protection Rules. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 7) (200) (Text)

Chernomyrdin 17 May Decree No. 604 On Changes To Composition Of Russian Side Of Joint Russian-Ukrainian Commission On Cooperation (Adds Ministers, Including Primakov, To Membership). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 9) (250) (Text)

Chernomyrdin 17 May Decree No. 608 On Signing Agreement Between Russian And Ukrainian Governments On Trade And Economic Cooperation In 1996 (Approves Draft Submitted By Ministry For Cooperation With CIS States; Instructs Deputy Premier Bolshakov To Sign It, Authorizing Him To Make Minor Changes To Agreement In Course Of Negotiations). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 9) (250)

Chernomyrdin 21 May Decree No. 617 On Signing Agreement Between Russia And IBRD On Loan To Fund Plan For Repair Of Highway Bridges (Loan Is For $350 Million; First Vice Premier Kadannikov Instructed To Sign Agreement). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 9) (300)

Government 27 May Directive No. 837 Naming Delegation To UN Habitat Conference In Istanbul. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 7) (150)

Yeltsin 27 May Edict No. 779 Awarding State Literature, Arts Prizes. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 3) (1300)

Federal Law No. 57 Of 27 May 'On State Protection' Of Officials, Official Buildings, Installations. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 96 pp 4-5) (8000)

Texts Of Laws Nos. 58, 59, And 60 All Signed By Yeltsin 27 May Ratifying Pensions Agreement With Moldova, Agreements With Belarus On Baranovichi Missile Early Warning Station, Vileyka Radio Station. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jun 96 p 3) (100/100/100)

Government 28 May Directive No. 857 Listing Members Of Chechnya Negotiating Commission. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jun 96 p 6) (600) (Text)

Yeltsin 3 June Edict No. 800 Setting Up MVD Juridical Institute In Chelyabinsk. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 96 p 6) (450)

Yeltsin 3 June Edict No. 802 On Phased Formation Of Municipal Organs For Protection Of Public Order. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 6) (400) (Text)

SECTION III:

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Government 6 May Directive No. 715 Concerning Implementation Of Presidential Decree On Supporting State Public Scientific And Technical Library Of Russia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 6) (150)

Regional Affairs

Russia: Head of Zhukovskiy Administration Assassinated

LD1306074596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0724 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — Administration head of the Moscow region city of Zhukovkskiy Viktor Mosalov was killed on Thursday morning, law enforcement bodies told Interfax. His

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corpse with bullet wounds was found at about 9:30 a.m. on the staircase of his house in Serov street.

The leadership of the Main Interior Department of the Moscow Region went to the site of the incident, where an investigation group of employees of the prosecutor's office and Interior Ministry is already working.

The city of Zhukovskiy, with a population of 100,000 people, is situated 20 kilometers to the east of Moscow.

Russia: Yeltsin Calls Zhukovskiy Mayor Murder 'Terrorist Act'

LD1306103396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1027 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 13 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin qualified the murder of Viktor Mosalov, the mayor of the city of Zhukovskiy near Moscow, as a "terrorist act" aimed at intimidating the people on the eve of elections.

"The idea of the new terrorist act against a representative of authorities is evident: to intimidate people, to sow fear, to undermine belief in public order. We have forces interested in such a turn of developments. In the atmosphere of fear and panic they try to break the fragile public accord which is shaping out in Russia", the president said in a message of condolences to the family of Mosalov.

"Calmness and safety of people remain the main aim of the President of Russia", Yeltsin said.

Mosalov, 42, was killed by two shots in the head and one bullet hit him in the eye, police said.

His body was found Thursday morning near the staircase of his apartment by a neighbour who alerted the police.

Spokesman of the Moscow regional police told Tass that no motives of the murder had been established so far. "In such crimes there is a standard set of preliminary versions. The economic one comes to the foreground, then goes family quarrel", he said.

The town of Zhukovskiy, with a population of 100,000 and some 20 kilometres east of Moscow, is known for the annual Russian air show and the TsAGI aircraft institute. The Bykovo airport of Moscow is situated there.

Mosalov's murder was the third in recent attacks on local governors in Moscow and the region this month.

The governor of the Saltykovka district of the Moscow region was killed and the prefect of the Southern Moscow district, Valeriy Shantsev, survived an assassination bid last Friday.

Shantsev is running as vice-mayor at June 16 elections of the Moscow leader together with incumbent mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.

Russia: Yeltsin Hails Signing of Accord With Tver Region

LD1306085396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0806 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared today that the signing of an agreement on the division of powers between the centre and the Tver region was part of a civilised process of bringing Russian lands together. The Russian head of state stressed that the agreement signed in the Kremlin today marked another step forward on the road of development of federative relations and the building of a new Russian state.

"Reaction to such agreements is still mixed," Yeltsin admitted. "I hear sometimes that the signing makes our federation unstable and people do not feel any real positive results. But we are confident that this is the right direction," he stressed. According to Yeltsin, agreements of this kind help strengthen Russia's unity and there is no question of regions taking over "the powers vested in the federal bodies of authority."

Just the contrary is true — the regions transfer part of their powers to the centre to tackle problems with which they cannot cope on their own. So it amounts to an upwards movement — "from subjects of the federation to the centre," the President said.

Yeltsin expressed confidence that the agreement singed today will help the Tver region to pursue the course of reforms more actively and productively: "if people get a better life, it will mean that the agreement works, that the authorities work efficiently. Should there be no betterment, there are people who must be called to account," Yeltsin said.

The President said the Government of Russia was finalizing a programme of support for depressed regions, including Tver. According to him, the programme in question, just as the agreement signed today, will help the region pull out of the "zone of economic and social trouble."

Tver Governor Vladimir Platov for his part expressed support of Boris Yeltsin's policy but added that the inhabitants of his region thought it necessary to have the economic policy corrected.

According to the Governor, the role of domestic manufacturers and producers must be enhanced on the do-

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mestic market, as must be influence on the financial monopoly. He also called for an analysis of the results of stripping the state of its overall monopoly.

President Yeltsin agreed to consider the proposals.

Russia: Yeltsin Arrives in St. Petersburg 13 Jun

LD1306104796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1039 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SAINT PETERSBURG, June 13 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin arrived in St. Petersburg Thursday afternoon. The president will meet with city residents and sign power-sharing agreements with the city and the Leningrad region during his less than one day visit.

The president also plans to visit the Baltiyisk factory and address a meeting of his supporters in Dvorets Square.

Russia: Chernomyrdin Visits Orenburg Region

LD1306085796 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived in Orsk, a town in the east Orenburg Region, today. Our correspondent Yevgeniy Tereyukhin reports:

[Tereyukhin] Straight from the airport the prime minister set off for the workshops of the Yuzhuralnikel [South Urals nickel] Joint-Stock Company, where he studied the work of cobalt processing. Chernomyrdin then plans to hold a series of meetings with the people of the town in the local drama theatre, to visit an exhibition of the output of the enterprises of Orsk, and to hold a conference with the heads of administration of towns and districts of the east Orenburg Region. In the evening, Chernomyrdin will fly to Orenburg where he plans to hold a number of important conferences and meetings tomorrow with the heads of the region, enterprises, and organizations. The prime minister also plans to visit the Strela Production Association, one of the largest enterprises in the defense industry.

Russia: Nakhodka, Harbin To Broaden Economic Ties

LD1306105196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0929 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Leonid Vinigradov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NAKHODKA, June 13 (Itar-Tass) — Russia's Far Eastern Nakhodka free economic zone and four similar economic zones of the Chinese city of Harbin are ready to pass from a "shuttle" trade to economic ties at the governmental level.

In view of this, the city of Nakhodka and Harbin are due to exchange missions. An official delegation headed by director for the development of the Nakhodka free economic zone programmes, Viktor Pokotilov, has flown to Harbin on Monday.

The free economic zones of the two countries will be exchanging technologies and scientific developments. The sides are planning to carry out mutual deliveries of high-quality goods and intend to jointly penetrate the markets of the Asian-Pacific region countries.

Up to now, the ties between Nakhodka ad Harbin have been restricted to the so-called "shuttle" trade, when hundreds of small traders were flooding the stores of both cities with mass consumption goods and foodstuffs of dubious quality.

Russia: Yeltsin Denies Giving Instructions on Chechnya Elections

LD1306102896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1019 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Svetlana Ivanova, Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ST. PETERSBURG, June 13 (Itar-Tass) — Responding to questions of journalists here today, President Yeltsin said he had given no instructions to Doku Zavgayev on holding elections in Chechnya, because "this is a matter to be decided by subjects of the federation themselves."

On the decision of the Chechen authorities, elections to the People's Assembly of the republic will be held simultaneously with presidential elections in Russia on June 16. The voting will be held, starting from June 14, because of a complicated situation in the republic.

Russia: Chechnya Assembly Election To Begin 14 Jun

LD1306084996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0811 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Yuriy Kirilchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Itar-Tass) — The elections to the People's Assembly of the Chechen Republic will begin on June 14 and last until Sunday, June 16, when the Russian presidential elections will be held. This decision of the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership was today confirmed to Itar-Tass on condition of anonymity by an aide of Doku Zavgayev, the Head of the Chechen Republic.

In his opinion, this decision cannot be interpreted as a violation of the agreement to put off the elections, reached the day before at Nazran by the delegations

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of the federal authorities and the Chechen separatists. The official said that the Chechen Supreme Soviet, which adopted the decision to hold the elections to local governing bodies simultaneously with the Russian presidential elections did not take part in the Nazran talks and, therefore, can regard the decisions made there only as a "recommendation".

A meeting of all the 355 candidates nominated for election to the People's Assembly was called on Wednesday, he recalled. "They were all present at that meeting and none of them objected to the elections," the aide noted. "On the contrary, they all said that it was necessary to hold the elections within the fixed time limits," he added.

Speaking on "Vainakh" television on Wednesday, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in Chechnya and Secretary of the Russian Security Council Oleg Lobov noted that he saw no serious reasons for calling off or postponing the elections to the Chechen Parliament. He regards them as "a necessary element of democratisation" and "a purely internal Chechen problem". "Nobody has any right to ban the elections," Lobov said, "no matter how difficult the situation may be." In his opinion, those who insist on putting off the elections, referring to the presence of Russian federal troops in Chechnya, were assuming a much too heavy responsibility.

"When elections take place in Germany, nobody ever says that they are being held under the pressure of the American troops deployed there," Lobov noted.

Russia: Zavgayev Insists Chechen Elections Not To Be Postponed

LD1206134396 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1140 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Zhilyakov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Krasnodar, 12 June (Itar-Tass) — "Local elections in Chechnya will not be postponed. They will be held on 16 June, the same day as the Russian presidential election," Doku Zavgayev, head of the Chechen Republic, said today in response to a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent. He made this announcement before the signing in Krasnodar of a friendship and cooperation treaty between Krasnodar Kray and the Chechen Republic.

Doku Zavgayev stressed that the decision on the date of the elections was passed this morning in Groznyy at a meeting between representatives of the public and candidates for the posts of deputies of the local legislature. He said none of the candidates has withdrawn from the elections under threats from the irreconcilable gunmen. The head of the republic said the leadership of the Chechen Republic today asked the Council of Europe to send observers to Chechnya on election day. "We are also inviting all those who would like to help us hold the election in order to abide by the Constitution," Doku Zavgayev said.

Russia: Withdrawal From Chechnya Only After Presidential Elections

LD1306094696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0929 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Jun 13 (Interfax) — The withdrawal of the federal forces from Chechnya may be started only after the presidential elections in Russia scheduled for June 16, a top-ranking Russian serviceman told Interfax in the Chechen capital of Groznyy on Thursday.

"The presence of Russian units in Chechnya during the vote is necessary. One should take into consideration that they are the factor ensuring calm in the republic," he said.

He reported that army detachments are not planned to be used to strengthen security measures in Chechnya on June 16. Chechen police, Russian OMON forces (riot police), special rapid-reaction detachments and detachments of Russia's interior forces will ensure legal order in Groznyy and several other populated centers, he said.

Russia: Tikhomirov Denies Start of Troop Withdrawal From Chechnya

LD1206144796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1427 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, June 12 (Interfax) — Lt. Gen. Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of the federal forces in Chechnya, refuted information stating that withdrawal of Russian forces from the republic's territory has been started.

"The matter concerns an ordinary re-deployment of separate detachments within the region of their stationing," he told Interfax Wednesday.

The concrete date of Russian forces withdrawal has not been defined yet, he said. The working group in charge of implementing the military part of the recent agreements between the federal authorities and Chechen separatists started consultations in the disposition of the 166th brigade near Shali (45 kilometers to the southeast from Groznyy).

In line with the initial agreement he himself and chief of the headquarters of Chechen illegal armed formations

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Aslan Maskhadov were to participate in the work of the group. However, the latter refused to come to this meeting explaining this "by the absence of security guarantees," Tikhomirov said.

The separatists mentioned the incident, which occurred the day before during the return of separatists delegation from the negotiations in Nazran, as the main reason.

"It looks like a real performance," Tikhomirov said. "There exploded a kind of crackers and they say that powerful charges were exploded in this region," he said. "If charges really exploded there nobody would be alive," he said.

Tikhomirov did not rule out that "either forces out of Maskhadov's control or his own people could organize this action."

Russia: Decision To Expel OSCE's Guldimann From Chechnya 'Not Final'

LD1306090396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0832 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Yuriy Kirilchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Itar-Tass) — "The decision to expel OSCE Mission Head Tim Guldimann from Chechnya is not final, because this is within the competence of the Russian Foreign Ministry, not the Government of the Chechen Republic," Itar-Tass was told today on condition of anonymity by an aide of Doku Zavgayev, the Head of the Chechen Republic. The Pro-Moscow Chechen government had earlier declared the undesirability of Guldimann's further presence in the republic.

Zavgayev's aide said that Guldimann would meet Zavgayev today to discuss the future of the OSCE Mission in Chechnya. The Groznyy authorities have blamed Guldimann for ignoring the official Chechen leadership, but, according to some reports, a preliminary agreement has already been reached to rectify this situation.

For its part, the Chechen opposition has sharply protested against Guldimann's expulsion from Chechnya. "The efforts of the OSCE Mission, led by Mr. Tim Guldimann, pursued the purpose of restoring peace in the Chechen Republic," says a statement issued by the Coordination Council of the Chechen Parties and Movements, which was forwarded to Itar-Tass by Council Co-Chairman Ruslan Kutayev. He said that the Coordination Council "will back the OSCE effort as the only correct way to stop the war and restore peace in the Chechen Republic".

Russia: Chechnya's Zavgayev Holds Talks With OSCE's Guldimann

LD1306110196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1047 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, June 13 (Interfax) — Moscow-backed Chechen leader Doku Zavgayev and emissary of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Tim Guldimann have met in the Chechen capital of Groznyy, a spokesman for the OSCE mission in Groznyy told Interfax.

The OSCE spokesman described the meeting as "highly beneficial." Zavgayev and Guldimann exchanged views on ways to settle the Chechen conflict, he said.

Guldimann and the Groznyy leaders will probably hold another meeting later today or tomorrow, after which a decision is likely to be made on an OSCE presence in Chechnya.

Earlier, Chechnya's Moscow-backed government accused the OSCE mission and Guldimann personally of "abuse of authority" and demanded the withdrawal of the OSCE mission from Chechen territory.

Russia: Chechnya Commander Investigates 'Provocative Explosions'

LD1206132696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1313 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, June 12 (Itar-Tass) — Investigation has been started into provocative explosions committed on Tuesday along the route of movement of Chechen separatists from the talks in Nazran. Lieutenant-General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of federal forces in Chechnya, told reporters on Wednesday about particulars of the incident.

According to the general, the convoy with the delegation of separatists was stopped at the northern outskirt of Achkhoy-Martan, which, Tikhomirov claimed, "was not planned by anybody and was not specified." "Three strange explosions" went off literally minutes after the stop, and the convoy "quickly drove away along the highway."

At this time, the commander continued, helicopters ensuring protection, "noticed flares on the ground and shots," indicating that the cars are being fired at. "Taking into account our obligations, we had no right to return fire in this case," Tikhomirov said.

Later, when the village of Alkhan-Yurt was passed, another five explosions thundered near a traffic control post. The movement across this district "was not planned, and it was not specified," the general added.

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He also said that "it was offered to the entire delegation to fly by helicopter together with the commander" to prevent any possible incidents on the route of the convoy's movement. However, separatists rejected this proposal.

The command of federal forces will announce results of the investigation later.

Following the incident with the explosions, "Ichkeria information minister" Movladi Udugov hurried to tell reporters that head of the Chechen Republic Doku Zavgayev and plenipotentiary representative of the Russian president Oleg Lobov were responsible for the incidents.

Commenting on this allegation today, Lobov said: the information minister, instead of provocative accusations, "should look for ways of reaching a lasting peace and accord in Chechnya.

However, there is nothing to wonder about: Udugov is "notorious for his provocative pronouncements. It would have been better to refrain from such pronouncements for a participant in the talks in Nazran where a decision was taken to avoid any actions or statements which can interfere with implementation of the understandings on ceasefire, combat operations and a settlement of the armed conflict in Chechnya".

In turn, chairman of the Chechen government Nikolay Koshman described Udugov's statement as "a provocation aimed at scuttling the intra-Chechen dialogue, elections to the National Assembly (Chechen parliament) and at destabilising the situation" in the republic.

"Despite provocative actions by separatists and their patrons, the government intends to look, in future too, for ways of a peaceful settlement of the Chechen crisis and to exert efforts to achieve peace and accord in the Chechen Republic," Koshman said on behalf of the Chechen government.

Russia: Basayev Interviewed on Nazran Talks, Chechnya War

BR1206134696 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 12 Jun 96 p 9

[Report on interview with Chechen guerrilla commander Shamil Basayev by Ettore Mo in Mekhkety; date not given: "'I Will Free Chechnya in the Name of Allah'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mekhkety, Chechnya — "If the Russians do not withdraw from the heights and from the areas around Groznyy, we will break off negotiations and start fighting again. Those are the terms that our representatives put forward at the Nazran negotiating table the other day." [passage omitted]

It was not easy to meet with Basayev: It took 10 days and several trips to the mountains where his guerrilla fighters are holed up. I could not have done without the precious cooperation of a Chechen warrior-journalist who goes by the romantic name of Tais, a girl of 25 who has known Shamil for a long time. It was a privilege to meet with the "chief," because the movement's chiefs of staff have forbidden him to give any interviews while talks are going on with the Russians. [passage omitted]

Basayev smiled a sarcastic smile as he spoke of the talks and of Yeltsin's trip to Groznyy: "They set this road show up purely for election purposes," he said. "The truce? None of the Russian leaders is seriously contemplating peace. They do not want the war to end. Indeed, they are trying to trick us; they just want to look good until election day."

Shamil said that the Russians have some 0.5 million soldiers in Chechnya: "We too have some 0.5 million fighters," he added, "but you must include women and children in that figure. My youngest soldier is 12 years old, but there are many aged 13 or 14."

Did you lose any brothers in Budennovsk?

"I lost 16 men; they were all my brothers."

Basayev does not consider himself a guerrilla fighter: "We are a government structure," he pointed out; "we are a regular army. I am a brigadier general, even if the Russians call me a bandit. We have 12 military units to which all our fighters belong." [passage omitted]

"Of course," Basayev said, "this is a Jihad, a holy war, like the one in Afghanistan. We are fighting for our independence and for Allah. The Koran says: If your enemy invades your land, you must arise and confront him... with a gun [as published]."

Who is paying for this war? Who is helping you?

"Russia," Basayev said. "We are forcing Russia to pay for this war. Our weapons? We take them from them [the Russians], and our tanks too. But we do not need them; they have no mobility; ours is a small country. So we destroy them. We hang on to only a few tanks in the mountains, to control the passes at strategic points. No country helps us. Aid comes in from the numerous Chechens living in Turkey and in Jordan, but no government has ever given us a penny. Ministers of the pro-Russian Chechen Government give us money, too, to prevent us from punishing them if we get to power in the future."

He took out of his pocket a fat wad of dollars which he received from Chechen collaborators. [passage omitted]

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Commander, I asked, people everywhere are saying that the reasons behind the conflict are not ideological but principally economic, because Chechnya is a rich country with its oil, the Caucasus oil pipelines, and so forth... "Russia has always considered us beggars," Basayev said, "but everybody knows that our economic potential is enormous. We left the economic crisis behind us early in 1995. Our currency was very strong. Food here cost five times less than in Russia. The Russians and the other countries in the Caucasus came to our stores to buy their goods. Then the war began, Groznyy was destroyed along with half the country, and our entrepreneurial capabilities went to hell."

Let us discuss the war. General, I went to Samashki and I was told terrible things... "We have been fighting the Russians for 300 years. We Chechens have never invaded another country. We do not say good morning or good-bye. Do you know how we address people? We say 'come free' when someone arrives and 'go free' when he leaves. The Russians? The Russians are slaves. The Russian soldiers entered Chechnya because they were ordered to. They are always drunk. We ourselves buy drugs in Russia in order to then buy arms. But we must underline a big difference here, namely between the conscripts and the professional soldiers. The conscripts are aged between 18 and 20 and they often look like children. But they, too, burgle houses after an attack. The others are criminals. Rape and looting are the rule for them. They kill and they get a reward for every Chechen killed. So many bodies, so much money. They are on salaries of about 3 million rubles a month — to kill. Young conscripts, too, tear gold teeth out of the mouths of the dead, but the professional soldiers, the mercenaries, they tear them out of the mouths of the living before killing them. It is more fun that way."

Basayev said one thing: When we capture the professional soldiers, we shoot them at once. But not the conscripts: We treat them like lost kids.

"In Chechnya," he pointed out, "there are only two prisons for the prisoners of war, and they are where the officers get sent. When we capture young 18- or 20-year-old soldiers, we treat them like our sons. We hand them into the care of families, where they live with the children of the household. Then we contact their parents in Russia, and they come and fetch and take them back home. We are Muslims and our religion prevents us from exerting pressure or from torturing. We do not exchange prisoners. I myself, in my area, have freed at least 230 of them, and they have all gone home. We do not tear gold teeth out of anybody's mouth, whether living or dead, but they call us bandits all the same. I am not a bandit. We have never had either czars or princes. They call us wolves. Fine, I am a wolf, a wolf like my father was, and my grandfather, and my great grandfather, and my great great grandfather before that. Russia is breaking all the international laws and the United Nations does nothing; it is afraid of Russia because Russia has its finger on the nuclear button."

Many people maintain that Dudayev is not dead. Shamil Basayev confirmed that Dudayev "is alive," but only in the sense that all the heroes of the Jihad never die, they live in paradise with Allah.

"The Russians wanted his death," he said. "They bombarded him wherever he was because he was the very symbol of Chechnya. In the end they found him and killed him. He was speaking on the phone with a Moscow deputy, Borovoy. The Russians do not even have the courage to admit that they killed him. But we know the identity of the four pilots who triggered the missile and to whom Yeltsin has awarded the Star of Russia. Dudayev was a great leader. Chechnya had 100,000 unemployed in 1990. Dudayev implemented deregulation and gave businessmen complete freedom, production increased, we repaired three refineries, and everything was beginning to be set right in our country. Then Moscow sent in its armored troops."

We said good-bye in Mekhkety, under the rain. "Chechnya will be another Afghanistan for Russia," Shamil Basayev said.

Economic Issues

Russia: Duma Lifts Customs Privileges on Imported Cars, Equipment

LD1306100996 Moscow Interfax in English 0837 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — Russia's State Duma Thursday adopted a bill lifting customs charges from imported cars and equipment. As many as 296 deputies voted for the bill On Amendments to Russia's Law "On Customs Tariffs" in the first reading - 226 votes were needed to adopt the decision.

A representative of the Duma Committee on industry, construction, transport and power engineering, which developed this document, explained the need for its adoption by the fact that many Russian enterprises which order imported equipment failed to pay customs tariffs after the majority of customs privileges were cancelled in March 1995. As a result, goods procured in large quantities - deputies named the sum of $10 billion - remained at the customs office. The Krasnoyarsk refrigerator-producing factory Biryusa, the scientific-industrial association Impuls, the joint stock company

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Razrez Nazarovsky and the Novosibirsk garment factory were named among those enterprises which have suffered.

In order to improve the situation, developers of this bill proposed to restore privileges for importers of cars and equipment purchased with credits of international financial organizations in line with international and intergovernmental agreements under the guarantees of the Russian government. In addition, in line with these documents privileges should be granted to importers which import cars and equipment with no domestic analogues.

The government has opposed the last amendment. The conclusion of the Cabinet of Ministers signed by Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Kadannikov and distributed among deputies says that privileges granted by the bill cover "practically the whole volume of Russian import of cars and equipment from foreign countries."

The government believes that introduction of tariff privileges during the import of a wide range of cars and equipment will not promote stimulation of domestic machinery construction. It has backed only privileges for importing such products paid for with credits from international financial organizations.

Russia: Treasury T-Bills' Profitability To Fall if Yeltsin Wins

LD1306105096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1021 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 13 (Interfax) — If the political status quo remains in Russia, the profitability of state securities, including Treasury bills, will start to lower later in August, Sergey Pavlenko, head of the Working Center for Economic Reforms under the Russian government, told a news conference on Thursday.

The lower profitability of T-bills will make it possible to divert part of the money being invested today into state securities, to finance real production needs. Pavlenko also said that the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank should "strictly coordinate their activities" to prevent a plunge in the profitability of T-bills.

He also said that the number of T-bills, which currently surpasses the planned figure, will be reduced later in the year.

Today's political tensions before the presidential elections will affect the country's economic situation unfavorably for a long time, said Pavlenko. He said that an expected $1.5 billion of Russian capital will begin to return from abroad in August-September. In addition, he said, uncertainty on the financial markets will continue.

Russia: Private Sector Yielding Almost Half the Country's Food

MM1306120796 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jun 96

[Unattributed report: "Whose Meat Are We Eating?" — from the "Business Tuesday" supplement p 2]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the beginning of 1996 there were 280,000 peasant (private) farms officially registered in Russia. In 1995 they produced 12 percent of all agricultural produce. Including 5 percent of grain and 4 percent of sugar beets.

Around 40 percent of agricultural produce is today produced on private subsidiary plots and private gardens and vegetable patches. Thus the private sector as a whole — even in the absence of full- fledged private ownership of land — produces approximately half of the country's food.

As for other products, they are mainly imported from abroad: Imports account for 25 percent (40 percent in the market turnover of foodstuffs).

Production continues to slump on former collective and state farms that have been formally transformed into joint-stock companies and so forth — in 1995 alone the downturn in the collective sector was 9 percent.

Russia: Energy Minister Shafranik Seen Renationalizing Oil

MM1306114696 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jun 96

[Article by Vladimir Zaynetdinov and Viktor Sokirko: "Fuel Ministry Leader Gambles on Black and...on Red. Is Minister Shafranik Going To Be the Oil King?" — from the "Business Tuesday" section p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is the personal conviction of Russian Federation Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Shafranik that he has many enemies. He includes among them anyone who doubts the justice of his official actions. Yuriy Shafranik states publicly that he supports the idea that "foreign capital should be allowed into Russia but it must be done intelligently." In fact it turns out that the minister is pursuing a policy of selling off our fuel and energy resources.

Here is a concrete example — on his own initiative the Timano-Pechorskiy oil basin, with total reserves estimated at 2 billion barrels, is going to be developed by foreign companies. The U.S. oil companies Texaco, Exxon, and Amoco and the Swedish [as published — bureau records list this company as Norwegian] company Norsk Hydro, which are exploring the field, have

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formed a consortium called the Timano-Pechora Company and refused to allow the Russian state enterprise Arkhangelsk-geologiya to join it. The minister shut his eyes to this...

However, beside his love for foreigners the fuel and energy minister has been involved in some other equally interesting affairs. In 1992-1994 a vast quantity of Russian oil was pumped to Chechnya on the instructions of the Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry. Yuriy Shafranik was bound to know about this (he was the minister at the time, after all!) but he continued to aid and abet this piece of extravagance, to put it mildly.

However, all of this was clearly not enough for Yuriy Konstantinovich. By all accounts on the eve of the presidential elections Minister Shafranik went for broke — he proposed...that the privatization of the fuel and energy complex be effectively halted (this is until 16 June but what then?)

Mindful of similar communist aspirations you might think that the minister is preparing the ground to adapt to the "new conditions." These are certainly not empty words, concrete work is already being done, albeit on the noblest pretext, of course — the more efficient use of the country's fuel and energy complex for the good of the people. Shafranik's department has already prepared draft decrees and edicts (with spaces left for dates and signatures) which it has sent to the government and the President's Staff and which effectively halt the further privatization of the fuel and energy complex. Meanwhile, (probably during the transition to nationalization) the Fuel and Energy Ministry is assigned the role of the state's sole representative with the right to hold the state's block of shares. (Currently these powers are exercised by the State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Fuel and Energy Ministry, and the State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy). Let us quote the draft edict: "It is established that the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy exercises...the shareholders' rights over the federally-owned block of shares in joint-stock companies (companies) [original uses two different words for company — obshchestvo, kompaniya — one with Slavonic, other with Latin roots] according to the list attached." In other words, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (for which read — Yuriy Shafranik) is robbing the shareholders without so much as batting an eyelid.

There is a plan to review the results of the shares-for-loans auctions held at the end of last year (on the government's initiative, by the way) and..."provide a special procedure for the management of shares in fuel and energy complex enterprises held as surety and on trust." The "customers" are the major Russian banks which lent the government a tidy sum pledged against shares and state guarantees. This figure involved here is almost $0.5 billion, no more, no less. With a very tasty dessert to follow: "To extend until 31 December 1998 the term of the federal ownership of blocks of shares in joint-stock companies (companies) in the FEC [fuel and energy complex] (our abbreviation — author's note) formed in the process of privatization producing output (goods, services) of strategic significance for ensuring the country's security." In other words, first we privatize, then we nationalize. After which you will have to trust the people, in this case the state, who will be in charge of it.

The drafts are accompanied by a list of fuel and energy complex enterprises which, in Yu. Shafranik's personal opinion, are suitable for de-facto nationalization. They include virtually all the major enterprises in Russia's fuel and energy complex: Lukoil, Yukos, Surgutneftegaz, Sidanko, Sibneft, Slavneft, Onako, Rosneft, Komi TEK, Norsi-oil, and also Transneft, the YeES Rossii Russian Joint-Stock Company, Rosugol, and a number of smaller enterprises.

However, Shafranik's "bolshevik" shift is probably not so much political in character as personal — the ministerial chair has really begun to rock under Shafranik. And by all account Yuriy Konstantinovich is prepared to pay any price to hang onto it. This is despite the fact that he was unable to establish efficient and well-organized work even in his own department. Ministry staffers themselves talk almost openly about this. Shafranik increased the ministry's staff to impossible proportions (it is rumored that salaries here are the highest among ministries) but this, unfortunately, did not motivate its officials to produce highly efficient work. For example, the signing of government production contracts with the oil companies was delayed here with a stubbornness worthy of the classic bureaucratic machine. For inexplicable reasons the Ministry of Fuel and Energy prevented various extraction and processing enterprises from amalgamating with major Russian companies, thus holding up the already difficult process of the consolidation of corporations.

The idea of halting the privatization of the fuel and energy complex, which originated with Minister Shafranik, is completely incomprehensible because just recently he actively lobbied for a completely different project. He even broke the rules of subordination and sent a memorandum directly to the president, without going via the prime minister first.

When these proposals are interpreted from the state's viewpoint they essentially boil down to one thing — the aim is to transform the Rosneft state enterprise into

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the Russian Oil Company, a joint-stock company. Given that it was intended to give Rosneft the status of the Russian Federation Government's agent with the right to sell the state's share of oil and gas, Yuriy Shafranik was expecting not only to strengthen his position but also to become custodian of the largest oil monopoly in the country. This is even better than a ministerial post.

When the attempt to create a national oil company based on Rosneft misfired, Yuriy Shafranik changed course. Having now adopted the slogan of strengthening the state's influence over the fuel and energy complex the minister has begun to push through a plan for the effective nationalization of energy structures. The struggle for the share out of the oil has reached a new fever pitch.

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International Affairs

Ukraine: UN, EU Welcome Ukraine's Nuclear-Free Status

LD1306100596 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0700 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] UN Secretary-general [Butrus Butrus-Ghali] expressed deep satisfaction in connection with the fact that Ukraine has completed the removal of all nuclear armaments from its territory, said (Ahmed Salzi), the UN secretary-general's representative for relations with the press.

Butrus Butrus-Ghali believes that the removal of 4,400 Ukrainian strategic nuclear warheads for subsequent destruction is a step toward a universal ban on nuclear weapons, he said.

The UN secretary-general welcomes the fact that Ukraine has acquired the status of a state free from this kind of mass annihilation weapons.

The European Union [EU], in its turn, also expresses its deep satisfaction in connection with the completion of the process of removing nuclear weapons, that were part of the former USSR arsenal, from the Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma announced in early June that the removal of nuclear armaments was completed.

The EU views this move by the Ukrainian Government as evidence of its readiness to assume responsibilities in the field of disarmament and welcomes the desire of Ukraine, as a nuclear-free state, to join the nonproliferation regime, says a statement circulated on behalf of the European Union by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs chairing the EU.

Ukraine: Chisinau Declines To Sign 'Whole Package' of Border Accord

AU1306084596 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 11 Jun 96 p 4

["Express Interview" with Leonid Osavolyuk, chief of the External Ties Service at Ukraine's State Committee for Border Issues and deputy head of the Ukrainian delegation at the meeting of the joint Ukrainian-Moldovan Commission for Delimitation of the State Border Between Ukraine and Moldova: "Not Approved...." — first paragraph published in a box]

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint Ukrainian-Moldovan Commission for Delimitation of the State Border Between Ukraine and Moldova held its scheduled meeting in Odessa. Leonid Osavolyuk, chief of the External Ties Service at Ukraine's State Committee for Border Issues and deputy head of the Ukrainian delegation at the meeting of the joint Ukrainian-Moldovan Commission, told our correspondent about the results:

[Osavolyuk] It must be pointed out that prior to the meeting of the commission, the working groups had worked for two days, and we coordinated the line of the border by 90 percent. In other words, of the 1,192 kilometers, just 250 remained uncoordinated. The heads of the working groups (I head the Ukrainian group) signed all of the relevant documents and submitted them for approval to heads of the commissions — Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko and Moldovan First Deputy Foreign Minister Aurelian Danila. Unfortunately, however, the Moldovan side declined to sign the whole package of the documents and, eventually, just 34 out of 270 maps were signed. Thus, for the time being, 200 kilometers of the border has been approved.

The sides agreed to complete work at the next meeting, which will take place in Chisinau in September. Then we will also start resolving several most important problems: Determination of the initial southern point of the border, the line of the border in the settlement of Bessarabia, and so on.

Ukraine: Justice Minister Meets Belarusian, Russian Counterparts

LD1206220996 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1705 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest — Ukraine's Justice Minister Serhiy Holovatyy has met his Belarusian and Russian counterparts within the framework of the 20th conference of European justice ministers in Budapest.

The Ukrainian Embassy in Budapest told UNIAN that the Ukrainian and Russian justice ministers discussed the reform of the two countries' Justice Ministries, in view of the need to step up their role in conditions of a transition to a market economy and a democratic system. The sides agreed to intensify bilateral cooperation between the two states, governments, and ministries in the sphere of law and legal reform.

Holovatyy and Belarusian Justice Minister Valyantsin Sukala, who is taking part in the conference as an observer, touched on promoting the release of the Ukrainian citizens who were detained in Minsk on 26 April after participating in a demonstration against the signing of an agreement on uniting Belarus and Russia. Their case is now under investigation.

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National Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma Dissatisfied With Government's Performance

LD1206114996 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1040 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — [President] Leonid Kuchma has expressed dissatisfaction with the implementation of the government's 1996 action program. Speaking at the Public Administration Academy in Kiev, the president said the government has not even begun to fulfill the year's main objective: the structural reform of the economy. He called for a radical revision of taxation policy. The president revealed plans for a further reshuffle in the government, stressing the importance of the right choice of personalities for official posts. Personnel changes will be made in state administrations at all levels, Kuchma said. He rejected the idea of direct elections to the posts of heads of state administrations.

Ukraine: Kuchma Discounts Speaker's Remarks on Constitution

LD1206122496 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1040 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — If the people of Ukraine reject the draft constitution in a referendum, the president and the Supreme Council must both resign, Leonid Kuchma said at the Public Administration Academy in Kiev. The president likened the constitutional process in Ukraine to the situation in Russia before the presidential election: "The future of our country depends on the people's choice."

Kuchma said that the draft constitution would be submitted to a referendum in September only after its second reading in parliament. "We must put an end to the bickering between power structures about the constitutional treaty. The document remains valid until a new constitution is adopted," he said.

The president dismissed speaker Oleksandr Moroz' recent remarks on the constitutional treaty as "political speculation". "Instead of a legislature, we have the Socialist Party leader running the parliament," Kuchma said. He described the Supreme Council leadership's statements that the constitution should be adopted by the parliament as "declarative" and accused the parliament of engaging in "political score-settling instead of attending to priority legislation."

Ukraine: Legislator Warns of Kuchma's Efforts To Consolidate Power

AU1206142996 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 8 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Chyzh, head of the Supreme Council socialist faction: "Yevhen Marchuk's Resignation and the Attempt to Make Oleksandr Moroz Resign Are Links in the Same Chain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to our current law, the prime minister is no more than a puppet with no real power. I was surprised at Marchuk's long silence. He was appointed according to a procedure by which any high-ranking statesman or official might be appointed, and not as head of the Cabinet of Ministers. He had no sufficient legal support as his appointment was not coordinated with the parliament, and he had no protection from the Supreme Council. That is why he was so "vulnerable" to the measure taken against him.

I am not specifically defending Yevhen Marchuk. Even though he was not the worst prime minister, the errors in economic policy were enormous indeed. However, when I read the statement by the Presidential Press Service, I couldn't help but think: The president is the one directly in charge of the leadership of our government (in conformity with his own edict, adopted in the summer of 1994), and isn't everything stated here, in fact, total criticism of the president and his policy? It is odd that the people who drafted the statement did not take this into account.

Incidentally, the theory of the government's direct subordination to the head of state emerged throughout the preparation of the draft constitution. This is what we proposed the president do: If you are de facto head of the executive power and leader of the Cabinet of Ministers, and the prime minister just implements your ideas, then assume personal leadership of the government, like, for example, in the United States. But it is clear now why this additional "level" in the person of a prime minister is necessary: to make sure that at the appropriate moment there is someone available to throw overboard as ballast. The draft constitution, proposed by the deputies conciliation commission, also contains a paragraph that stipulates the danger for all future prime ministers of having the same "Achilles heel": They will not have parliamentary protection (because they do not go through the approval procedure of the Supreme Council) and become totally dependent upon the mood of the "patron" who appointed them.

Commenting on "Prime Minister Marchuk's 100 days," I once said: "I cannot conceive of him as a political figure, because he has not in any way manifested

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himself in that role." To this day I have not formed an impression of him. I am not saying here that he has any weak political characteristics — no, he is a person who has acquired serious experience and who strikes one as a prominent personality in the posts he has occupied. However, he did his best not to be in conflict with anyone, whereas in politics, one needs to declare one's own position and disagree with some people. He tried to avoid this. Perhaps that is the reason why, as soon as the publication appeared in ZERKALO NEDELI, the prime minister was immediately labeled an "enemy." Incidentally, here is another detail: Elsewhere in the world, resignation of the prime minister automatically entails resignation of the entire Cabinet. Nothing of the kind happened in our country. This indicates once again that what really happened was preventive removal of an undesirable rival. This is a lesson for others, a kind of crossing of one's "t's" in the light of holding a referendum....

I am not inclined to overestimate his return to the parliamentary hall. It already accommodates quite a number of "ex's." Take preceding Prime Minister Masol. In the past, we had supported his appointment to the post of head of the government: He is a decent person and a competent professional. He left the "power Olympus" at the first wave of a hand without saying a word.... You see, after this, one can't help reassessing all of these "prominent statesmen"....

Let's wait and see. Marchuk seems to be a serious politician with good potential, and he is not out of place in the parliament hall. I am far from thinking that he will start forming alliances or anything of that sort. I am also perfectly convinced that neither he nor any other "ex-leaders" will join us — the left-wing faction.

The dismissal by the Ukrainian president of Yevhen Marchuk from the post of prime minister shows that Leonid Kuchma does not need serious leaders, either in executive or legislative branches of power.

It is true that the performance of the Cabinet of Ministers is unsatisfactory, but the work was organized by the Ukrainian president. As head of the government, Yevhen Marchuk could not help seeing the faulty policy pursued in Ukraine.

Yevhen Marchuk's resignation and the initiative to collect signatures for dismissing Oleksandr Moroz from his post as head of parliament are links in the same chain of the unrestricted claims upon unrestricted power. The parliament will cease its activity in the event of Oleksandr Moroz's resignation because the objectively left-wing alliance will not allow any other candidacy for head of the parliament. In such a situation, the Supreme Council's work may collapse, and this will enable the president to declare that the parliament is unable to work and that it is desirable to institute a single-person leadership of the state. When I say that the replacement of the prime minister and the attempt to dismiss Oleksandr Moroz — an attempt that has fortunately failed — are links in the same chain, I have reason to say so.

Oleksandr Oleksandrovych is a leading Ukrainian politician. He has a serious political future. Those who believe that he has occupied a permanent position on the Olympus are simply enraged. Just recall how much dirt was poured on the head of the Supreme Council — but that dirt simply doesn't cling to him. He is a decent, honest person, and he can stand up for his convictions and principles, which are based upon an understanding of his people and their misfortunes and expectations.

The recent events in the Supreme Council showed once again Oleksandr Moroz's prestige and the esteem in which the majority of deputies hold him. It is time to calm down. It will not be easy to find a person more devoted to our state independence and caring about Ukraine, a person who wont betray us or succumb to bribery.

Returning to the "issue" of Yevhen Marchuk, I will say this: His political fate is largely in his own hands. He should not miss it by remaining "silent"....

Ukraine: Moroz Calls For Detailed Consideration of Constitution

LD1206200996 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz believes it is inadmissible to put a draft constitution to an all-Ukrainian referendum before the document is coordinated between the president and parliament as subjects of legislative initiative and the Constitutional Treaty.

Moroz also told UNIAN that he would under no circumstances admit the possibility of putting two versions of the fundamental law to a referendum. At the same time, he said that parliament must check every norm of the law from the legal viewpoint during the second reading of the document and only then adopt it. The head of parliament said there is no sense in advancing the deadline for adopting the constitution.

Moroz gave assurances that he wwill spare no effort to prevent the adoption of the fundamental law "as a whole" in the second reading, without discussing it article by article, as some deputies propose to do.

Moroz said President Kuchma has also declared that it is inadmissible to put the constitution to a referendum

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before considering it in the second reading. At the same time, Moroz stressed that he doesd not rule out the possibility that the constitution will be adopted by referendum after it is approved by the Supreme Council. A different course of events "would look like manipulation," he said.

Ukraine: Kuchma Advisor on Adopting Draft Constitution

WS1306075596 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 7 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with well-known Ukrainian lawyer Fedor Hlibovych Burchak, Ukrainian president's advisor for legal issues, by Olena Pozdnyakova; place and date not given: "The Adoption of the Constitution Is an Urgent Problem Which Society Demands To Resolve"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Discussions about a new draft constitution are being held. An UKRINFORM correspondent asked well-known Ukrainian lawyer Fedor Hlibovych Burchak, the Ukrainian president's advisor for legal issues, to answer questions pertaining to Ukraine's primary law.**

[Pozdnyakova] Fedor Hlibovych, you have heard more than once that a new draft constitution does not correspond to the Declaration of Ukraine's State Sovereignty, not to mention the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic's Constitution of 1978. I would like to know a lawyer's opinion on this issue.

[Burchak] The current draft constitution is a synthesis of previous draft constitutions, particularly of 1 July 1992, of 27 May, and of 26 October 1993. Being a lawyer, I can say that the recent draft constitution is the best.

Indeed, today one can hear from the Supreme Council rostrum and read in the press that this draft constitution does not correspond to the Declaration of Ukraine's State Sovereignty. But this is only a partial truth. You must agree that any juridical document is adopted at a certain time. Let us recall when the Declaration of Ukraine's State Sovereignty was adopted. At the time, the Communist Party stopped playing a leading and guiding role in society. Someone had to take power. Then, due to the fact that the state had such bodies as councils of people's deputies, the Declaration of Ukraine's State Sovereignty proclaimed that they gain complete power. It is also necessary to admit that the people are implementing their power through both the Ukrainian Supreme Council and local councils of people's deputies. At the same time, it is also necessary to admit that this document also has its internal contradictions.

[Pozdnyakova] What do you mean?

[Burchak] For example, the declaration envisaged the building of state power on the principles of separating the legislative, executive, and juridical branches. The principle of concentrating complete power in councils and of dividing power between them contradict one another. By the way, when in 1990 the Communist Party Central Committee developed the first draft constitution, I delivered a speech at a meeting devoted to its discussion and drew attention to the fact that Lenin's statement on complete power of councils of people's deputies which — according to the Constitution — should pass decisions and control their implementation does not correspond to the principle of division of power.

[Pozdnyakova] Many of our citizens greatly doubt both the development of our society in terms of law and the supremacy of law. Our experience provides grounds for such doubts. Our country cannot boast of having stable legislation. The legislature has been known to introduce amendments to laws that had already been passed, to change laws completely, and to take over too many functions of the executive power.

[Burchak] These are defects of the legislative system, as well as the attempts by the legislature to take upon itself the resolution of as many issues as possible. The legislature must rule society through laws and through introducing general, mandatory norms of behavior for everyone, including itself.

As regards the executive power operating within the framework of the constitution, it must ensure the implementation of laws and oversee social issues within the framework of acting legislation. The Constitutional Accord between the Ukrainian Supreme Council and the president was aimed precisely at the exact division of power and functions between the legislative and executive branches.

As regards the second portion of your question, it is necessary to say the following: Precisely due to the fact that laws can be changed, the principle of the supremacy of law, which is also obligatory for a lawmaker, must be introduced. Throughout our history there was a viewpoint that law is an instrument in the hands of the state to pursue its policy. However, the principle of supremacy of law implies something else — that the state and all its bodies must act according to law and that laws cannot change legal principles, including natural human rights. The essence of a law-governed state lies precisely in this. A new draft constitution must enshrine these tenets.

[Pozdnyakova] The opponents of a new draft constitution are concentrating their attention on the fact that the Soviet Constitution comprised the rights of citizens

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which have not been included in a new draft constitution.

[Burchak] I must agree that the Soviet Constitution comprised a lot of attractive tenets. But the Soviet Constitution has never been a legislative act of direct action. For example, the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of 1978 formulated a norm according to which any citizen could apply to the court with a complaint against officials. But this norm was ineffective for almost 10 years because there were no relevant laws. There are many similar examples. An achievement of a new draft constitution is that it will be implemented directly. This implies that what is written down in the constitution must be ensured by both the state and the court. It is one thing to declare the right to have housing, which in essence implies a right to wait in line for an apartment for dozens of years, but it is quite another thing to specify precisely: Those who have money must buy apartments themselves, but as regards those segments of the population who cannot do this, the state takes upon itself relevant obligations.

[Pozdnyakova] When must a new constitution be adopted? There are various viewpoints on the issue. For example, one of them states the following: If a new draft constitution is not adopted before 8 June, the Constitution of 1978 will come into force. Is this so?

[Burchak] The Constitutional Accord envisages that it will be effective until a new constitution is adopted. The sides which concluded this accord took upon themselves obligations to prepare a draft constitution within a year.

[Pozdnyakova] Anyway, what if a draft constitution is not adopted as scheduled?

[Burchak] The Constitutional Accord will come into force.

Ukraine: Deputies Ask For Prosecution of Defense Minister

LD1306110596 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0855 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — A group of people's deputies, members of the parliament's standing Commission for Defense and State Security, have appealed to Ukrainian Prosecutor General Hryhoriy Vorsinov to institute criminal proceedings against Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov in connection with the fact that the minister put obstacles in the way of their activities as people's deputies and thus offended their honor and dignity.

An appeal made available to UNIAN says that members of the Commission for Defense and State Security were not allowed to attend a conference on the reform of military education, which was held at the Defense Ministry on 7 June. This runs counter to Article 18 of the law On the Status of People's Deputy.

People's Deputies Volodymyr Holovko, Yevhen Lupakov, Yaroslav Ilyasevych, Mykola Porovskyy, and some other deputies signed the appeal.

Ukraine: Kuchma Raises Economic Issues for New Prime Minister

WS1306080996 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0533 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, June 11 — Careful attention to taxes and entrepreneurial activity will be among the watchwords for the Prime Minister as he shepherds Ukraine's economy through reforms, President Leonid Kuchma told a convocation of mayors belonging to the Association of Ukrainian Towns.

"We used to extinguish fires in the economy and the social policy while they are raging," Kuchma said Tuesday. "That's why it's necessary to formulate the program of actions of the government, headed by new Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, to prevent crisis by taking action in the early stages."

In particular, Kuchma stressed that the stable tax code, which can remain unchanged for a long period and provide the development of production, is to be elaborated. Kuchma suggested tensions be lifted by government immediately appealing to Parliament to review and change the law requiring entrepreneur carry a $200 monthly patent scheduled to become effective July 1.

According to Kuchma, the government headed by Yevhen Marchuk was slow in carrying out reforms and failed to respond to the economic situation. The primary reason fore the business financial crisis is because enterprises use the barter deals by 75 percent to 80 percent instead of cash settlements, Kuchma said. The situation is complicated by Parliament, which keeps intruding into the executive branch, such as Parliament's leveling salaries of employees of science, education and culture branches to the average wage in industry, requiring KBV125 trillion of 1995's state budget and affecting the 1996 budget as well.

Kuchma praised such Cabinet efforts as using state bonds to strengthen the budget. Regarding wage debts, Kuchma said that can be partially paid off by opening special accounts in the Savings Bank with the cash being withdrawn from the accounts after a few months. Kuchma also called for the resumption of promissory notes as a form of settlement between enterprises.

In other policy comments, Kuchma said a review of the system of welfare for veterans and liquidators of

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the Chernobyl accident is needed. As for the protection of domestic producers, Kuchma said current regulations are adequate, but the problem is to ensure government and business follow the legislation.

Ukraine: Cabinets Adopts Measures To Ensure Timeliness of '97 Budget

LD1206213796 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1705 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — The Cabinet of Ministers has passed a relevant resolution in order to ensure that Ukraine's 1997 state budget is drafted on time.

The government press service told UNIAN that under the resolution, the Ministry of Economy, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank, and some other ministries and departments, should work out, by mid-June 1996, the main forecast macroindices of the socioeconomic development of Ukraine for 1997 and, by 5 July, for the next three years.

Ukraine: Marchuk's Personnel Policies Criticized

WS1306080496 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 8 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by political experts Andriy Bilous and Yuriy Nazarenko: "The Former Premier's Career, or Before the 'Paper Lion' Jumps"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Long before Yevhen Marchuk's dismissal from the post of the head of government, a favorite topic of certain media was to lament about the sad fate of the prime minister, whom the president allegedly prevented from forming his own team in either the Cabinet or in individual ministries. On this basis, conclusions were made to the effect that in those unbearable conditions Yevhen Marchuk could not be held responsible for the successful implementation of economic reform or for raising people's living standards. It is typical that these kinds of speculations, including those expressed directly by Mr. Marchuk, were characterized by an absolute lack of facts. Not a single name or fact were mentioned to support this theory. Of course, the theory could impress certain people who were absolutely unfamiliar with the internal workings of Ukraine's power structures. Nevertheless, its absurdity was difficult to ignore if one had at least a minimum amount of information — in particular, if one knew about the number or, more precisely, the abundance of state security officers who made up the prime minister's closest retinue.

Among Yevhen Marchuk's advisers were Generals Valeriy Malikov and Oleksandr Nezdolya. Shortly before Marchuk's dismissal, General Andriy Khomych had been cleared for employment. The group of advisers was headed by Colonels Vasyl Sitar and Mykola Sukhoviy. Marchuk's former subordinates from Ukraine's Security Service [SBU] were (and still are) represented in all the structural components of the government apparatus. During Yevhen Marchuk's premiership, most senior officials were removed from the Cabinet of Ministers if they had been "observed" (justly or not) not to be loyal to the head of the Cabinet.

The situation in most ministries and departments is even more obvious: Mr. Marchuk managed to appoint people who were personally loyal to him (or dependent on him) not only to the posts of ministers or deputy ministers, but also to the posts of heads of major departments. In addition, it is not a state secret that information about all the candidates was collected personally by Viktor Burlakov, chief of the SBU's "T" Department. This department exercises control over all the aspects of the domestic political situation. In light of this, every "disobedience" on the part of these high-ranking state officials would be fraught with very unpleasant consequences for them, including publicity of discrediting documents, which would automatically amount to an end of their careers. The same can be said about senior SBU officers from the prime minister's closest retinue. Their every step was described and filed under appropriate filenames.

Perhaps we can agree that Marchuk's team was not the team of a politician in the generally accepted meaning of this term. It was something different — a clan with a strict hierarchy, consolidated by common fear and mutual cover-ups. We have no intention to attach any labels, but one cannot disregard the structural-organizational identity of that clan with classical mafia groups. It is significant that this structure had a single "axle" in the person of the prime minister himself. Even after his dismissal, this structure did not lose any of its strength and efficiency.

It should be emphasized that Yevhen Marchuk, like a magnet attracted retired bureaucrats famous for their anti-presidential sentiments. It is enough to mention recent senior SBU officers Valeriy Malikov and Andriy Khomych, who were engaged in widescale intrigues against Leonid Kuchma instead of attending to their assigned functions. When Marchuk employed Andriy Vydrin, Kuchma's former adviser for domestic policy issues, as a member of his team of advisers, this became a direct challenge to the president and a demonstration of Marchuk's strength. Meanwhile, Vydrin's absolute incompetence, combined with great ambitions, was widely known. It is hard to find a logical explanation of the fact that former Industry Minister Anatoliy Holubchenko and Transport Minister Orest Klympush also reemerged in Marchuk's retinue, particularly since

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they had been seriously criticized for ruining the sectors under their supervision.

As far as we know, Leonid Kuchma did not turn out a single candidate for ministerial posts recommended by Yevhen Marchuk. Under Marchuk's pressure he even dismissed Agriculture Minister Yuriy Karasyk, who had been awarded State Prize for raising new breeds of cattle and was believed to be one of the best specialists in agriculture. Incidentally, the reason behind Marchuk's resentment was purely personal: Karasyk had failed to establish good relations with Marchuk's wife, who headed one of the Agriculture Ministry departments.

It appears that Marchuk, mildly speaking, did not experience even the slightest difficulties in conducting his personnel policy, and thus, had perfect conditions for reforming the economy and creating an efficient system of social protection for socially vulnerable categories of the population. Unfortunately, the head of government was preoccupied with absolutely different matters, which can be proven by documents....

On 11 December 1995, the Cabinet of Ministers issued instruction No. 993 "On the Division of Functional Powers Among the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Leadership." The instruction clearly determined the departments which would be supervised directly by the prime minister and his deputies. It envisioned for the prime minister to "coordinate and control the activities of the following bodies: the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the State Committee for Energy Saving; the State Committee for Radio and Television; the SBU; the Ukrainian National Information Agency [UKRINFORM]; the Ukrainian Government's Special Mission to the EU; the Cabinet of Ministers Expert-Technical Committee, the Civil Defense Staff; the National Council of Social Partnership."

It is hard to believe that when issuing this instruction the prime minister did not know that, according to the Constitution, control over the Interior Ministry, the SBU, and the Foreign Ministry was the president's exclusive prerogative. However, the "expropriation" of certain powers was not exactly the point.... It is strikingly evident that the key issues of economic reform and social protection were delegated to deputy prime ministers, while the major power structures, the Foreign Ministry, the financial-distributary bodies, and the information-propaganda institutions were subordinated to the premier. All the aforementioned bodies are of a secondary importance during routine work in the economic sector. However, they may play a decisive role if someone pursues other goals....

It is evident that during Yevhen Marchuk's premiership the Cabinet of Ministers was transformed into something bigger that an SBU branch; it was transformed into some sort of "super SBU" whose range of tasks was probably known only to Yevhen Marchuk and, perhaps, to some of his closest sponsors. It would be naive to believe that publications in the loyal regional press are worthless. The local press was among Marchuk's priorities. Not accidentally, apartments in one of the SBU houses were granted to several of the most loyal individuals [representing the regional press]. Even in the manner of his behavior Marchuk remained a professional intelligence officer rather than the head of government. He dodged concrete facts; his meaningless speeches were ambiguous; he made vague hints and promises, which was more typical of a provincial SBU chief interviewed by an oblast newspaper than of the prime minister of a large European state.

We all remember Marchuk's promises to put an end to corruption in high places and to organized crime, made when he was still the SBU chief. He even claimed that very "famous" names would be shortly publicized.... We can see the results now, and they can hardly be justified by the "specific nature of investigatory activities." Whenever it is necessary, the SBU's actions can be quick and efficient. A vivid example of this efficiency is Marchuk's election as a Supreme Council deputy in the Myrhorod constituency. The Poltava Oblast SBU Directorate's resources were engaged, and in addition, a tangible reinforcement was sent from Kiev. As a result, the people voted "properly," particularly since the only realistic rival backed o[illegible]f the election race on time. For some reason, how[illegible] the SBU structures turned out to be helpless in eradicating corruption which had flooded the Cabinet of Ministers, not to mention sectoral ministries.

We should agree with Moscow's OBSHCHAYA GAZETA that "great hopes were pinned on the appointment of an SBU colonel general to the post of prime minister. Marchuk was acceptable for both the left and the right, and at the same time, he had not been recruited by any political force. The primary hope was that he would be able to establish iron discipline in the executive structures, restore order in the state, and become a consolidating factor for the political establishment.... Overall, he failed to meet those hopes."

The following question now emerges: Is the former prime minister's political career over? Will he be satisfied with the role of an ordinary deputy representing Myrhorodskyy rayon? Judging by Mr. Marchuk's entire previous career, he will not. Nevertheless, it seems that events may develop irregardless of Deputy Marchuk's will and wishes. He was strong, dangerous, and for some people even terrifying when he had obedient "organs" under his control, a powerful government apparatus, and

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the regularly bribed press. In that type of situation, not only his words, but even his silence had weight. All policy failures could be justified by intrigues on the part of some kind of unspecified dark forces, which sounded vague, yet lofty.

Without any exaggeration, the prime minister was regarded on Ukraine's political arena as a lion decorated with blue SBU epaulets. However, now, left without the usual air of mystery and omnipotence, the lion may turn out to be made of paper and fade very fast under the hot sun of open politics. He may try to jump again. Everything will depend on whether the general situation in Ukraine will normalize. Political and economic stability, which may be brought about by the adoption of a new constitution, will dramatically decrease his chances for a retaliation, and the other way around. Special service chiefs do not become heads of developed states; this is the fate of banana republics.

Ukraine: Poll Analyzes Population's Regional Concerns

AU1206114796 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 8 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Oleksandr Stehniy, candidate of historical sciences and SOTsIS-Gallup leading research associate: "Life Wouldn't Be So Bad Had It Not Been for.... What Bothers the Population of Ukrainian Regions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Any appreciable changes in the political and economic life of society in Ukraine are only possible if there is support for them in various regions..... What is it that the regions want, what problems bother them, and what unites them and what makes them different?

According to a recent nationwide survey, conducted by SOTsIS-Gallup (1,200 respondents were polled), all the main regions have a certain "menu" of problems that the population rates as particularly important. The difference lies in the extent to which these problems affect the interests of residents of specific regions (the degree of topicality of the problems). To make the sampled population more significant at the regional level and thus obtain more accurate results, all the regions in the survey below are divided into six main categories: the west, north, center, east, south, and the Crimean Republic.

The majority of the population in the regions feel an obvious need for material and status security, which is unlikely to be satisfied in the near future. No wonder that the population is mainly concerned about the financial situation, something that finds a concrete expression in stressing the purchasing power (prices of foodstuffs and manufactured goods) and the ability to pay for communal services. Here, regional variations can be observed. In particular, the financial situation is a matter of particular concern for residents of the northern and central regions (76 and 75 percent), whereas in other regions this problem concerns between 63 and 68 percent of the population.

Many of the participants in the survey are aware of the looming threat of unemployment. This prospect is quite real in view of the prevailing socioeconomic factors, which are associated with both the implementation of reforms and the inactivity of the legislative and executive authorities. This problem also has "regional characteristics." From the point of view of the respondents, unemployment is particularly badly felt in the center and in the east and west (at the level of between 35 and 38 percent). Respondents in southern and, partly, northern regions express less anxiety on this matter. It must be pointed out that, for the overwhelming majority of the population, unemployment is an absolutely new and hitherto unknown phenomenon. The experience of both social groups and individuals does not include habits or samples of behavior in such a situation.

However, not just professional, but also everyday life proceeds under threat. The significance of the problem of personal safety is particularly strong in the Crimea and in the northern region (45 and 41 percent respectively). By way of comparison, in the western and southern regions, the problem of crime is of concern to 30 percent of the respondents.

The problem of survival has overshadowed that of environmental pollution, but in a number of regions, environmental safety continues to prevail in the scale of values of the population. In particular, in the east and north, 36 percent of respondents rate the ecological situation as one of the most outstanding problems. This concern can be explained by the level of the technologically produced burden upon nature (in the east) and radioactive contamination of the territory as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe (in the north).

The above "thesaurus" of problems logically leads one to the following question: How do these problems determine the sociopolitical situation in regions and the degree of social tension?

The results of the poll indicate that the sociopolitical situation is the calmest in the western and central regions. In turn, the highest level of social tension could be observed in the east, where 31 percent of respondents pointed to a potentially explosive situation and only one in every 10 respondents, on the contrary, spoke about a stable situation. All the remaining Ukrainian regions occupy an intermediate position or are generally charac-

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terized by the population's tolerant attitude toward the current sociopolitical situation. –

What is the reason for the potentially explosive situation in the eastern region? In the opinion of 77 percent of respondents, who tend to be pessimistic in their assessment of the situation, the main reason lies in the socioeconomic difficulties, in particular, mass delays in the payment of salaries in the state sector and the pre-strike situation in labor collectives at a number of industrial enterprises in the region.

The resolution of which problem do you consider to be of top priority for your region? (Percentage of relevant responses)

Problem	Total	Region					
		West	North	Center	East	South	Crimea
Financial situation of population	67	64	76	75	63	68	55
Crime	32	30	41	25	35	27	45
Unemployment	33	35	26	38	37	22	25
Environmental pollution	28	18	35	24	36	21	24

How do you assess the sociopolitical situation in your region? (Percentage of relevant responses)

Characteristic of situation	Total	Region					
		West	North	Center	East	South	Crimea
Calm	9	28	28	25	10	14	16
Tolerable	55	56	56	55	56	54	48
Potentially explosive	21	13	9	15	31	18	24

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Belarus

Belarus: Sharetski Receives Integration Committee Chairman

WS1306091196 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Syamyon Sharetski has received Nigmetzhan Insingarin, chairman of the Integration Committee of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. During the conversation, the Belarusian speaker expressed his viewpoints on the integration problems of the states of the former USSR. According to him, it is too late to talk about a federation or confederation. The time for this is gone. The most sensible thing now is to hold negotiations on the Community of Sovereign Republics.

Touching on the problem of introducing dual citizenship in the Community of Sovereign Republics, Syamyon Sharetski said that the Belarusian parliament had decided to reject this idea. Instead, the Belarusian legislators propose to considerably simplify the system of acquiring citizenship in all four states. The problems of reforming the economy, competitiveness of products, and investments in the production sphere were also discussed.

Belarus: Deputy Foreign Minister Holds Briefing on Joining CEI

WS1306110496 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1000 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Khvastow held a regular briefing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said that the fact that the Republic of Belarus had been admitted to the Central European Initiative on 31 May proves that another obstacle to the path of our integration with the European Community has been overcome. According to him, this decision is very important for us due to the fact that Belarus is striving to, and has clearly determined its interest in participating in the Council of Europe. Moreover, participation in the Central European Initiative will enable the appropriate Belarusian ministries and departments to conform our legislation with European standards, as well as enable us to realize which obstacles need to be overcome in order to integrate with the EU.

Belarus: Conference Addresses Human Rights Violations

WS1306075496 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0647 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk, 12 June — Since March this year human rights have been repeatedly violated in Belarus. This conclusion was drawn at a conference which was held in Minsk on June 11. The conference was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, the Belarusian PEN center, the weekly "FEMIDA" and the Belarusian Association of Journalists. Participants at the conference together with leaders of national public associations, political parties and MPs tried to give a legal assessment to the events that occurred in the country in spring.

Stanislaw Bahdankevich, the leader of the United Civic Party and the parliamentary faction "Civic Action" expressed his "extremely negative attitude' towards the authorities' methods of banning mass demonstrations. According to him, if one can reconcile himself to the disregard of standards and regulations in the economic sphere, the infringement of human rights in the country cannot be tolerated.

In first instance this concerns the freedom of the media, because even the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet was not allowed to appear on TV at his first request.

However, intellectuals were to blame for the events on March 24, April 2, April 26 and May 30 as well, because they did not dare to publicly condemn the authorities' action. Nevertheless, Mr Bahdankevich said, all responsibility rests with the authorities because they created a "climate for arbitrary rule", and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the first instance because it "provoked the dispersal."

Yuryy Khadyka, Deputy Chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), told in detail about the organization and course of the Charnobylski Shlyakh-96 demonstration on April 26. The BPF received an official ban from the Minsk-City Executive Committee only on April 24, later than stipulated by legislation. At that time the demonstration could not be called off. Then BPF leaders and Henadz Karpenka, Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman, did everything possible to avoid extremes and skirmishes with the militia that mourning day. They held negotiations with the city's militia, the KGB department on terrorism prevention and Viktar Sheyman, State Secretary of the Security Council, until April 26.

Mr Khadyka expressed certitude that the dispersal had been planned in advance. This is proved by the fact that all the 9 city militia reception centers were vacated before the demonstration. Participants at the conference made a number of statements concerning the flagrant infringement of human rights and an appeal to the country's judicial corps, urging it to serve the law only, not the powers that be.

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Belarus: TU Leaders Appeal to Lukashenka To Make Economic Changes

WS1306075396 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0647 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk, 12 June — The chairman of the Federation of the Trade Unions of Belarus (FTUB), Uladzimir Hancharyk, and the chairpersons of 8 sectoral industrial trade unions signed a letter addressed to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka titled "About the Situation in Industry and Proposals for the Improvement of Social and Economic Situation at Enterprises in the Republic."

"In view of the critical situation experienced by most labor collectives at industrial enterprises in the Republic, we consider it necessary to appeal to you," the letter reads. "Though industrial output seems to have been stabilized, and even an increase was to be observed in April this year compared to the same period of 1995, the volume of sold products has considerably decreased. As of April 1, 25.1 percent of industrial enterprises operated at a loss against 9.1 percent in the first quarter of 1995. The average level of profitability dropped to 8.4 percent against 10.3 percent in 1995. Wage arrears are continuing to be accumulated. As of May 25, they totalled 305.5 billion rubles. The unemployment rate is approaching a dangerous line. 170,000 people were deprived of the right to labor..."

The authors of the letter propose a number of urgent measures aimed at the stabilization of the social and economic situation in the country. Some of them are:

— to make an inventory of industrial products as soon as possible in order to determine the enterprises that have stable and solvent consumer markets;

— to consider the possibility of raising import duties on the foreign products similar to those manufactured in the country in order to support national producers;

— to work out and implement a program of restructuring the large production amalgamations and enterprises which have no plans to ensure their efficient functioning and solvent markets;

— to radically change the tax system, to abolish the taxes which are included in production costs with the exception of excise taxes.

In addition the letter contains proposals aimed at the development of small and medium-size businesses, the creation of new jobs and raising public incomes. The industrial trade union leaders also suggest a meeting between representatives of enterprises, trade unions, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidential Administration to discuss in detail the problems listed in the letter.

Moldova

Moldova: Rotation of Russian Troops in Dniester 'Not Carried Out'

AU1206144096 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau/Tiraspol 11/06/1996 (BASA-press) — The rotation of Russian peacekeepers in Dniester was not carried out on schedule.

Two trains carrying Russian peacekeepers, which were to leave Dniester on July 7, were detained. Stefan Kitsak, military adviser of the Dniester leader Igor Smirnov, viewed as "disinformation" reports that Dniester authorities forbade the dispatch of trains as a way of preventing evacuation of Dniester-based Russian troops' equipment.

Aleksandr Baranov, deputy commander of the Russian prompt-reaction troops, declined to comment on the matter.

Subunits of the former Russian 14th Army had been earlier placed in the collective security zone to take over peacekeeping functions, a move disputed by Chisinau.

Over the last days, Russian and Moldovan representatives conducted consultations on this problem.

The Joint Control Commission was expected to meet on Tuesday in Tighina (Bender) to discuss this issue.

Moldova: JCC Approves 14th Army Deployment in Security Zone

AU1206160296 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tighina (Bender) 11/06/1996 (BASA-press) — The Joint Control Commission (JCC) today approved the former 14th Army subunits' placement in the security zone on condition that they are pulled out of the Russian troops composition.

The subunits were placed in the security zone a week and half ago to replace by rotation two Russian peacekeeping battalions.

Moldovan JCC co-chairman Victor Catana told BASA-press Moldovan delegation approved Russian subunits' placement in the security zone for a normal rotation of peacekeepers and continuation of peacekeeping in Dniester.

"We stay on our earlier positions — the Moldovan-Russian July 21, 1992, agreement must be respected by both sides, including in the sense that the former 14th Army should keep its neutrality," said Catana.

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"We agreed to the Russian side's proposal that these subunits will be withdrawn from the composition of the Russian prompt-reaction troops, will not be run by the Russian troops commander and will be called the Russian contingent of peacekeeping forces in Dniester just as it was earlier. We still hold our position that the 14th Army cannot be delegated peacekeeping functions," said Moldovan JCC co-chairman.

According to Catana, the subunits are made up of Russian and not Dniester resident soldiers and the JCC will establish a tough control in this respect.

Catana said other aspects of this problem will be discussed at other JCC meetings.

Russian JCC co-chairman Vladimir Ustinov refused to make any comments.

The Russian Defence Ministry suggested late last year that the former 14th Army be granted a peacekeeping mandate as Russia lacks funds to finance separate peacekeeping forces. Moldova rejected this suggestion then.

Moldova: Dniester Leader Maracuta Tells Troops To Vote for Yeltsin

AU1306101096 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau/Tiraspol 12/06/1996 (BASA-press) — Tiraspol leader Grigore Maracuta has favored Boris Yeltsin's re-election as Russian president.

In a speech yesterday before officers of the Dniester-based Russian troops, the Tiraspol Supreme Soviet chairman called on Russian troops and citizens residing in Dniester to vote for Yeltsin in the Russian presidential elections.

This was the first statement by Dniester officials in support of a candidate running for the Russian presidency.

Tiraspol sources reported that Dniester President Igor Smirnov is currently in Moscow where he met Russian Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, Yeltsin's principal rival in elections.

Groups in support of Gennadiy Zyuganov and Aleksandr Lebed were earlier reported in Dniester. There are 28,000 Russian citizens and several thousands Russian troops in the region.

Moldova: Former Communist Chief Calls For Three Official Languages

AU1306100896 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 12/06/1996 (BASA-press) — Moldovan and Dniester authorities are very far from a solution to the conflict, the newspaper NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA quoted Ivan Bodiul, former prime secretary of the Soviet Moldova's Communist Party as saying.

Calling for union since "there is no other way," he suggested Chisinau officials should offer Dniester a transition period.

"It is inadmissible to press them, to demand immediate reintegration within Moldova. Give them the possibility to take their breath. And when they themselves will make the first step toward you (and they sure will), then offer them limited autonomy," said Bodiul.

In his opinion, Moldova should have two official languages — "Moldovan" and Russian, "or maybe even three — the Ukrainian will not be surfeit."

Moldova: Russian 'Edinstvo' Favors Left-Wing Bloc for Election

AU1306111096 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, June 12 (INFOTAG) — The Unitatea-Edinstvo [Unity] Movement has spoken up for forming "a bloc of patriotic forces at the initial state of electoral struggle," and calls "to give up personal and party ambitions for the sake of mutual interests."

Its today's press release reads that "only consolidation of progressive, genuinely democratic forces can lead us to victory," and condemns "any actions damaging the unity of left-wing forces before the presidential elections.

"The election results will largely influence our future, and will determine whether the republic will remain an independent state, or it will keep on preparing for unification with Romania; whether all citizens will be given equal opportunities, or ethnic discrimination will become an official policy; whether we will cooperate with CIS states, or Moldova will be looking only to the West," the document states.

Observers believe, by speaking so resolutely for setting up a left-wing bloc, the Edinstvo Movement persuades the Socialist Party to join it, too. At present, the amalgamation of these two organizations — the Socialist Unity faction — is the second-largest force in Parliament.

Currently, stormy debates are on in the Socialist Party concerning forming a bloc or acting independently in the elections.

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Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan: Parliament Adopts Vote of Confidence in Government

LD1206065596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0636 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By Vladimir Akimov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, June 12 (Itar-Tass) - The parliament of Kazakhstan on Wednesday delivered a vote of confidence in the republic's government. At a joint meeting of the houses of parliament, a majority of MPs, in a secret ballot, voted in support of the Cabinet.

Kazakhstan: Parliament's Vote of Confidence in Government

LD1206115396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0805 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, June 12 (Interfax) — A joint meeting of the two chambers of the Kazakh parliament passed the vote of confidence in the government of Kazakhstan.

The proposal to discuss confidence in the government was made on June 10 by Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin after the lower parliament chamber rejected a government bill on introduction of changes and amendments to the law on pensions on May 23. The amendments aimed to cancel several pension benefits and gradually raise the pension age by the year 2001: from 60 to 63 years for men, and from 55 to 58 years for women.

The voting on confidence in the government was held 48 hours after the proposal was made, in accordance with the constitution. The majority of law makers (76 for, 29 against) expressed their confidence in the government. Some 35 members of the upper parliament chamber voted for, 10 voted against, while in the lower parliament chamber 41 voted for, 19 voted against.

In order to pass the vote of no-confidence in the government, the law makers were to collect 2/3 of votes in each parliament chamber.

Under the Kazakh constitution and bearing in mind the vote of confidence, the amendments to the pension law are considered approved.

Kazakhstan: Duties of Prime Minister, Deputies Defined

LD1206193896 Almaty PANORAMA in Russian 7 Jun 96 p 1

[FBIS Translated Text] The duties of the prime minister, his deputies, and heads of the government apparatus have been defined. Only the duties of First Deputy Prime Minister Nigmetzhan Isingarin have changed significantly, compared with a similar resolution of 22 January 1996. His domain used to be the functioning of the economy, construction, transport, and communications, relations with employers' associations and trade unions, social partnership, mobilizing the national economy, material and technical provision both of state material reserves and a number of ministries and departments. Now, his job is to head the Integration Committee, to represent the republic in CIS organizations, and to handle the issues of the State Committee for Cooperation with CIS Countries.

The prime minister is to handle interaction with local administrative bodies, development of regions, and the work of personnel.

The duties of former First Deputy Prime Minister Mette, which were science and industrial policy, have been given to Deputy Prime Minister Garri Shtoik, in addition to operational issues regarding the republic's economy and cooperation with CIS countries. Deputy Prime Minister Zhanibek Karibzhanov has taken over the duties of Akhmetzhan Yesimov and coordinates sectors in the agro-industrial complex and food supply.

Deputy Prime Minister Nagashbay Shaykenov has been given the duty of coordinating government legislation and responsibility for passing draft laws in the chambers of parliament.

Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev at Ceremony for Commercial Control of Kenbay Oil

LD1106192496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1623 GMT 11 Jun 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev who is on a tour-day tour of Atyr Region in the west was involved in a ceremony to mark the start of commercial running of Kenbay oil field on Tuesday, Nazarbayev's spokesman Dulat Kuanyshev told Interfax.

He quoted Nazarbayev as saying the event "is a vital link in the investment stage of reforms." The president stressed the project was put in place by the local workforce.

Kenbay's proven and recoverable oil reserves are estimated at 100 million and over 30 million tonnes respectively, President of state- run Munaigaz company Tulegen Khasanov told Interfax. As many as seven drilling holes, now in operation, are expected to produce from 500,000 to 1 million tonnes of crude annually.

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Kenbay has been transferred to Embamunaigaz stock company which is part of Munaigaz. Khasanov said that a total of 470 million tenge ($1 fetches 66.8 tenge) had been invested into the development of the site and equipment imports.

The spokesman said Nazarbayev also visited a floating caviar- making base and Balukshin district affected by spring floods.

The president is expected to visit a seismic base of the international consortium, Kazakhstankaspiishelf and hold a meeting of local officials later in the day.

He returns to the capital Almaty late on Tuesday.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan: Ministry Statement Criticizes PRC Nuclear Test

LD1106145396 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 1100 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Follows a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic expresses serious anxiety at the fact that China tested a nuclear system at the Lop Nur test site [in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region] on 8 June 1996. It says that Kyrgyzstan, as a peace-loving state, favors the complete renunciation of nuclear tests, and that it believes that such tests will have a negative influence on the progress of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and that they in no way promote the swiftest possible conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests completely.

If China shows further restraint and does not resume the relevant nuclear programs, this will have a very favorable impact on the general trend toward removing the accumulated nuclear arsenal, which is dangerous to mankind, and will help to reinforce stability and security in the world and in the region. Kyrgyzstan hopes that, in line with the official statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China of 8 June 1996, the Chinese side — China — will declare an indefinite moratorium on nuclear tests and will take an active part in the process of concluding a relevant agreement to ban nuclear weapons [as heard] completely.

[Signed] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Kyrgyzstan: UN Official Urges Assistance for Fight Against Drugs

LD1206152396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1242 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, June 12 (Interfax) — A U.N. official on Wednesday urged priority assistance to Kyrgyzstan in fighting drug traffic.

Maisik Arkadius, director of the U.N. Drug Control Commission's regional office in Tashkent, told a seminar in Bishkek that Kyrgyzstan could become a barrier for drugs which come from Southeast Asia via Tajikistan.

A road linking Khorog in Tajikistan to Osh in Kyrgyzstan is today a key drug transit route, blocking which would stop drugs from traveling on to other countries, Arkadius argued at the seminar, whose theme was "Drugs and crime: new challenges." The seminar was arranged by the Kyrgyz government and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Arkadius said international organizations were ready to help the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, primarily Kyrgyzstan, to combat drug traffic and organized crime, which, he said, posed a threat to the countries' economies.

The Central Asian states have already received about $3.5 million in such aid.

The director of the U.N. Bureau for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Audrey Glover, urged Central Asian states to join forces in fighting corruption, money laundering and drug traffic. She suggested that those countries set up a coordinating antidrug body.

Kyrgyzstan: Indian Defense Forces Order Kyrgyz Airliner To Land

LD1306093196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0901 GMT 13 Jun 96

[By Leonid Kotov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NEW DELHI June 13 (Itar-Tass) — A Tu-154 plane of the Kyrgyzstan airlines was forced to land on order from Indian anti-aircraft defences at Raja Sansi airfield in the Western Indian state of Punjab.

It became known to Itar-Tass that the airliner with the crew of nine and 23 passengers on board, which took off from Bishkek, entered the Indian airspace in the area of Kashmir near the Pakistani border.

In this connection Indian air forces were alerted and fighter planes took off from an airbase to intercept the

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violator plane. Pilots of the Tu-154 plane were given a command from the ground to land at an airfield in Punjab.

Upon the landing, the airliner was sealed off by Indian security forces and thoroughly searched. All the persons who were onboard the plane were detained.

During the investigation which was started, pilots of the Kyrgyz airliner said they were forced to change the itinerary and enter Indian airspace without sanctions of Indian civil aviation services because of bad meteorological conditions and refusal of the Pakistani authorities to permit the plane's emergency landing in the Pakistani territory.

The incident with the Kyrgyz airliner is similar to that with the Russian An-26 transport aircraft which had to land in the Delhi airport in December 1995 when making a Kazan-Kathmandu flight. It entered the Indian airspace without preliminary permission. After the investigation of several weeks the Russian aircraft received the permission to continue the flight to the Nepalese capital.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan: Government Wants Commission To Resume Work on Tehran Accord

LD1206155096 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0542 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dushanbe, 12 Jun — The Tajik Government has spoken in favor of the speedy resumption of work of a joint conciliatory commission for observing the Tehran agreement on a cease-fire both in the republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border and will guarantee the safety of opposition members in the commission. This was said in an official note by the Tajik Foreign Ministry sent to the mission of the UN's permanent observers in Dushanbe on 11 June.

The note underlines that wide-scale hostile actions by the Tajik opposition in some of the districts of the Pamir mountains have forced the joint conciliatory commission to cease its work. Their actions were justifiably denounced by the UN Security Council at its meeting on 21 May.

As for the constant demands by the UN permanent observers on their freedom of movement within the country — although the Tajik Government favors their free movement within the territory of the republic — at the same time it cannot guarantee their safety in some of the districts of the republic, in particular, in the eastern areas where fighting is going on. All the responsibility for the possible incidents during observers' visits to the unstable areas will be on the mission's leadership in the event of the Tajik side failing to guarantee their safety.

Speaking of the statement by the Tajik Foreign Ministry, a presidential spokesman, Zafar Saidov, reiterated the readiness of the government to do whatever is necessary to ensure the safety both of the commission for observing the Tehran cease-fire agreement and of the mission. However, the implementation of the UN Security Council's decision on setting up the UN roadblocks for monitoring the Tajik opposition units on the Afghan side of the border would be preferable. [passage omitted]

Tajikistan: Official Criticizes UN Mission Over Access to Unsafe Areas

LD1206180996 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Emomali Rakhmanov has always been and remains a loyal supporter of a peaceful approach to the Tajik issue. He is convinced that there is no alternative to a process of peaceful talks. The leadership and Government of the country regard observance of the agreement on a cease-fire and other hostile acts in the country and at the Tajik-Afghan border as a necessary condition for the development of the inter-Tajik political dialogue. In this context, further improvement of the mechanism of control over observance of the cease-fire procedure is important. Presidential Press Secretary Zafar Saidov spoke to our correspondent about this:

[Begin Saidov recording] By striving for an immediate resumption of the work of the joint commission for implementing the agreement on a cease-fire and other hostile acts in the country and at the Tajik-Afghan border, the Government has once again confirmed its readiness to protect representatives of the opposition, members of the aforementioned commission. As is known, the real reason for the commission's temporary inactivity are the large-scale acts of hostility by the opposition, which received justified condemnation in a statement issued by the UN Security Council chairman on 21 May this year.

As for the issue of free movement of staff in the UN observer mission in Tajikistan, the Tajikistan Government is adopting a balanced approach, bearing in mind the accident last year, and guided primarily by concern for the safety of its members. At the same time, the Government wants to draw the attention of the mission's leadership to one contradiction in its demands. While fully understanding that the Tajik authorities cannot guarantee complete security for observers in some areas now,

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the UN mission continues to insist on free access to these very areas.

The Tajikistan Government, while confirming again its adherence to the principle of free movement for the UN mission members and its readiness to ensure their safety as far as it can, states that in cases where it cannot ensure safety, responsibility for any possible incidents lies wholly with the mission's leadership at the time of the observers' visit to an unsafe area.

The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan wants immediate implementation of the UN Security Council's decision to set up UN military observer posts on the Afghan border to monitor the behavior of the opposition's armed groups on neighboring territory. [end recording]

Tajikistan: Red Cross Official Praises Iranian Role in POW Exchange

LD1206221796 Tehran IRNA in English 1802 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, June 12, IRNA — Representative of International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in Eastern Europe and Central Asia thanked Iran for its peaceful efforts in resolving the crisis in Tajikstan, one of the Central Asian republics.

The ICRC representative Jean Barnett at a meeting on Wednesday with Iranian ambassador to Tajikstan 'Ali Ashraf Mojtahed-Shabestari also hailed the positive role of Islamic Republic of Iran in facilitating the exchange of Tajik prisoners including prisoners of war (POW) and called for continuation of Iran's humanitarian endeavors and mediation to secure further release of POWs held by conflicting sides in Tajikstan.

He termed the materialization of the release of Tajik political and military prisoners as the most prominent effort of the Red Cross committee in Tajikstan, adding that this success could not have been possible without Iran's assistance.

Some other military prisoners are to be freed by opposition groups in the coming weeks under the supervision of representatives of ICRC and peace talk observers in Tajikstan, Iran being one of the observer countries.

In the meeting, the Iranian ambassador expresed Iran's readiness to act as intermediary in the Tajik crisis and to help free some other prisoners of both conflicting sides in the country.

Tajikistan: Opposition Warns Pamir Fighting May Lead to Bigger War

LD1206135796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1340 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 12 (Itar-Tass) — Tajik opposition leader Said Abdullo Nuri warned of a possible outbreak of war in Tajikistan if the government does not stop fighting in the Tavil-Dara region of the republic within the next day or two.

In his message to U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and the leaders of the countries which are monitoring the intra-Tajik talks on Wednesday, Nuri accused Dushanbe of launching a large-scale offensive against the territory controlled by the opposition.

He said that the government has also recalled its pledge to resume the U.N.-sponsored peace talks in Ashgabat on June 17.

Nuri urged Butrus-Ghali to find "measures and forms of influence in order to silence the guns and begin a search for a political way to stop the spreading civil war in Tajikistan."

His deputy Khodzhi Akbar Turajonzoda told Itar-Tass in Tehran today that the town of Tavil-Dara "has been practically wiped off the face of the Earth. Hundreds of people have been killed."

Turajonzoda pointed out that during his telephone conversation with U.N. secretary general's special envoy to Tajikistan Gerd Merrem earlier today, the latter confirmed that the Tajik government has refused to resume talks on June 17.

Merrem, who is currently in Dushanbe, intends to meet Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov in the very near future to discuss this issue, he added.

The Tajik Foreign Ministry sent the U.N. observer mission an official note on June 11 to confirm that the government continues to favour the earliest possible resumption of the work of a joint commission set up to enforce the implementation of the Tehran ceasefire agreement both in the republic and on the Afghan border.

The government also assured the opposition that it will ensure the security of its members on the commission.

It noted that the halt in the commission's work was caused by large-scale hostile actions by the Tajik opposition in some districts of the Pamir region which were condemned by the U.N. Security Council on May 21.

Speaking about the date of a possible resumption of peace talks, presidential spokesman Zafar Saidov

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recalled that during his meeting with the Swedish ambassador on May 15, Rakhmanov confirmed that the talks will resume in the beginning of July.

The president believes that they cannot begin sooner because there is a lot of preparatory work to be done.

Tajikistan: Foreign Minister Proposes Postponing Talks With Rebels

LD1306091196 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0300 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Talbak Nazarov, foreign minister of Tajikistan and chairman of the regime's negotiating delegation, has proposed postponing the Tajik talks from 17 June until the first week of July. In response to this proposal, Professor Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, first deputy leader of the United Opposition of Tajikistan and chairman of its negotiating delegation, has said that this action is another political intrigue by [Tajik President Imomali] Rahmanov's regime.

The president is making efforts to take control of his lost areas with the support of Russian troops, particularly their air force, by the beginning of July. In that case, the ruling regime would talk from a position of strength, which would only lead to deadlock, Turajonzoda stressed.

The subject of holding the next round of the Tajik peace talks will be considered at a meeting between the UN secretary general's special envoy to Tajikistan, Dietrich Merrem, and President Rahmanov in Dushanbe today.

The opposition side is against any [word indistinct] delay to the start of the peace talks, Turajonzoda said, because the regime wants to improve its position in Tavil-Dara by means of this intrigue.

Tajikistan: Rebel Leader Asks UN Probe of 'Savage' Russian Attack

LD1306093496 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in 0300 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a message to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, Professor Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Opposition of Tajikistan, has informed him of heavy bombing in the district center of Tavil-Dara by Russian military aircraft.

The letter stresses that this savage act is unparalleled since the beginning of the conflict in the area. As a result of the heavy bombing, which took place on 11 June, dozens of houses were razed to the ground and a certain number of people were killed in the district center of Tavil-Dara.

Prof. Nuri urged a delegation of observer countries to be dispatched to investigate the Russians' savage treatment of Tavil- Dara.

Tajikistan: Saidov: No Government, Russian Air Raids on Tavil Dara

LD1306072296 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0609 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dushanbe, 13 Jun — Safar Saidov, the press secretary of Tajikistan's president, described the accusation by the leader of the Tajik opposition that government forces had bombarded Tavil Dara from the air and that the Russian Air Force had taken part in it as an invention of the first order. "Russian troops have not participated and are not participating in Tajikistan's internal conflict, including in combat operations in Tajikistan's Pamir region," he told the ITAR-TASS correspondent this morning. "The Russian Air Force was not employed in the combat operations that are taking place in this region. Russian troops maintain their neutrality and come into operation only to defend the external borders of the CIS — the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan". [passage omitted]

Tajikistan's armed forces have their own Air Force. Even though it is not very large, it has modern means of carrying out strikes both against ground and air targets, the press secretary said. However, the Tajik military refrain from carrying out air strikes so as to avoid the destruction of peaceful villages and casualties among the civilian population. The government forces act only in retaliation against operations provoked by militants of the Tajik opposition. [passage omitted]

Tajikistan: UN Envoy Says Talks With Rebels To Resume 'Early July'

LD1306101596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0842 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, Jun 13 (Interfax)—Inter-Tajik negotiations will be resumed in early July, special envoy of the U.N. Secretary General Dietrich Merrem, who leads the U.N. Observers Mission in Tajikistan, told journalists in Dushanbe on Thursday after a meeting with the Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov.

The meeting was held behind closed doors. The two men discussed the development of events in Tajikistan. Rakhmonov said that during the new round of talks the two sides will have to agree primarily on ways to ensure full compliance with their agreement on temporary cease-fire.

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Rakhmonov and Merrem also discussed the possibility of resuming the work of the joint commission on monitoring compliance with the agreement on cease-fire, which represents the Tajik government and the opposition.

According to Merrem, the Tajik leadership guarantees the safety of commission members, and the U.N. Observers Mission will give comprehensive aid in promoting the commission's work.

During their meeting with him on Wednesday, Merrem said, the opposition leaders promised "to appoint their representatives to the commission in the next few days."

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Armenia

Armenia: Armenia, Russia Discuss Border Forces' Cooperation

LD1306103196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1002 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, June 13 (Interfax) — Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Eduard Zuloyan and Deputy Commander of Russian Border Forces Aleksandr Manilov discussed cooperation between Armenia's and Russia's border forces in Yerevan on June 13.

The parties also considered the joint work of the border missions of the two countries, the press center of Armenia's Foreign Ministry told Interfax.

The press center did not reveal details of the conversation.

Russian border guards stationed in Armenia guard the borders of this republic with Iran and Turkey.

Armenia: Deputy Foreign Minister Receives Russian Commander Manilov

NC1206203896 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Eduard Zuloyan on 12 June received General Aleksandr Manilov, deputy commander of the Russian Border Troops, who is in Yerevan on a working visit.

During their conversations, they discussed prospective matters relating to cooperation between the Armenian and Russian border troops, as well as issues relating to joint work carried out by the two countries' border troops liaison offices.

General Levon Stepanyan, commander of the Armenian Border Troops, was present at the meeting.

Armenia: Communist Leader Tells Congress Ready for Power 'Takeover'

NC1206125896 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1200 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, June 11 (NOYAN TAPAN)—The 32nd congress of the Communist Party of Armenia took place on June 9. It was attended by 334 of the 345 elected delegates. A member of the Russian Communist Party's Presidium, State Duma deputy Mikhail Surkov, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, deputy of the Supreme Council Peter Simonenko, Secretary of United Communist Party of Georgia Wilhelm Maharadze, political advisers of the Russian and Chinese embassies and various political organizations were also invited to attend the congress.

In his speech the First Secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee Sergey Badalyan, noted that the Communist Party is entering a new historical phase — this phase is marked with the takeover of political power. According to him, in order to end the current crisis, Armenia needs a party which can unite the people around a program of national importance. He said that the Armenian All-National Movement has brought the country to the brink of national disaster. The national economy was "kicked back" to 40-50 years ago. Under the disguise of privatization, robbery has reached shameful limits, the system of education is under threat of deterioration and emigration has reached almost 1 million people, said Badalyan. The Communist leader said that instead of democracy "a system of police-governed authority has been formed in the republic." Reporting that the Communist Party recognizes its role in the political life of the country, he said that they were ready to cooperate with other political forces.

"We do not aspire to govern alone and we are ready to establish a coalition government of the people," said the Second Secretary of the Communist Party Darbinyan. He noted that whether the national disaster in Armenia will be aggravated or not, solely depends on the outcome of the forthcoming presidential elections. Emphasizing the necessity for radical changes in the state political structures, Darbinyan said that the current leadership's policy is pro-Western and pro-Turkish. According to him, the authorities are ready to use the lowest measures to stay in power. They scare the people with mass persecutions if the Communists come to power, they say that the economy will be returned to stagnation. According to Darbinyan, we need to give the power back to the people, pay special attention to the rural areas, and reconsider the current taxation policies. He also noted that the Communist Party supports businessmen, but believes that enterprises of strategic importance must belong to the nation, and Armenia and Karabakh should be equal subjects in the new independent state. Darbinyan negatively evaluated the establishment of the Communist Party of Workers of Armenia and said it was done on orders of dark powers in Armenia and abroad. On the other hand, he said this has allowed their party to get rid of the traitors.

Member of the Russian Communist Party's Presidium, Surkov, also spoke at the congress. Touching upon the forthcoming presidential elections in Russia, he said that according to public opinion polls held in 47 regions, in 37 of the regions, people gave preference to the First Secretary of the Communist Party Gennadiy Zyuganov. According to him, the devastating impact of Yeltsin's reforms exceeds by 7-fold the aftermath of the war. Saying that they are dealing with a regime that is ready

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to do everything to keep its power, Surkov said that the Communist Party will do everything to gain back the power. "We hope that we will celebrate victory together, we in Russia and you in Armenia," Surkov said.

The congress unanimously adopted a resolution to nominate Sergey Badalyan as the Communist party candidate in the up-coming presidential elections.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Black Sea Economic Cooperation Meeting Begins in Baku

LD1206152696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1244 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Viktor Shulman]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, June 12 (Itar-Tass) — A two-day session of the Parliamentary Assembly for economic cooperation in the Black Sea region started today its work in the Azerbaijan capital Baku. The agenda to be discussed includes setting up of the regional bank for trade and development, combining efforts of the Black Sea region countries in fighting organised crime.

Parliamentarians from 11 countries, Russia included, have come out with proposals aimed at creating proper conditions for cooperation in the domain of economy, transport, environmental protection, science and education, humanitarian field. According to the participants in the forum, to create such conditions means to turn the region into a flourishing zone of peace and stability.

Azerbaijan: Moves Said Being Made To Transfer Part of Black Sea Fleet

NC1306073796 Baku TURAN in English 1700 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow/12.06.96/TURAN— It became known from the sources in the Head-quarter of the Military-Navy Fleet of Russia, that a draft of the decree is being prepared according to which some parts of the Black sea fleet will be transferred to Astrakhan to the Caspian Fleet of Russia. The talk is about border troops and subdivisions of the shore-guard which are to be reduced in the Black sea. Together with the military units rear troops will also be transferred to Astrakhan.

Russian military sources consider that the Caspian Fleet, the head-quarter of which is located in Astrakhan, occupies an important place in the southern flank of Russia.

The same sources note that turning the Caspian into the water basin, Moscow is taking measures for reinforcing of water borders on the part of Azerbaijan. In this respect, not only navy but land and air units of the Caspian fleet entering the regional defence sector take part in reinforcing the borders.

Thus, even in January 1996 a moto-maneuver group of Nikel [as published] border division (from the Arctic group of border troops), consisting of 200 people, was transferred for this purpose to the Dagestani part of the border.

Military sources report about works for re-equipment of the Astrakhan military port and modernisation of the shore infrastructure. In addition to the task on the defence of southern borders of Russia, the Caspian fleet should border the water basin itself — the Caspian sea.

Border offshore infrastructure includes a shore line with length 1,150 kilometres (territories of Dagestan, Kalmikia and Astrakhan) and well as rear regions and strategic highways: Astrakhan-Elista-Rostov, Astrakhan-Volgograd, Astrakhan-Makhachkala, Makhachkala Stavropol-Krasnodar which connects whole southern Russia into a single military and transport system.

According to military sources, the first to be reduced are the units of the Black sea fleet dislocated in the village Novoozernyy of the Crimea military-navy base (Donuzlav). Just part of forces and means of this military basis should be transferred to Astrakhan. According to the information it includes military and helping ships of different ranges, rocket boats, land forces ships, supply bases, warehouses for keeping ammunition and military property.

Reduction of the 126-th division of the shore guard should be carried out till the end of this year. A group of officers with military technique of this unit have already been withdrawn from the Crimea and was re-dislocated to Astrakhan.

Military specialists note that active transference of the units of the Black sea to the Caspian can start after signing of the Major Political Agreement on the Black sea fleet between Kiev and Moscow. However, it will bring about sharp violation of the military balance in the Caspian in Russia's favour. As a result, the border control of Russia onshore and offshore will become more tough.

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Azerbaijan: Azeri, Russian Officials Pledge To Advance Relations

LD1206204496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1829 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Sevindzh Abdullayeva, Pavel Kuznetsov and Viktor Shulman]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, June 12 (Itar-Tass) — Azerbaijan and Russia agreed on Wednesday that relations between them have invigorated lately and accumulated the necessary potential for further growth, according to a communique signed by Azerbaijani parliament speaker Rasul Guliyev and State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev who is in Baku on a visit as head of a parliamentary delegation.

Speaking at a press conference, Seleznev noted that Russian parliamentarians will do their best to settle the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Asked whether the Soviet Union could be restored in one form or another, Seleznev said that "any unions can be born only by the will of people expressed through a referendum."

No one can force a country to join a union. This is a voluntary process based on reasonable economic and political integration, he said.

Azerbaijan: Russia's Seleznev Says Mutalibov Extradition Still Open

LD1306100296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0910 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, June 13 (Interfax) — The issue of the extradition of Azerbaijan's ex-president, Ayaz Mutalibov, to Baku remains open, Russian State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev told a news conference on the results of his visit to Azerbaijan in Baku on Wednesday.

Moscow believes that the Azerbaijani prosecution has not presented sufficient proof of Mutalibov's guilt required for his extradition, he said.

As soon as Russia receives additional materials, the Prosecutor General's Office will reopen this affair, Seleznev said.

Mutalibov was detained in Moscow on April 12 this year, but he was released on May 13.

Baku charges Mutalibov with having organized mass disturbances and attempted to seize power. The Azerbaijani authorities also blame Mutalibov for having surrendered population centers in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone to Armenian troops in the spring of 1992. When Mutalibov was detained, he had a heart attack, and was taken to a hospital in Moscow, where he stayed until his release.

Seleznev and the speaker of Azerbaijan's parliament, Rasul Guliyev, signed a communique Wednesday on expanding ties between the two parliaments. The head of the Azerbaijani parliament's secretariat, Safar Mirzoyev, told Interfax that the condemnation of separatism and terrorism expressed in the document is the most important for Azerbaijan.

The State Duma delegation, which had come to Baku to attend the 7th plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly for Economic Cooperation in the Black Sea Area, left Baku on Wednesday.

Georgia

Georgia: Shevardnadze, Germany's Herzog Discuss Relations, Issues

LD1206191896 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1500 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgian and German delegations today held talks at the Blue Hall of the presidential residence. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze noted the great significance of German experience during the drafting of the constitution and other important Georgian laws. He recalled his visit to Bonn and spoke about cultural ties between the two countries. He noted that many young Georgians are studying in Germany and will later use their experience for the benefit of Georgia. He discussed prospects for the Eurasian corridor and relations between Georgia and German business, especially the Siemens company.

In his speech, German President Roman Herzog said that his visit is confirmation of the fact that Georgia will always remain within the sphere of German interest. He said that Germany wants peace and stability to be restored to Georgia and the Caucasus generally.

Later today, German President Roman Herzog and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze held a news conference.

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] The fact that Georgia has managed to withstand a devilishly hard test and overcome internal unrest, civil wars, and so on, is very much due to the support of the Federal Republic of Germany and its leadership. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The Georgian president went on to discuss the importance of the current visit and said that an agreement has been signed providing for the allocation to Georgia of a long-term credit worth 50 million German marks for the rehabilitation of the Georgian energy sector. The visit marks a new stage in

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strengthening relations between Germany and Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze said at the end of his speech.

German President Roman Herzog expressed gratitude for an exceptionally warm reception, and said that Germany will always be among Georgia's friends.

The two presidents then answered correspondents' questions.

Georgia: Germany To Give Georgia Long-Term DM50 Million Credit

LD1206140796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1212 GMT 12 Jun 96

[By Tenghiz Pachkoria]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, June 12 (Itar-Tass) — Germany intends to give a long-term credit of DM 50 million to Georgia to reconstruct its state power grids, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze told the journalists at a press conference he held on Wednesday in Tbilisi together with German President Roman Herzog, now in Georgia on an official visit.

The German President told the media representatives that a number of well-known German companies had allocated funds to provide a group of Georgian students and specialists to work and study in German educational establishments and research institutions with financial support.

Georgia: CFE Quotas To Be Exchanged With Russia for Military Aid

MK1306095896 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Dmitriy Gornostayev, Nodar Broladze: "Tbilisi Is Helping Its Ally. Some Quotas Under CFE Treaty To Go to Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Text by Dmitriy Gornostayev] A sensational information came yesterday from Tbilisi: The Georgian Defense Ministry has agreed to give Russia half of its quotas under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This decision, should it be approved by the Georgian parliament and President Eduard Shevardnadze, will permit Russia to augment the number of its armed fighting vehicles and artillery systems in the Caucasus, which has been a serious problem for Moscow as an object of controversy between the Russian Federation and other participants in the CFE Treaty — above all the United States and other NATO countries.

It can be supposed right now that a rise in the quota of Russian armaments on the southern flank will provoke extreme displeasure of Turkey and, possibly, other NATO members.

Under the CFE Treaty, Georgia can have 220 tanks, 220 armored fighting vehicles, 285 artillery systems, 110 warplanes, and 50 helicopters. At present, Tbilisi has only a part of this arsenal. The remaining share of quotas will be given to the Russian Federation in exchange for delivery of Russian armaments to Georgia. True, the opposition National Democratic Party of Georgia has already voiced its harsh protest against such agreements and has urged the parliamentarians to block this decision.

[Text by Nodar Broladze] The question about who should possess armaments and in what amounts will probably continue to remain a burning issue over the CIS expanse for many years to come. This problem, usually accompanied by various caustic controversies, in the Russian-Georgian relations has thus far been solved with a considerable ease, driving out excessive dramatization in favor of strategic sober-mindedness.

For instance, the quotas of Georgian military equipment are being discussed only within the framework of agreements envisioned by the treaty on military cooperation between Russia and Georgia, which, as is known, has already been initialed by defense minister of the two countries: Pavel Grachev and Vardiko Nadibaidze. In accordance with international agreements, Georgia has the right to have a certain amount of military equipment on its territory. Tengiz Gogotishvili, deputy head of the Georgian Defense Ministry, said that had Georgia had funds to purchase itself as many tanks as it needed to bring their number to 220 in accordance with the quota allowed on its territory, in this case, under the effective international agreements, Russia would have had to pull its military equipment out of Georgia as superfluous. Therefore, Moscow, pursuing its interests in Transcaucasia, has asked that the Georgian side give it a part of its quotas so that Georgia could provide its troops on this territory with sufficient armaments.

In other words, at issue is the transfer to Russia of about half of these quotas — on condition that should an urgent need emerge, the equipment will be returned to Georgia on its first request. The Russian side, in its turn, pledges to give it back precisely at an agreed time in acceptable condition and in quantities specified by the Georgian military agency. Finally, it is also important that Russia pledges to replenish the Georgian army with military equipment after the signing of the treaty on military cooperation. Say, whereas now Georgia has in service no more than 100 tanks, after this document comes into force legally, the Russian Defense Ministry will hand over to Georgia the remaining portion of

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authorized equipment. All this can possibly happen, however, not earlier than Georgia restores its territorial integrity, since the official Tbilisi, as is known, in view of the current situation, is forced to link the question of the military presence of Russia with a full restoration of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Georgia: Commentary Examines Relations With Armenia

AU1306110896 Tbilisi REZONANSI in Georgian 5 Jun 96 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Zurab Chiamurashvili: "Armenia Does Not Want To Live in the 'Common Caucasian Home' — the Situation in the Region Is Pushing It Precisely Toward This"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation of qualitatively new relations in the Caucasus began. The supposition that the religious factor would result in close integration between Georgia and Armenia, while Azerbaijan would be "cast aside" has not been justified. The West's arrival in the region and economic interests have abruptly changed the situation.

Armenia has been left out of the Caspian oil route. As a result of the conflict in Karabakh, its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain tense. Yerevan also has interests on the territory of Georgia (the Armenian diaspora in Javakheti and Abkhazia) but, as Vartan Grigorian, commentator for GOLOS ARMENII, points out, it is forced to maintain normal relations with Tbilisi. The reason is clear: From the point of view of transport communications, Armenia is largely dependent upon Georgia.

Official Yerevan has been trying for a long time now to reduce the quality of its dependence upon Georgia. If its "flirtation" with Russia can be explained by military interests, Armenia is interested in "good-neighborly relations" with Iran precisely from the point of view of communications. However, in conditions of a rapprochement between Moscow and Teheran, to all intents and purposes, Yerevan becomes dependent upon only one side.

Who are the other sides? The West and, in its satellite region, Turkey, Georgia, which have recently drawn fairly close toward the latter, and Azerbaijan. However, Georgia cannot be placed so firmly in this second bloc. In the first place, it is possible that Tbilisi, like Yerevan, will concede its military quotas to Moscow and legalize the [Russian] military bases on its territory. Second, Abkhazia continues to remain a lever for the Kremlin. Incidentally, the fact that Armenia has not condemned Abkhazian separatism is not conditioned solely by the support of a part of the Armenian population for the Gudauta regime. In that case, Yerevan would in no way have been able to justify the war in Karabakh. This viewpoint is confirmed by the fact that Armenia also did not express active support for Georgia's central government during the time of the conflict in so-called South Ossetia.

In contrast to Azerbaijan, Armenia gave a cold response to Eduard Shevardnadze's "peaceful Caucasus" initiative as this envisages an increase in the influence of Turkey and not Russia or Iran in the Caucasus. The increase in Turkish influence is conditioned by the fact that the oil pipeline and the bringing into operation of the whole "Eurasian bridge" becomes a guarantee of peace and stability in the region. Moreover, it is not by chance that one sees the following type of headline in the Armenian press: "Turkey's Relations With Its Neighboring Countries Are Deteriorating Further." However, it is only the well-known historical relations between Turkey and Greece that are under discussion in this article.

In spite of the existing doubts and disagreements, Armenia and Georgia should take into account that good-neighborly relations between them will be far more advantageous for both countries than enmity and rivalry. It is not excluded that, in order to "remove" Armenia from under the influence of Russia and Iran, the West will use the same method as in Azerbaijan and Georgia, namely establish important communications through its territory.

Running an oil pipeline through Armenia appeals to Russia as it hopes that it will control this route. Russia's military bases in Armenia would seem to guarantee this. However, in that case, the Karabakh problem will also arise. In response to Armenia's fragile position, Turkey's attitude is clear and unambiguous. It is less likely that whoever controls the pipeline in the West will actually want to fall out with Turkey and Azerbaijan on account of Armenia. Turkey and, correspondingly, its favorable disposition [toward the West] have been a key priority for the West for a long time now in the whole region.

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Georgia: Official Views Dismissal of Abkhazian Ministers

AU1206140396 Tbilisi AKHALI TAOBA in Georgian 6 Jun 96 pp 1, 2

[Report by ALIONI, IBERIA: "Why Ardzinba Dismissed His Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with an order from Abkhazian separatist leader Vladislav Ardzinba, Defense Minister Sultan Sosnaliyev and Interior Minister Givi Agrba have been released from their posts. Vladimir Mikanba, who held the post of vice president of the republic and, at the same time, was in charge of defense issues, has been appointed the new minister of defense. The new minister of internal affairs is Aleksandre Kchach, who was former head of Ardzinba's security service. According to a representative of the Abkhazian government, the reason for Agrba's release was "unsatisfactory work," while Sosnaliyev's removal is connected with "his family situation."

Vladimer Arshba, who commanded the operation that resulted in the taking of Gagra in October 1992, has been appointed new head of staff of the Abkhazian Armed Forces.

An IBERIA correspondent spoke with Deputy Parliament Chairman Vakhtang Qolbaia about the changes made by Ardzinba in his cadres policy. In the view of Vakhtang Qolbaia, what deserves attention is the fact that Sosnaliyev, in his capacity as so-called defense minister, was unable to be in Abkhazia. According to Qolbaia, as is clear, Ardzinba took the decision as he thought that a local person would be able to strengthen the defense capability of the so-called republic better. It is also not excluded that a political confrontation arose between Ardzinba and Sosnaliyev regarding the Chechen problem.

As regards the dismissal of Givi Agrba from his post as head of Abkhazia's so-called Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vakhtang Qolbaia cannot understand this as Givi Agrba had been coping splendidly with the task given to him by the separatist authorities. He had conducted punitive operations on the territory of Gali with particular "honor." According to V. Qolbaia, what gave rise to Givi Agrba's dismissal was the worsening crime situation in Abkhazia. The territory of Abkhazia has turned into an oasis for the unbridled activities of bandit groups and the narcotics business and there are clashes of interests between local clans and newcomers.

From what Vakhtang Qolbaia has said, it is clear that, against the background of all this, it has become necessary for Vladislav Ardzinba, the so-called president of the Republic of Abkhazia, to summon an extraordinary session at which the cadres changes that have been made and other issues will be discussed.

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Latvia

Latvia: President Rejects 'Common Security System' With Russia

WS1306081096 Tallinn BNS in English 1607 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jun 12, BNS — Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis reiterated Wednesday that the Baltic country has no intentions to build a common security system with Russia.

"We cannot have any common security systems with Moscow," the president said on the state radio when asked to comment on a respective initiative of a Russian parliament member.

As reported, Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament) foreign affairs committee head Vladimir Lukin suggested that Russia offer security guarantees to the Baltics and set up a collective security system with the Baltic states and NATO.

"It is an axiom that each country (...) chooses its security policies by itself," Ulmanis said.

During their upcoming trip to the United States, the presidents of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will touch on Russian plans to increase the concentration of conventional weapons at the Latvian and Estonian border, Ulmanis said.

"We still have not received a clearcut answer from the United States and Russia to why it has happened," the president said.

Latvia: Foreign Ministry Says Russia Trying To Discredit Baltics

LD1206224096 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 1900 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Latvian Foreign Ministry says some members of the Russian Parliament, the Duma, are trying to discredit the Baltic states.

The Latvian Foreign Ministry stated on Tuesday that these Russian lawmakers use Russia's membership in the Council of Europe to exert political pressure on the neighboring countries. That was Latvia's response to a recent statement of the head of the Russian delegation at the Council of Europe, Vladimir Lukin. Mr. Lukin wrote a letter to the president of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, expressing concern over alleged obstacles for Russian citizens to vote in the Russian presidential elections in the Baltics.

Last week the Russian parliament urged the OSCE and the Council of Europe to demand that Latvia and Estonia open additional polling stations for Russian citizens residing there.

According to the statement of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, Latvia has allowed Russia to open an extra polling station on the territory of the radar base in Skrunda. The Latvian Foreign Ministry is convinced that Russia has not used all possibilities to organize the elections more efficiently.

Voting constituencies for Russian citizens will be opened in the Latvian cities Riga, Liepaja, and Daugavpils.

Latvia: Government To Allocate More Resources to Defense Needs

LD1206213396 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 2000 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At its itinerant session in Adazi today, the government in principle supported amendments to this year's budget, providing more funding allocation for defense requirements. A draft on this has been submitted to the government by Defense Ministry chiefs. Before the itinerant session, the government visited several military sites. Navy Commander Gaidis Zeibots, talking to the prime minister and to ministers at the central naval region's base at Bolderaja, acknowledged that because of a lack of technical equipment and ships, the navy is not at present fully able to execute its tasks. According to Zeibots, in port at present are more than 40 high-speed motor yachts, both registered and unregistered, which do not meet the requirements of the port security and traffic service. They have been moved around without consultation with the port about their routes, thus creating a hazard at sea. Prime Minister Andris Skele remarked to the navy commander that such arbitrariness is not permissible. [passage omitted]

Latvia: Border Guards Chief Indignant Over Dismissal

LD1206205196 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Passages in quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Leonids Lasmanis, former commander of the Border Guard troops, held a news conference today to inform journalists about the possible reasons for his dismissal. Taking part in the news conference was our correspondent Ainars Asaks:

[Asaks] Leonids Lasmanis asserted that right up to this moment the defense minister and the commander of the National Armed Forces [NBS] have not presented him with the order, by request of the State president, dismissing him from his post. Lasmanis found out about it while at the Lithuanian-Polish border, where he was working with the Baltic Assembly group on

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border issues. Leonids Lasmanis expressed amazement that such a decision was made even before an official investigation had begun, without even establishing the actual circumstances of the case.

In his opinion, it is a settling of scores, or even by order of some political force — exactly which one, Lasmanis declined to say.

[Lasmanis] "Well, let's leave that aside until the full details are revealed, but (?some information could be put forward). Anyway there is enough information."

[Asaks] Lasmanis added that the Defense Ministry and the NBS have been in conflict with the Border Guards forces for a long time, as an attempt was made to dismiss him from his post even during the time of Maris Gailis, former premier and defense minister. Now the disappearance of these 13 Kalashnikov-type submachine guns is being presented as the biggest crime of recent years. Lasmanis thinks there have been worse crimes, in which, for various reasons, soldiers of the Interior Ministry and Defense structures have lost their lives. Yet the leadership has got off scot-free for these events. Lasmanis went on to stress that politicians may not appoint and dismiss the commanders of the Border Guard forces.

In his opinion, that is the prerogative of the Saeima. Lasmanis ventured the possibility that he will go into politics in the future, so as to be able to say what he has not been able to say so far.

[Lasmanis] "(?We might well ask) why the NBS commander was not dismissed. He (?is still at his post). Why was the minister not dismissed? And ultimately why has Ulmanis not resigned? He is the commander-in-chief. (?And what will happen) if these weapons are found and it turns out that they didn't disappear at all? The men who are connected with the weapons, (?who are responsible, have to be caught) and they won't like it, and then they'll start to talk."

[Announcer] The state president expressed the view to Latvian radio that the commander of the Border Guards will be able to continue at his work if the investigation does not prove his guilt.

[Ulmanis] "After long and stormy — definitely long — talks, I demanded that the commander of the Border Guards must be dismissed by the end of the official investigation. And after the official investigation is conducted, the final decision will be made on who is guilty and who must be punished. [Words indistinct] people are already under arrest, and in the case of the investigation, perhaps there are even people listening to my speech who took part in the theft of these sub-machine guns, then it would be of the greatest satisfaction both to Latvia and to many people if these people would come to their senses and return these submachine guns. This was not a theft (?from outside) or a break-in. And what is regrettable is that we cannot at present establish when these guns were taken, what numbers these guns had, nor establish the total number of guns in the store. It is scandalously irresponsible, and if necessary (?not a single official will be allowed to leave)."

Lithuania

Lithuania: Lithuanian Diplomats, U.S. Officials Discuss CFE Amendments

LD1206201796 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 1900 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lithuanian diplomats have continued consultations with high-ranking American officials about the talks on amending the treaty on Conventional arms in Europe. [as heard; should be Conventional Forces in Europe]

Lithuanian Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Alfonsas Eidintas, met an under secretary of the State Department, Lynn Davis, who is the main negotiator of the United States in talks on the arms limitation agreement. Mr. Eidintas said he stressed during the meeting Lithuania's desire to hold consultations in the future.

According to Mr. Eidintas, the Americans explained to him the so-called secret agreement which is causing the greatest concern in the Baltic states. Ms. Davis said the document dealt only with technical matters and did not concern the interests of the Baltic states.

The amendment in question may allow Russia to concentrate more military hardware along its borders with the Baltic countries. Asked how the deteriorating Baltic security could be compensated for in this case, the ambassador said the best compensation would be membership in NATO. He added, however, that that was hardly possible at the moment. Mr. Eidintas said many forms of compensation could be foreseen, such as political, economic, military, or expanded cooperation. He also mentioned the involvement of Lithuania in the Western defense process.

Lithuania: President Views Possible Steps To Join NATO

WS1106081896 Vilnius ELTA in English 1908 GMT 10 Jun 96

[From "News Bulletin" No.1028]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, June 10 (ELTA) — Lithuania's cooperation with Poland, especially in the

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field of security, as well as formation of Baltic, battalion, Lithuanian-Polish battalion and Polish-Ukrainian battalion could be the steps which could be supported by the U.S.A. for Lithuania striving to join NATO.

Such was the opinion of Vytautas Landsbergis, Homeland Union's (Lithuanian Conservatives) leader, who spoke at news conference on Monday about the NATO enlargement project sent to U.S. Congress.

Landsbergis noted that "we could be insufficiently satisfied with the fact that Lithuania is not among the countries to be admitted to NATO." He mentioned Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, first of all to enter NATO, than goes Slovakia and other states, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Landsbergis noted the necessity to apply principle in the project stressing the opinion of the U.S.Congress that the United States should support and facilitate the Baltic states way to NATO in order that security and economic stability of this region were promoted.

He also said Lithuania should rely upon efforts of not only Lithuanian diplomats but also of emigrees in order that Lithuania found itself closer to the group of three leading NATO candidates and became the fourth one in the line.

"Our conditions absolutely coincide with the Polish geopolitical, border and other conditions," Landsbergis said.

Landsbergis criticized document signed by Lithuanian president that "idnividual steps are absolutely needless, all the steps should be made together with northern neighbours."

In his opinion, coordination and solidarity are good things, but individual steps are also possible.

"Estonia is better prepared and could make faster progress to join European Union... and if there is a real possibility to do so, no artificial barriers should be built," Landsbergis said.

Lithuania: Vilnius Rejects Moscow's Proposals on Security Guarantees

LD1106215796 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia's ideas with regard the so-called security guarantees to the Baltic states are unacceptable to Lithuania because Lithuania has already made its choice to integrate into Western structures, diplomats in Vilnius say in reaction to Russia's attempts to postpone the expansion of NATO.

Lithuania is aware of the ideas entertained by some Russian politicians concerning the so-called security guarantees to the Baltic states. However, these ideas are unacceptable because Lithuania has already decided to integrate into Western structures, diplomats in Vilnius say.

According to a high-ranking official at the Foreign Ministry, Lithuania does not question its choice and this choice remains clear — integration into the European Union and NATO, therefore proposals of security guarantees coming from Moscow are unacceptable to Lithuania.

The diplomat was referring to the statement made by Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the international affairs committee of the Russian Duma, that Moscow was prepared to start negotiations with the Baltic states and NATO on a joint security system. In an interview to SN SEVODNYA, Lukin maintains that Russia does not pose a threat to the Baltic states. However, if the Baltic states were apprehensive, they could be granted extra guarantees.

We see the expansion [of NATO] not as a matter of fear but to the contrary, as a matter of strengthening stability in the region in which Russia should also be interested, the diplomat in Vilnius told BNS.

Concerning the proposal voiced by Vladimir Lukin to gradually increase the powers of countries, associate members of NATO, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry official said that as far as we know, decisions on NATO expansion are passed in Brussels and not in Moscow.

Lithuania: Extra Polling Station To Be Opened for Russian Elections

LD1206212296 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 1900 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry has permitted Russia to open one more polling station in Lithuania for the oncoming Russian presidential elections.

The voting station will be opened in Visaginas, the town of the Ignalina nuclear plant. The absolute majority of the town's population are Russians, some of them citizens of Russia.

Lithuanian officials say this is a political step of goodwill because Lithuania is aware of the significance of the Russian presidential elections for the democratic processes in that country.

According to international conventions, Russia has the right to open its polling stations in its diplomatic missions.

The Russian citizens in Lithuania will be able to vote at the Russian Embassy in Vilnius, at the Russian

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Consulate in Klaipeda, and in Visaginas after the Foreign Ministry has issued a permission.

Lithuania: Polish Foreign Minister Views Bilateral Relations

WS1306081296 Tallinn BNS in English 1312 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Jun 12, BNS — Poland's Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati said the Lithuanian-Polish relations are developing in a good way and downplayed claims by the Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action (PEA) about allegedly worsening situation of Polish national minority as ungrounded.

Rosati voiced the position in response to an question by Polish lawmakers last week, head of the Lithuania's parliamentary Lithuanian-Polish group Vytautas Pleckaitis said.

A delegation of Lithuanian MPs visited Poland last week and met with their counterparts from Poland's parliamentary Polish-Lithuanian group.

Pleckaitis, a Social Democratic MP, said at a news conference on Tuesday many influential Polish lawmakers "are making politics" out of this bias information from the radical PEA they receive.

Vytautas Bogusis, a Christian Democratic MP, said the intensified statements on alleged violations of Polish minority in Lithuania reflect the pre-electoral sentiments which are gaining momentum in Poland.

The Lithuanian and Polish parliamentary groups agreed at the meeting that the interstate relations between the two countries are developing in a normal way. The lawmakers, however, noted problems experienced in the field of national minorities' education.

Vilnius is particularly dissatisfied with the situation in respect of Lithuanians' education in Poland which has failed to publish a single textbook for Lithuanian schools. Around 170 to 180 Polish textbooks are published in Lithuania annually.

Lithuania, however, should also direct more attention to the region in the eastern Lithuania with a large Polish population Pleckaitis said.

First of all, efforts are needed while preparing teachers of the Lithuanian language and literature for Polish schools.

Lithuania: Prime Minister Announces Rise in Energy Prices

LD1206221396 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Speaking on state television today, Prime Minister Mindaugas Stankevicius expressed his satisfaction that the Litimpeks bank has resumed its activity, and expressed the hope that the problem of the Lithuanian Joint Stock Innovation bank [LAIB] would also be solved. [passage omitted]

The current situation in the power engineering sector was described by Mindaugas Stankevicius as a very important issue. [passage omitted] A decision was made today by the government to increase the prices for thermal energy on average by 25 percent. The price for hot water will go up from 1t July and for heating of people's homes from the start of the heating season late in the fall.

Announcing the price increase for heating people's homes, the prime minister stressed once again that people below the poverty line will be taken care of first of all. The prime minister also spoke about reforms in the power engineering system.

Mindaugas Stankevicius said that prior to making this decision, he held consultations with prominent Lithuanian economists and former heads of government. They were unanimous in the opinion that although the decision is not popular, it must be made. A heavy burden can only be born jointly, Prime Minister Mindaugas Stankevicius concluded.

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